Paul K. Moser

Philosophy After Objectivity: Making Sense in Perspective

Introduction 1. Ontology, Evidence, and Philosophical Questions 2. Justification, Meta-Epistemology, and Meaning 3. Meaning, Interpretation, and Analyticity 4. Reasons, Truth, and Relativism 5. Physicalism, Action, and Explanation Appendix: Charity, Interpretation, and Truth References Index

Probability in rational decision-making

Les correlations statistiques ont valeur dans des situations a long terme et peuvent, donc, trouver une application dans la prise de decision a long terme. Cependant ces correlations ne correspondent pas automatiquement a une structure operative et causale dans des cas individuels isoles et ne sont pas appropriees a la prise de decision rationnelle dans les cas individuels

Natural evil and the Free Will Defense

Recently Richard Swinburne has argued that the well-known Free Will Defense can provide an explanation of Gods permitting moral evil (i.e., evil intentionally brought about by human agents) only if there is also natural evil (i.e., evil not intentionally brought about by human agents).1 Ultimately his argument aims to show that there must be natural evil if we are to have the knowledge we need to have in order to bring about moral evil. Thus, if Swinburnes argument is sound, then, contrary to common opinion, if the Free Will Defense can meet objections to Gods existence arising from moral evil, then that Defense can also meet such objections arising from natural evil. My aim in what follows is twofold. First, in Part I, I shall restate Swinburnes argument in succinct form, and show why it is ultimately unsuccessful. And secondly, in Part II, I shall sketch an alternative argument that purports to improve on Swinburnes argument.

Lehrer’s Coherentism and the Isolation Objection

Among coherence theories of epistemic justification, Keith Lehrer’s version is second to none in its originality, detail, and precision. It is, without a doubt, the most refined coherence theory in circulation. In this paper I ask whether Lehrer’s coherentism withstands the familiar isolation objection to epistemic coherentism. Part 1 outlines Lehrer’s coherentism in its most recent garb. Part 2 states the isolation objection to coherentism without relying on the troublesome metaphor of “cutting off” empirical justification from the world. And Part 3 argues that Lehrer’s coherentism falls prey to the isolation objection because of a deficiency shared by all versions of epistemic coherentism.1

Two paradoxes of rational acceptance

Any adequate account of epistemically rational acceptance must avoid two well-known paradoxes: the lottery paradox and the paradox of the preface. Although epistemologists have proposed various solutions to these para? doxes, it is arguable that the most natural solution has been overlooked. In what follows, we shall outline the paradoxes in question, and provide a surprisingly natural solution to them. In doing so, we shall take some steps toward solving the difficult problem of relating epistemic justification to probability.

Undermining the case for evidential atheism

Evidential atheism, as espoused by various philosophical atheists, recommends belief that God does not exist on the basis of not just the evidence of which we are aware, but also our overall available evidence. This article identifies a widely neglected problem from potential surprise evidence that undermines an attempt to give a cogent justification of such evidential atheism. In addition, it contends that evidential agnosticism fares better than evidential atheism relative to this neglected problem, and that traditional monotheism has evidential resources, unavailable to evidential atheism, which promise to save it from the fate of evidential atheism.

Cosmic Evolution and Evil

This is the final version. Available from Cambridge University Pressvia the DOI in this record

The Wisdom of the Christian Faith

Introduction: philosophy and cruciform wisdom Part I. Wisdom, Faith, and Reason: 1. Faithful knowing Paul Gooch 2. Repentance and self-knowledge Merold Westphal 3. Obedience and responsibility William Wainwright 4. Forgiveness, justification, and reconciliation John Hare Part II. Wisdom, Love, and Evil: 5. Wisdom and evil Andrew Pinsent 6. Moral character and temptation Sylvia Walsh 7. Altruism, egoism and sacrifice Gordon Graham 8. Unconditional love and spiritual virtues Robert C. Roberts Part III. Wisdom, Contemplation, and Action: 9. Meaningful life John Cottingham 10. Beauty and aesthetics in theology Charles Taliaferro 11. Education for political autonomy Paul Weithman 12. The wisdom of hope in a despairing world Jerry Walls.

Naturalism and psychological explanation

Abstract This article explores the possibility of naturalized theory of action. It distinguishes ontological naturalism from conceptual naturalism, and asks whether a defensible theory of action can be either ontologically or conceptually naturalistic. The distinction between conditions for an ontology and conditions for a concept receives support from Donald Davidsons identification of two modes of explanation for action: rational and physical causal explanation. Davidsons action theory provides a naturalized ontology for action theory, but not a naturalized concept of intentional action. This article raises doubts about Davidsons basis for such one‐sided naturalism. It examines some conditions for a mode of explanation, in order to clarify whether an intentional mode of explanation might have ontological significance and thus raise problems for ontological naturalism. The article argues for the central role of certain instrumental factors in explanatory strategies, whether naturalistic or intentional...

Justification in the Natural Sciences

Philosophy of science includes the epistemology of natural science as a major component. The epistemology of natural science seeks a correct explanation of the conditions for scientific knowledge of the natural world. A central part of such epistemology is the theory of scientifically justified belief. A scientifically justified belief, roughly characterized, is a belief appropriately warranted to be a component of scientific knowledge. The conditions for a beliefs being thus appropriately warranted attract much controversy among epistemologists of natural science. These days philosophers of science are nowhere near consensus on a substantive epistemology of science. And this seems to be in keeping with the turbulent history of matters philosophical. One wonders whether we can find any common ground from which to measure epistemological progress.