Peter Howlett

Distribution dynamics: stratification, polarization, and convergence among OECD economies, 1870-1992

Using a distribution dynamics approach, the growth experience of 17 OECD economies is investigated. After explaining the distribution dynamics approach, the empirical analysis examines both the observed period dynamics and the unique long-run equilibrium associated with three periods. This study suggests persistence and stratification, not convergence, characterized the pre-1914 regime, whereas convergence was the key feature of the post-war regime. However, a larger sample of OECD economies in the post-war period indicates that convergence was primarily a feature of the Golden Age and in the post-Golden Age period separation, polarization, and divergence came to the fore.

Evidence of the Existence of an Internal Labour Market in the Great Eastern Railway Company, 1875–1905

Evidence from promotion ladders and the wage payment system of the GER is evaluated to see if it supports existing claims, primarily based on welfare and pension provision, that by 1900 the railway companies had become the first important adherents in the country to a system of internal labour markets. It is suggested that promotion was internalised and that it was based on merit and seniority, that some form of seniority wage payments system did evolve, and that wage increases were sharpest in the first ten years of employment and were associated with spatial mobility

The Economics of World War I: The United Kingdom during World War I: business as usual?

Throughout the war there were two phrases which must have been repeated hundreds of times … ‘Every private interest must be subordinated to the successful prosecution of the war’ and ‘There must be as little interference as possible with the normal channels of trade’ … The real problem was to determine the exact degree of interference with normal trade channels that was necessary for the successful prosecution of the war (Lloyd, 1924: 259). Introduction World War I transformed the British economy in the short run and had a significant impact on growth and development in the long run. In August 1914 there was little appreciation of the sheer scale of the war effort that would be needed to defeat the Central Powers. Similarly, few could imagine the scale of the sacrifice that the country would be called upon to make, in terms of both the number of men lost on the battlefield and the drain on national finances. Some historians have questioned whether the experience can be called a ‘total war’, but from an economic perspective the term is not too misleading, even though the degree of mobilisation in World War II would turn out to be even greater (Chickering and Forster, 2000; Broadberry and Howlett, 2005). As the war lengthened in duration and the war effort expanded, the tension highlighted by Lloyd (1924) between the initial desire to continue with ‘business as usual’ and the need for co-ordinated state intervention came to the fore.

Lessons Learned? British Mobilization for the Two World Wars

We compare the mobilization of the British economy during the two world wars, asking to what extent performance improved in World War II as a result of lessons learned from the experience of World War I. We find that government controls were introduced more quickly and comprehensively in World War II, which improved the scale and speed of mobilization. Better fiscal and financial management also led to less inflation. However, the external account proved more of a problem during World War II, and the greater reliance on planning rather than market mechanisms may have had adverse effects on productivity performance in the postwar world. The setback to national wealth was greater during World War II, but this did not lead to heavier reparation demands, as a result of lessons learned from the Versailles settlement.

The British Economy in the Twentieth Century . By Alan Booth. New York: Palgrave, 2001. Pp. x, 244.

Alan Booth has produced a textbook for (British) first-year undergraduates, the traditional structure of which belies its passionate motivation. It was “written in a mood of growing disenchantment with the level of debate on recent British economic performance” (p. ix). Although such a perspective ensures that the writing is often challenging and never dull, it is not clear that it is the best way to write a core textbook. The aim may have been to produce a first-year-level version of Sidney Pollards classic Development of the British Economy, 1914–1990 (4th ed., London: E. Arnold, 1992), but at times it comes closer in tone to his Wasting of the British Economy (London: Croom Helm, 1982).