Paul Thagard

Analogical Mapping by Constraint Satisfaction

A theory of analogical mapping between source and target analogs based upon interacting structural, semantic, and pragmatic constraints is proposed here. The structural constraint of isomorphism encourages mappings that maximize the consistency of relational corresondences between the elements of the two analogs. The constraint of semantic similarity supports mapping hypotheses to the degree that mapped predicates have similar meanings. The constraint of pragmatic centrality favors mappings involving elements the analogist believes to be important in order to achieve the purpose for which the analogy is being used. The theory is implemented in a computer program called ACME (Analogical Constraint Mapping Engine), which represents constraints by means of a network of supporting and competing hypotheses regarding what elements to map. A cooperative algorithm for parallel constraint satisfaction identities mapping hypotheses that collectively represent the overall mapping that best fits the interacting constraints. ACME has been applied to a wide range of examples that include problem analogies, analogical arguments, explanatory analogies, story analogies, formal analogies, and metaphors. ACME is sensitive to semantic and pragmatic information if it is available, and yet able to compute mappings between formally isomorphic analogs without any similar or identical elements. The theory is able to account for empirical findings regarding the impact of consistency and similarity on human processing of analogies.

Analog retrieval by constraint satisfaction

We describe a computational model of how analogs are retrieved from memory using simultaneous satisfaction of a set of semantic, structural, and pragmatic constraints. The model is based on psychological evidence suggesting that human memory retrieval tends to favor analogs that have several kinds of correspondences with the structure that prompts retrieval: semantic similarity, isomorphism, and pragmatic relevance. We describe ARCS, a program that demonstrates how these constraints can be used to select relevant analogs by forming a network of hypotheses and attempting to satisfy the constraints simultaneously. ARCS has been tested on several data bases that display both its psychological plausibility and computational power.

Abductive reasoning: Logic, visual thinking, and coherence

This paper discusses abductive reasoning—that is, reasoning in which explanatory hypotheses are formed and evaluated. First, it criticizes two recent formal logical models of abduction. An adequate formalization would have to take into account the following aspects of abduction: explanation is not deduction; hypotheses are layered; abduction is sometimes creative; hypotheses may be revolutionary; completeness is elusive; simplicity is complex; and abductive reasoning may be visual and non-sentential. Second, in order to illustrate visual aspects of hypothesis formation, the paper describes recent work on visual inference in archaeology. Third, in connection with the evaluation of explanatory hypotheses, the paper describes recent results on the computation of coherence.

The AHA! Experience: Creativity Through Emergent Binding in Neural Networks

Many kinds of creativity result from combination of mental representations. This paper provides a computational account of how creative thinking can arise from combining neural patterns into ones that are potentially novel and useful. We defend the hypothesis that such combinations arise from mechanisms that bind together neural activity by a process of convolution, a mathematical operation that interweaves structures. We describe computer simulations that show the feasibility of using convolution to produce emergent patterns of neural activity that can support cognitive and emotional processes underlying human creativity.

Emotion and action

The role of emotion in human action has long been neglected in the philosophy of action. Some prevalent misconceptions of the nature of emotion are responsible for this neglect: emotions are irrational; emotions are passive; and emotions have only an insignificant impact on actions. In this paper we argue that these assumptions about the nature of emotion are problematic and that the neglect of emotions place in theories of action is untenable. More positively, we argue on the basis of recent research in cognitive neuroscience that emotions may significantly affect action generation as well as action execution and control. Moreover, emotions also play a crucial role in peoples explanation of action. We conclude that the concept of emotion deserves a more distinctive and central place in philosophical theories of action.

Coherence, Truth, and the Development of Scientific Knowledge*

What is the relation between coherence and truth? This paper rejects numerous answers to this question, including the following: truth is coherence; coherence is irrelevant to truth; coherence always leads to truth; coherence leads to probability, which leads to truth. I will argue that coherence of the right kind leads to at least approximate truth. The right kind is explanatory coherence, where explanation consists in describing mechanisms. We can judge that a scientific theory is progressively approximating the truth if it is increasing its explanatory coherence in two key respects: broadening by explaining more phenomena and deepening by investigating layers of mechanisms. I sketch an explanation of why deepening is a good epistemic strategy and discuss the prospect of deepening knowledge in the social sciences and everyday life.

Explaining Disease: Correlations, Causes, and Mechanisms

Why do people get sick? I argue that a disease explanation is best thought of as causal network instantiation, where a causal network describes the interrelations among multiple factors, and instantiation consists of observational or hypothetical assignment of factors to the patient whose disease is being explained. This paper first discusses inference from correlation to causation, integrating recent psychological discussions of causal reasoning with epidemiological approaches to understanding disease causation, particularly concerning ulcers and lung cancer. It then shows how causal mechanisms represented by causal networks can contribute to reasoning involving correlation and causation. The understanding of causation and causal mechanisms provides the basis for a presentation of the causal network instantiation model of medical explanation.

CAUSAL INFERENCE IN LEGAL DECISION MAKING: EXPLANATORY COHERENCE VS. BAYESIAN NETWORKS

Reasoning by jurors concerning whether an accused person should be convicted of committing a crime is a kind of casual inference. Jurors need to decide whether the evidence in the case was caused by the accuseds criminal action or by some other cause. This paper compares two computational models of casual inference: explanatory coherence and Bayesian networks. Both models can be applied to legal episodes such as the von Bülow trials. There are psychological and computational reasons for preferring the explanatory coherence account of legal inference.

Spiking Phineas Gage: A Neurocomputational Theory of Cognitive-Affective Integration in Decision Making.

The authors present a neurological theory of how cognitive information and emotional information are integrated in the nucleus accumbens during effective decision making. They describe how the nucleus accumbens acts as a gateway to integrate cognitive information from the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the hippocampus with emotional information from the amygdala. The authors have modeled this integration by a network of spiking artificial neurons organized into separate areas and used this computational model to simulate 2 kinds of cognitive-affective integration. The model simulates successful performance by people with normal cognitive-affective integration. The model also simulates the historical case of Phineas Gage as well as subsequent patients whose ability to make decisions became impeded by damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex.

Why Wasn't O. J. Convicted? Emotional Coherence in Legal Inference

This paper evaluates four competing psychological explanations for why the jury in the O.J. Simpson murder trial reached the verdict they did: explanatory coherence, Bayesian probability theory, wishful thinking, and emotional coherence. It describes computational models that provide detailed simulations of juror reasoning for explanatory coherence, Bayesian networks, and emotional coherence, and argues that the latter account provides the most plausible explanation of the jurys decision.