Peter Fearon

The Formative Years of the British Aircraft Industry, 1913–1924

Although early British aircraft manufacturers attempted to exploit the private, civil aviation, and export markets for their products, the military market became the most important one by World War I. Mr. Fearon shows that the aircraft industry was largely dependent on military orders, but that government policy in this area tended to retard rather than promote progress and growth. It was only the optimism of the pioneer firms about the future which made the expansion of the industry possible.

AWKWARD DOMINION - AMERICAN POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND CULTURAL-RELATIONS WITH EUROPE, 1919-1933 - COSTIGLIOLA,F

New updated! The latest book from a very famous author finally comes out. Book of awkward dominion american political economic and cultural relations with europe 1919 1933, as an amazing reference becomes what you need to get. Whats for is this book? Are you still thinking for what the book is? Well, this is what you probably will get. You should have made proper choices for your better life. Book, as a source that may involve the facts, opinion, literature, religion, and many others are the great friends to join with.

A ‘social evil’: Liverpool moneylenders 1920s–1940s

During the 1920s and 1930s many working-class families needed emergency credit. Their use of pawnbrokers is well documented but the presence of a network of moneylenders, most of whom were women operating from their own homes, is not. This article examines the background to and the impact of the Moneylenders Act (1927) which was designed to reduce the number of working-class lenders, widely perceived as disreputable, in order to protect vulnerable borrowers, most of whom were women. Using Liverpool as a case-study, I also examine the possible reasons for the dramatic decline in the number of licensed moneylenders and analyse the implications of this for the provision of working-class credit.

Mechanisation and Risk: Kansas Wheat Growers 1915–1930

After the Civil War, settlers surged into the western two-thirds of Kansas occupying a region which only a few decades previously had been identified as part of the Great American Desert, and therefore too parched for farming. Many of those newly exploiting the virgin soil had learned their farming in a humid climate and were poorly equipped for survival in an arid region. Failure rates were high amongst pioneers who could not withstand the periodic droughts which destroyed not only their crops but also the gardens which were designed to provide vital subsistence foodstuffs. Farms thrived for a few years but then withered in the relentless sun; eventually hard-hit families gave up the struggle and moved on.

The 1920s: Sources of Instability

THE aim of this chapter is to expose economic weaknesses, operating at the domestic or international level, which can help explain not just why the world was plunged into depression in 1929 but why the slump assumed the characteristics it did. The most convenient starting point for such an investigation is the first major economic shock of the twentieth century, World War I.

The Crisis in Primary Products

ONE of the most important factors deepening the depression in 1930–1 was the collapse of raw-material prices [Condliffe, 1932; Timoshenko]. Between 1929 and 1933, the world price of foodstuffs fell by 55 per cent and of raw materials by 60 per cent — a much sharper fall than in manufacturing prices. In addition, capital imports evaporated, and the worsening terms of trade led to restrictions in the import of manufactured goods. Why was the fall in primary products so steep? We can begin to answer this question by making a few general observations, since the price falls varied considerably between commodities, indicating that there is no monocausal explanation. It can be argued that capital imports and commodity-control schemes kept prices artificially high during the late 1920s, so that, when international borrowing was no longer possible, surpluses were dumped on international markets in a panic and rapid price falls ensued. In addition, although farm income declined substantially during the depression, output was maintained.

Government Policy and Recovery

MANY contemporaries welcomed the depression, at first, as an instrument which would sweep away the unsound businesses which had grown up in the preceding period of easy credit, and, therefore, enable economies to grow from a sounder base once recovery began [Robbins]. This extreme position is also taken by Rothbard, who believes that depressions should be permitted to run their natural course, as any governmental action merely postpones the inevitable crisis. Few would accept that thesis, and as the depression worsened there was considerable pressure on governments to take action to alleviate the misery. The only country to increase its output steadily through these years was the USSR; all capitalist nations succumbed, and in this chapter we shall examine, briefly, the economic policies pursued during the depression, and see that they acted as a strong deflationary force.

Economic Expansion 1925–9

ECONOMIC progress was rapid between 1925 and 1929, as illustrated by the League of Nations World Index for Manufacturing Industry, which rose eighteen points during this period; the figures for Europe (excluding the USSR) and North America show rises of nineteen and twelve points respectively [LN World Production and Prices 1935/6]. The boom was not a period of uninterrupted national growth, but recessions, such as those experienced by Britain and Germany in 1926 and by the United States in 1927, were shortlived. During this period international trade expanded even faster than production, and the output of raw materials increased substantially.

The Financial Crisis of 1931 and the Demise of the Gold Standard

ALTHOUGH the gold-exchange standard had been adopted to promote and to preserve financial stability, its operation after 1929 showed all its inadequacies. A system of fixed exchange rates, like the gold exchange standard, connects prices and incomes in the different countries which adopt it. Therefore, any major contraction involving a fall in prices in one country must spread to others through the balance of payments. The situation was made potentially more unstable because the countries acquiring gold up to 1931 sterilised it, and, as a result, those losing gold, who often had minimal reserves, found that the full burden of adjustment fell upon their economies. The gold-exchange standard thus made the international financial system more vulnerable to disturbances, not less [Friedman and Schwartz].