Aurel Croissant

From transition to defective democracy: mapping Asian democratization

This article undertakes a systematic inquiry of democratic development in Asia. It shows two main trends of democratization in south, south-east and north-east Asia. First, in most of the democracies the institutionalization of political rights exists side by side with stagnation or decline of the rule of law and civil liberties. Second, the quality of democracy in the different countries is growing further apart. While new democracies in north-east Asia are on the track to democratic consolidation, democracy in south Asia is on the edge or has already fallen victim to authoritarian renewal. In south-east Asia, democratic consolidation is stagnating. The article also provides for a systematic analysis of why and how defective democracies originate. It argues that not a single primary cause but a set of interconnected variables influences the track of democratic development. While ‘Asian values’, the type of colonial rule and ethnic heterogeneity give only weak support for democracy in Asia, socio-economic development, political institutions, stateness and political party systems are more important determinants. In the last section the article offers a sceptical outlook on the prospects for further liberal democratic development in Asia, arguing that for most young democracies in the region remaining a defective democracy is the most likely prospect in the near future.

Beyond the fallacy of coup-ism: conceptualizing civilian control of the military in emerging democracies

It is consensus in the democratization literature that civilian control of the military is a necessary ingredient for democracy and democratic consolidation. However, there is considerable disagreement on what civilian control of the military exactly entails and there is a lack of solid theoretical arguments for how weak or absent civilian control affects democratic governance. Furthermore, a considerable portion of the research literature is captured by the fallacy of coup-ism, ignoring the many other forms in which military officers can constrain the authority of democratically elected political leaders to make political decisions and get them implemented. This article addresses these lacunae by providing a new conceptual framework for the analysis of civil–military relations in emerging democracies. From democracy theory it derives a definition of civilian control as a certain distribution of decision-making power between civilian leaders and military officers. Based on this definition, the authors develop a five-dimensional concept of civilian control, discuss the effects of weakly institutionalized civilian control on the quality of democracy and address the chances for democratic consolidation.

Party system types and party system institutionalization: Comparing new democracies in East and Southeast Asia

This article is an overview of the types and level of institutionalization of party systems in seven young democracies in East and Southeast Asia. By applying Alan Siaroff’s typology of party systems, the analysis demonstrates that the party systems in Asia do not converge on a single format. The party systems under consideration also differ in the level of institutionalization. Party systems in Thailand, the Philippines and especially South Korea are stuck in an inchoate state. Even though there is considerable variation among the cases, the party systems in Indonesia, Mongolia and Taiwan can be considered as well institutionalized relative to the rest of Asia and moderately institutionalized when compared to Latin America. Furthermore, weak institutionalization correlates with volatile structures of party competition and cooperation in Thailand, whereas in South Korea and the Philippines party systems seem to be paradoxically stabilizing in a situation of protracted under-institutionalization, as both cases combine more or less stable party system patterns with weak institutionalization.

Democratization and Civilian Control in Asia

PART I Conceptualizing Civilian Control oft he Military Explaining Civilian Control of the Military in New Democracies PART II South Korea. Purges and Presidential Prerogatives Taiwan. From Martial Law to Civilian Control Indonesia. The Democratization of Personal Control Bangladesh. From Militarized Politics to Politicized Military The Philippines. Civil-Military Symbiosis under the Veneer of Civilian Rule Thailand. Civilian Control Deterred Pakistan. Military-Guided Transitions to Elected Government and the Failure of Civilian Control PART III Conclusion. Contours, Causes, and Consequences of Civilian Control

Introduction: democratization in the early twenty-first century

Wolfgang Merkel, Social Science Research Center (WZB), Reichpietschufer 50, D-10785, Berlin. Germany, Email: wolfgang.merkel@wz-berlin.de

Riding the Tiger: Civilian Control and the Military in Democratizing Korea:

For many young democracies, the institutionalization of civilian control over the military is a crucial task for democratic consolidation. This is especially true for South Korea. After Korea gained independence in 1948, the military was the most powerful player in Korean politics. However, in the 1990s, the pattern of civil-military relations changed dramatically from military dominance over civilian politics to civilian supremacy over the military. This article explores the dynamics of the institutionalization of civilian control in South Korea in four steps. In the first part, the study clarifies the concept of civilian control. The second part formulates an analytical frame of favorable and unfavorable conditions for successful institutionalization of civilian control. Thereafter the evolution and state of civil-military relations in South Korea before and after democratization is illuminated. Finally, some conclusions are drawn about why civilian control successfully became institutionalized in democratizing Korea.

