Paul Mitchell

The politics of electoral systems

Foreword PART 1: INTRODUCTION: ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND ELECTORAL SYSTEMS RESEARCH 1. Introduction to Electoral Systems 2. Comparative Electoral Systems Research: The Maturation of a Field and New Challenges Ahead 3. Why are There so many (or so few) Electoral Reforms? PART 2: SINGLE-MEMBER CONSTITUENCY SYSTEMS 4. Australia: The Alternative vote in a Compliant Political Culture 5. Canada: Sticking to First-past-the-Post, for the Time Being 6. France: Stacking the Deck 7. India: Two-Party Contests Within a Multi-Party System 8. United Kingdom: Plurality Rule Under Siege 9. United States of America: Perpetual Campaigning in the Absence of Competition PART 3: MIXED SYSTEMS 10. Germany: Stability and Strategy in a Mixed-Member Proportional System 11. Hungary: Holding Back the Tiers 12. Italy: A Case of Fragmented Bipolarism 13. Japan: Haltingly Toward a Two-Party System 14. New Zealand: The Consolidation of Reform? 15. Russia: The Authoritarian Adaptation of an Electoral System PART 4: CLOSED LIST SYSTEMS 16. Israel: The Politics of Extreme Proportionality 17. South Africa: One Party Dominance Despite Perfect Proportionality 18. Spain: Proportional Representation with Majoritarian Outcomes PART 5: PREFERENTIAL LIST SYSTEMS AND PR-STV 19. Austria: A Complex Electoral System with Subtle Effects 20. Belgium: Empowering Voters or Party Elites? 21. Chile: The Unexpected (and Expected) Consequences of Electoral Engineering 22. Denmark: Simplicity Embedded in Complexity (or Is it the Other Way Round?) 23. Finland: One Hundred Years of Quietude 24. The Netherlands: The Sanctity of Proportionality 25. Ireland: The Discreet Charm of PR-STV PART 6: CONCLUSION 26. Conclusion Appendix A - The Mechanics of Electoral Systems Appendix B - Indices of Fragmentation and Disproportionality Appendix C: Effective Threshold and Effective District Magnitude Appendix D: Values of Indices for 22 Countries at Most Recent Election Appendix E: Web Sites Related to Elections, Election Results, and Electoral Systems

Party competition in an ethnic dual party system

Abstract Combining material from theories of segmented societies and of party competition this article examines Northern Irelands ethnic party system. The first section focuses on political segmentation and the defensive character of party competition. In segmented societies multi‐ethnic parties or alliances are typically unstable and are often replaced by parties projecting an exclusive ethnic appeal. Since ethnic parties appeal solely to one ethnic group elections are more about ‘mobilizing the faithful’ than competing for uncommitted voters. Indeed, since there are so few uncommitted voters turnout becomes a critical variable. A highly ideological and inflammatory language of appeal is often the easiest way of mobilizing apathetic partisans so that there is no premium on moderation. Electoral competition becomes almost entirely defensive, reinforcing divisions at the mass level and providing relatively secure positions for leaders. The second section considers the implications for conflict regulation ...

The Candidates’ Perspective

My re-election campaign commenced in January 2002. No election date had yet been set but the campaign for many candidates was already underway. This meant that the campaigning for this election was the longest campaign in many years. As it happened the election was called on Thursday 25 April and polling day was Friday 17 May.

Government Formation in 2002: ‘You Can Have Any Kind of Government As Long As It’s Fianna Fáil’

In 2002 outgoing Taoiseach Bertie Ahern joined the pantheon of truly great Fianna Fail leaders by restoring the self-styled ‘national movement’ to its former hegemonic position in Irish politics. Well, almost. A virtual avalanche of opinion polls conducted during the three-week election campaign strongly contributed to the belief that Ahern would indeed embrace his destiny (whether he truly sought it or not) as the first Fianna Fail leader in 25 years to win an overall majority and restore the party to the glory days of singleparty rule. Although Fianna Fail had been averaging about 42 per cent in opinion polls for the two years prior to the dissolution,1 the national polls (with one exception) published during the official campaign suggested that Fianna Fail would do much better than this.2 Indeed, the Irish Independent made most of the headlines by publishing four IMS polls in which Fianna Fail averaged 49.5 per cent (ranging from 48 to 51 per cent). It declared as early as 4 May that Fianna Fail’s campaign was ‘virtually certain to propel them to an outright Dail majority’, and declared after the second poll halfway through the campaign that it was ‘All over – bar the voting’ (Irish Independent 9 May 2002).3 Of course prior to earlier elections in the 1980s and 1990s Fianna Fail had also sometimes been riding this high in the polls only to find that the numbers took a significant dip once voters were faced with the quite different context of a real campaign and the imminent prospect of handing untrammelled power to Charles Haughey and Albert Reynolds.

Fianna Fáil still dominant in the coalition era: The Irish general election of May 2002

One of the strongest behavioural regularities in European politics is that parties in opposition tend to gain votes at election time, whereas governing parties generally lose votes. Incumbency is rarely an electoral asset. Exceptions exist, however, as they did recently in Ireland, when the banner headlines in the aftermath of the 2002 election proclaimed that for the first time since 1969 an incumbent government (in this case the Fianna Fáil–Progressive Democrat coalition that had governed since 1997) had been re-elected. Moreover, the main opposition party, Fine Gael, not only failed to revitalise itself during its time in opposition, but was slashed from 54 to 31 seats. It was as though the electorate had exacted its revenge on the opposition. Although Fianna Fáil as far back as 1989 had abandoned its traditional exclusive pursuit of single-party government (preferring to go into opposition rather than join a coalition), its first dalliances with coalition partners had ended in acrimonious divorces in 1992 and 1994. Thus, when Bertie Ahern led Fianna Fáil into their fourth coalition government after the 1997 election, one of his key aims was to prove that Fianna Fáil could govern consensually with a partner and thus avoid another early demise. Ahern promised to put together a government that would last the full five years. Few took this literally, especially since he proceeded to form a minority coalition administration with the Progressive Democrats (PDs) which depended on the votes of a few independents. But by the time the 2002 election was finally called the Fianna Fáil–Progressive Democrat coalition had been in power for 1,786 days (four years and 11 months), the longest serving government in the history of the state (excluding the special circumstances during the Second World War). When it finally ended Bertie Ahern’s first government was so close to the constitutionally prescribed maximum that if he had delayed any longer the President would have had to call in the bailiffs.