Paul W. Chambers

Beyond the fallacy of coup-ism: conceptualizing civilian control of the military in emerging democracies

It is consensus in the democratization literature that civilian control of the military is a necessary ingredient for democracy and democratic consolidation. However, there is considerable disagreement on what civilian control of the military exactly entails and there is a lack of solid theoretical arguments for how weak or absent civilian control affects democratic governance. Furthermore, a considerable portion of the research literature is captured by the fallacy of coup-ism, ignoring the many other forms in which military officers can constrain the authority of democratically elected political leaders to make political decisions and get them implemented. This article addresses these lacunae by providing a new conceptual framework for the analysis of civil–military relations in emerging democracies. From democracy theory it derives a definition of civilian control as a certain distribution of decision-making power between civilian leaders and military officers. Based on this definition, the authors develop a five-dimensional concept of civilian control, discuss the effects of weakly institutionalized civilian control on the quality of democracy and address the chances for democratic consolidation.

Democratization and Civilian Control in Asia

PART I Conceptualizing Civilian Control oft he Military Explaining Civilian Control of the Military in New Democracies PART II South Korea. Purges and Presidential Prerogatives Taiwan. From Martial Law to Civilian Control Indonesia. The Democratization of Personal Control Bangladesh. From Militarized Politics to Politicized Military The Philippines. Civil-Military Symbiosis under the Veneer of Civilian Rule Thailand. Civilian Control Deterred Pakistan. Military-Guided Transitions to Elected Government and the Failure of Civilian Control PART III Conclusion. Contours, Causes, and Consequences of Civilian Control

Evolving Toward What? Parties, Factions, and Coalition Behavior in Thailand Today

How important have Thai parties and intraparty factions been in Thailands fast-evolving democracy? What role do they play today, especially since the enactment of the latest constitution? What has accounted for the fragmentation in Thailands party systems and coalitions? How did Thai democracy allow for the rise to power of Thaksin Shinawatra? This article analyzes these questions, presents a theory of Thai coalition behavior, and offers some predictions for Thailands democratic future.

The Resilience of Monarchised Military in Thailand

ABSTRACT This paper argues that conventional notions of Thailand’s military must be re-examined because they misrepresent the military’s role in politics. Instead of examining its material interests, one must also scrutinise the power and legitimacy of Thailand’s armed forces in terms of its connection to monarchy over time. The relationship between monarchy and military represents a “parallel state”, whereas the ideology, rituals and processes within this relationship result in what can be termed a “monarchised military.” The purpose of this nexus is to sustain a palace-centred order from which the military obtains legitimacy. From 1991 until 2014, the monarchised military mostly operated behind a defective democracy, although it occasionally carried out coups to re-assert the palace’s authority. Its more recent political intrusions have enhanced the military’s power on Thailand’s political stage. Civilian prime ministers have unsuccessfully sought to reign in the military, but to no avail owing to the armed forces’ close association with monarchy.

Political Party Finance in Thailand Today: Evolution, Reform, and Control

ABSTRACT This study examines the evolution of political party finance in Thailand, which has been crucial for party development. The nature of party finance cannot be examined separately from the countrys democratization given that the military early on dominated political parties. At the same time, such financing traditionally depended upon either regional factions (for larger parties) or party leaders (for micro-parties), while state funding for parties was nonexistent. The 1998 and 2007 Organic Acts on Political Parties contained finance reforms to strengthen parties, making them more transparent and accountable. Yet these reforms have only been partly successful. Today party leaders, faction leaders, and the military continue to influence party finance. This study addresses the issue of party finance in Thailand by scrutinizing its historical evolution from the dawn of Thai parties and party laws in the 1950s to the present. The authors conclude, first, that the limited nature of party finance laws in the pre-1998 period legitimized military-backed parties while facilitating intra-party factionalism. Second, they contend that despite reforms in party finance laws in Thailand major flaws remain to be corrected.

Military “Shadows” in Thailand Since the 2006 Coup

Abstract: In contemporary Thailand, achieving effective civilian control of the armed forces is a daunting challenge. The countrys long series of military coups are one outcome of the operational independence generally enjoyed by the military. In most cases, these military interventions have sought to support the political ambitions of the palace and its networks. For almost a decade, Thai politics has been polarized by reactions to the electoral success of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his perceived threat to military and royal power. The military has thus acted as arch-royalist “protector,” helping itself to enhance its political status in a monarchy-led parallel state. This paper examines how and why the armed forces continue to remain powerful in Thailand and what prospects exist for diminishing this clout in the messy aftermath of the 2006 coup.