Performance and persistence of autocracies in comparison: introducing issues and perspectives

Authoritarianism research has evolved into one of the fastest growing areas in comparative politics and political economy. However, the newly awakened interest in autocratic regimes goes hand in hand with a lack of systematic research on the results of the political and substantive policy performance of variants of autocratic regimes. In this article we introduce the individual contributions to this special issue and summarize their findings with regard to three core research questions: What are the differences between autocracies and democracies, as well as between different forms of authoritarian regimes, with regard to their outcome performance in selected policy fields? Does policy performance matter for the persistence of authoritarian rule? How can we conceptualize different types of autocratic regimes and do differences in the availability of performance data matter for the results of empirical studies comparing democracies and autocracies or different types of non-democratic regimes?

Civil Society and Competitive Authoritarianism in Malaysia

This article looks at the development of civil society in Malaysia under competitive authoritarian rule. It focuses on three main questions: What role does civil society play under competitive authoritarian rule? Can it successfully challenge authoritarianism? Or does the existence of a civil society actually strengthen the stability of the authoritarian order? In order to provide answers to these questions, the concept of historical institutionalism will be applied. Thereby, institutional legacies which have been and still are of great influence on the structures and functions of Malaysian civil society will be identified. This study shows that the structures and functions of Malaysian civil society changed significantly over the last five decades. Furthermore, this article argues that civil society groups are increasingly emerging as challengers to the autocratic elites. Nevertheless, the analysis indicates that the institutional framework of competitive authoritarianism heavily restricts civic engagement and the establishment of civic associations. However, the use of coercion and co-optation is restricted due to the regimes competitive character, thus producing a structurally, functionally and operatively limited civil society.

Defekte Demokratie Konzept, Operationalisierung und Messung

Die vergleichende, um quantitativ wie qualitativ verlassliche Ergebnisse bemuhte Analyse von ‘defekten Demokratien’ steht im Schnittpunkt zweier jungerer Stromungen der Demokratieforschung, namlich Transformationsforschung und Demokratiemessung. Die Transformationsforschung (zum Uberblick vgl. Merkel 1999; Merkel/Puhle 1999; Moruno 1998) ist in den letzten Jahren zunehmend skeptischer geworden, da zahlreiche Demokratien der sogenannten ‘dritten Welle der Demokratisierung’ offensichtlich nicht nur mit Konsolidierungsproblemen zu kampfen haben, sondern mit Qualitatsdefiziten besonderer Natur belastet sind. So kann die betrachtliche Zunahme demokratischer Systeme im letzten Viertel dieses Jahrhunderts nicht daruber hinwegtauschen, dass die ‘dritte Welle’ weniger der Triumphzug liberaler, rechtsstaatlich-konstitutioneller Demokratien, als vielmehr die Erfolgsgeschichte einer eingeschrankten oder defekten Variante von Demokratie ist (vgl. Zakaria 1997; Diamond 1999; Merkel 1999; Merkel/Croissant 2000) — ein Universum, das je nach Schatzung etwa 50 Lander umfasst2. Ungeachtet dieser empirischen Beobachtung fehlt bislang aber ein heuristisches Raster, das es gleichermasen erlaubt, diese Regime konzeptionell zu ordnen, sie operational zu definieren und hierdurch Regeln zur empirischen Beobachtung und theoretischen Erklarung der Ursachen ihres Entstehens, ihrer zentralen Merkmale und ihrer spezifischen Entwicklungsdynamik anzugeben.

Following the Money Trail: Terrorist Financing and Government Responses in Southeast Asia 1

This comparative study of ten nations in Southeast Asia demonstrates how terrorist groups in the region finance their activities and how governments combat terrorism financing. It demonstrates that area countries converge on norm acceptance measured as the spread of the international norms and practices and their transformation into national law. Norm acceptance, however, does not cause adherence and application of norms. Differences in scope, pace, and success of implementation and effectiveness of new rules between countries are related to the preferences and calculations of policymakers; the institutional capacity of political systems to produce policy changes; administrative and law enforcement capacities, and characteristics of the financial systems.