Paul Formosa

Patriotism: Philosophical and Political Perspectives

Primoratz, Igor and Pavkovic, Aleksandar, eds, Patriotism: Philosophical and Political Perspectives, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007, pp. viii + 241, £55 (cloth). This is an important and diverse edited c...

Papers, Please and the systemic approach to engaging ethical expertise in videogames

Papers, Please, by Lucas Pope (2013), explores the story of a customs inspector in the fictional political regime of Arstotzka. In this paper we explore the stories, systems and moral themes of Papers, Please in order to illustrate the systemic approach to designing videogames for moral engagement. Next, drawing on the Four Component model of ethical expertise from moral psychology, we contrast this systemic approach with the more common scripted approach. We conclude by demonstrating the different strengths and weaknesses that these two approaches have when it comes to designing videogames that engage the different aspects of a player’s moral expertise.

Kant on the highest moral-physical good : the social aspect of Kant's moral philosophy

In §88, entitled ‘On the highest moral-physical good’, in his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (hereafter Anthropology for short), Kant argues that ‘good living’ (physical good) and ‘true humanity’ (moral good) best harmonize in a ‘good meal in good company’. The conversation and company shared over a meal, Kant argues, best provides for the ‘union of social good living with virtue’ in a way that promotes ‘true humanity’. This occurs when the inclination to ‘good living’ is not merely kept within the bounds of ‘the law of virtue’ but where the two achieve a graceful harmony. As such, it is not to be confused with Kants well-known account of the ‘highest good’, happiness in proportion to virtue. But how is it that the humble dinner party and the associated practices of hospitality come to hold such an important, if often unrecognized, place as the highest moral-physical good in Kants thought? This question is in need of further investigation. Of the most recent studies in English that have taken seriously the importance of Kants Anthropology for understanding his wider moral philosophy, very few have considered §88 in any depth. This paper aims to help bridge this signifcant gap in the literature.

Morality Play: A Model for Developing Games of Moral Expertise

According to cognitive psychologists, moral decision-making is a dual-process phenomenon involving two types of cognitive processes: explicit reasoning and implicit intuition. Moral development involves training and integrating both types of cognitive processes through a mix of instruction, practice, and reflection. Serious games are an ideal platform for this kind of moral training, as they provide safe spaces for exploring difficult moral problems and practicing the skills necessary to resolve them. In this article, we present Morality Play, a model for the design of serious games for ethical expertise development based on the Integrative Ethical Education framework from moral psychology and the Lens of the Toy model for serious game design.

Kant on Education and evil—Perfecting human beings with an innate propensity to radical evil

Kant begins his Lectures on Pedagogy by stating, ‘[t]he human being is the only creature that must be educated’ (Kant, 2007, 9:441), and he argues that it is through education that we can transform...

Evil, virtue, and education in Kant

Abstract For Kant, we cannot understand how to approach moral education without confronting the radical evil of humanity. But if we start out, as Kant thinks we do, from a morally corrupt state, how can we make moral progress? In response, I explore in this paper Kant’s gradualist and revolutionary accounts of moral progress. These differing accounts of progress raise two key questions in the literature: are these accounts compatible and which type of progress comes first? Against other views in the literature, I argue that gradual progress through a change of mores must come first and can gradually lead toward, as its ideal endpoint, a revolution in our disposition (or a change of heart) and the overthrowing of our radical evil. This has important implications for moral pedagogy.

Playing Around With Morality

This special issue of Games and Culture focuses on the intersection between video games and ethics. This introduction briefly sets out the key research questions in the research field and identifies trends in the articles included in this special issue.

Means, Ends, and Persons: The Meaning and Psychological Dimensions of Kant's Humanity Formula, by Robert Audi

Audi seeks to develop an ethics of conduct that focuses on treating persons as ends and not as mere means. While this approach has its roots in Kant’s ethics, Audi seeks to develop it independently of Kant. We treat others merely as a means when we treat them as having only an instrumental value as a means to our end and we are not disposed to treat them differently. For example, I stop to ask a person for directions. I treat her, like a map, only as an instrument to my end. But after fulfilling her role as a means, she starts to choke. If I am disposed to help her, I have used her solely as a means. If I am not so disposed, I have used her merely as a means. This is prima facie wrong, since I thereby treat the good of this person as having only an instrumental worth. We treat others as ends by caring about their good for its own sake in act, motive, and manner. When a mother feeds her baby out of love and with care, she treats her baby as an end. Whereas a mother who feeds her baby hurriedly, in order to get some quiet, fails to treat her baby as an end, since she performs the right act-type but her motive and manner are instrumental. Failing to treat others as an end is not, however, always prima facie wrong. Two points of difference with Kant are worth noting. First, Kant focuses on treating persons as rational agents whose possible consent must always be sought. In contrast, Audi focuses on treating persons as having an objective good about which we should care. While for Audi a person’s consent plays an important part in determining a person’s good, it does not completely determine this in the way that it does for (some) Kantians. This raises problems for Audi in regards to paternalism, problems that Kantians can avoid. Second, Kantians focus on respect for dignity as a rational motive on which we can (if we are rational) always act. Audi, in contrast, relies on motives that may or may not be present, such as love for others. When we lack such motives we can’t treat others as ends, and so for Audi moral worth is not the ever-present possibility that it is for Kantians.