Pedro Mira

Dynamic discrete choice structural models: A survey

This paper reviews methods for the estimation of dynamic discrete choice structural models and discusses related econometric issues. We consider single-agent models, competitive equilibrium models and dynamic games. The methods are illustrated with descriptions of empirical studies which have applied these techniques to problems in different areas of economics. Programming codes for some of the estimation methods are available in a companion web page.

Caregiving to Elderly Parents and Employment Status of European Mature Women

We study the prevalence of informal caregiving to elderly parents by their mature daughters in Europe and the links between parental health, intense (daily) caregiving, and the employment status of daughters. We group data from SHARE into three country pools (North, Central, and South), which differ in the availability of public formal care services and female labor market attachment. There is a strong North-South gradient in the (positive) effect of parental ill health on the probability of daily caregiving. The loss of employment ascribable to daily informal caregiving seems negligible, except in southern countries. We use a time allocation model to provide a link to an empirical IV-treatment effects framework and to interpret our findings.

An Estimable Dynamic Model of Entry, Exit and Growth in Oligopoly Retail Markets

This paper presents an estimable dynamic structural model of an oligopoly retail industry. The model can be estimated using panel data of local retail markets with information on new entries, exits and the size and growth of incumbent firms. In our model, retail firms are vertically and horizontally differentiated, compete in prices, make investments to improve the quality of their businesses, and decide to exit or to continue in the market. The model extends in two important ways the entry-exit model estimated in Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007). First, it includes firm size and growth as endogenous variables. And second, the empirical model has two sources of permanent unobserved heterogeneity: local-market heterogeneity and firm heterogeneity. This allows the researcher to control for potentially important sources of bias when using firm panel data with many local markets and several time periods.

A Genetic Algorithm for the Structural Estimation of Games with Multiple Equilibria

This paper proposes an algorithm to obtain maximum likelihood estimates of structural parameters in discrete games with multiple equilibria. The method combines a genetic algorithm (GA) with a pseudo maximum likelihood (PML) procedure. The GA searches efficiently over the huge space of possible combinations of equilibria in the data. The PML procedure avoids the repeated computation of equilibria for each trial value of the parameters of interest. To test the ability of this method to get maximum likelihood estimates, we present a Monte Carlo experiment in the context of a game of price competition and collusion.

A Hybrid Genetic Algorithm For The Maximum Likelihood Estimation Of Models With Multiple Equilibria: A First Report

This paper presents a hybrid genetic algorithm to obtain maximum likelihood estimates of parameters in structural econometric models with multiple equilibria. The algorithm combines a pseudo maximum likelihood (PML) procedure with a genetic algorithm (GA). The GA searches globally over the large space of possible combinations of multiple equilibria in the data. The PML procedure avoids the computation of all the equilibria associated with every trial value of the structural parameters.