Thailand: Civilian Control Deterred

In Thailand, the military has been involved in politics for most of the twentieth century. It ruled the country either through personal dictators or within the framework of institutionalized military rule from the 1930s to 1973, with only a brief interregnum from 1944 to 1947 (Yawnghwe, 1997). In the 1970s, a process of political transformation began that culminated in Thailand’s transition to democracy in May 1992. Under the new democratic rules, the military’s political role became more complex. The Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTAF) refrained from direct political involvement and focused on protecting the monarchy as well as furthering their own corporate and security interests. At the same time, the military remained a political force through its linkages, both as an institution and as individuals, to the new elites of party politics, to the monarchy and to its political network and associated institutions (Chai-anan, 1997). Therefore, in order to properly understand civil—military relations after May 1992, the complexities of the political role of the monarchy and its links to civilian and military elites must be accounted for. Democratization and civilian control were to be realized only to the extent that they did not threaten the position of the ‘network monarchy’ (McCargo, 2005) or the ideas that underpinned its power (Hewison & Kengkij, 2010: 180). This became obvious during the premiership of Thaksin Shinawatra (2001–2006), whose government attempted to sever the relationship between the military and the monarchy.

Lee, TerenceDefect or Defend: Military Responses to Popular Protests in Authoritarian AsiaBaltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press252 pp.,

This solid analytical work highlights the conditions under which militaries in Asian authoritarian regimes have determined or prevented regime change in support of popular demonstrations and why. The author, Terence Lee, is assistant professor of political science at the National University of Singapore and a noted scholar on civil-military relations in Asia. Lee uses two cases of military defection from supporting regimes (Philippines 1986, Indonesia 1998) and two cases of military defense of the state (China 1989, Burma/Myanmar 2007) to support his thesis. He argues that personalistic forms of authoritarian rule tend to lead to military fissures that become ripe for military defection when popular protests erupt. The defectors will support regime change if they can come to an agreement with leaders of the protests. On the other hand, where authoritarian regimes are organized through power-sharing mechanisms that severely reduce personalism, military defection during popular protests becomes less likely (189). In Chapter 1, Lee argues that in the literature on authoritarian transition, the role of military behavior itself in ensuring or preventing moves toward political change has been under-explored. His study fills this void. Chapter 2 presents a theoretical framework that highlights the importance of agencydetermined structure, drawing from “new institutionalism” political science literature (22). To engender elite loyalty, many tyrannies establish institutions that deliver balanced levels of carrots and sticks to the regime’s stakeholders. These power-sharing institutions provide information about the actions of regime stakeholders while offering routines designed to diminish moral hazard problems. Examples include autocratic

59.95 hardcoverISBN 978-1421415161Publication Date: January 2015

though Keyes admits that Thai democracy has a “checkered history,” he points out that it allowed elected politicians from Isan to represent constituents (60). Suspicious that they were mostly Communist-leaning, the state repressed many of them. According to Keyes, such repression was perceived by northeasterners as symptomatic of central Thai discrimination. In Chapter 5, Keyes examines the period 1957–1973, during which the military administered Thailand with support from monarchy. For Keyes, Isan people recognized the Thai king as their leader but felt that the then-military regime prevented them from redressing their grievances. Some thus supported Communist revolution. However, as Keyes shows in Chapter 6, insurgency had faltered by 1983 partly due to new state decrees allowing amnesty and assistance for surrendering rebels and permitting the establishment of non-governmental organizations. In Chapter 7, Keyes illustrates how northeasterners, having experienced more upward mobility and interconnectedness with the world, have become increasingly involved in organizations to safeguard the environment, community rights and other regionally based interests. Lastly, in Chapter 8, Keyes argues that northeasterners have, since 2001, finally come to make their voices heard through supporting populist political parties of Thaksin Shinawatra and participating in the Red Shirts protest movement. As for strengths, this book, based upon Keyes’s extensive research, offers an elaborately detailed history of Isan, which elucidates the growing political role of Thai northeasterners. Though the book is meant primarily for academics and policymakers engaged with Asia, Keyes’s straightforward writing makes it accessible to the general audience. Yet the book does have weaknesses. First, Keyes sometimes tends to overgeneralize about Isan from work he has done over the years in Nong Tuan village. Second, there is much more diversity within Isan’s identity and history than Keyes acknowledges. Third, to emphasize northeasterners’ growing political participation, Keyes overemphasizes Red Shirts’ support from Isan, lessening the importance of its backing from northern and central regions. Fourth, Keyes never acknowledges that some northeasterners, including farmers comprising NGO “PMove” and politician Newin Chidchob, are anti-Thaksin. Finally, though this book was written before the 2014 antiShinawatra coup, one wonders why Keyes’ “cosmopolitan peasants” only slightly resisted it. Ultimately, however, as a book revealing crucial sociopolitical transformations in Thailand, this book is one of the better studies available—aside from works on Isan written in Thai by Thai authors.

Sam Rainsy with David Whitehouse We Didn't Start the Fire: My Struggle for Democracy in Cambodia Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books 210 pp.,

Charles KeyesFinding Their Voice: Northeastern Villagers and the Thai State Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books 262 pp.,