Paul R. Pillar

Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process

This work draws on insights from the experimental and theoretical literature on bargaining to provide a much-needed comprehensive treatment of the neglected subject of how wars end. In a study of how states simultaneously wage war and negotiate peace settlements, Paul R. Pillar argues that war termination is best understood as a bargaining process.Originally published in 1983.The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq

THE MOST SERIOUS problem with U.S. intelligence today is that its relationship with the policymaking process is broken and badly needs repair. In the wake of the Iraq war, it has become clear that official intelligence analysis was not relied on in making even the most significant national security decisions, that intelligence was misused publicly to justify decisions already made, that damaging ill will developed between policymakers and intelligence officers, and that the intelligence communitys own work was politicized. As the national intelligence officer responsible for the Middle East from 2000 to 2005, I witnessed all of these disturbing developments. Public discussion of prewar intelligence on Iraq has focused on the errors made in assessing Saddam Husseins unconventional weapons programs. A commission chaired by Judge Laurence Silberman and former Senator Charles Robb useftilly documented the intelligence communitys mistakes in a solid and comprehensive report released in March 2005. Corrections were indeed in order, and the intelligence community has begun to make them. At the same time, an acrimonious and highly partisan debate broke out over whether the Bush administration manipulated and misused intelligence in making its case for war. The administration

Counterterrorism after Al Qaeda

The counterterrorism challenges that will follow Al Qaeda—collecting and analyzing intelligence, enlisting foreign support, and sustaining the U.S. commitment while avoiding further damage to relations with the Muslim world—may be even more complex.

Alienation and Rebellion in the Arab World

The revolts known collectively as the Arab Spring are largely reactions of alienated populations to the closed economic and political systems that prevail in the Middle East. Revolutions in individual countries have differed because of the differing status of the military, sectarian divisions, and mineral wealth. The prospect of peaceful political change reduces the appeal of extremist ideologies, but extremists still could make inroads to the extent that high popular hopes are dashed. Democracy will need a long time to take root in Arab political cultures.

The Diffusion of Terrorism

The prevailing perception of the threat from international terrorism is that it emanates chiefly from one group, al Qaeda, it is tied to a territorial presence in South Asia, and it is driven by a fixed ideology bent on inflicting maximum damage on the West. The perception stems more from Western fears and the legacy of past experience than from actual trends in terrorism. The real threat is more diffuse and decentralized, not embodied in any one group or piece of territory, and has more malleable goals and tactics.