Stephen Broadberry

The Early Modern Great Divergence: Wages, Prices and Economic Development in Europe and Asia, 1500-1800

Contrary to the claims of Pomeranz, Parthasarathi and other ‘world historians’, the prosperous parts of Asia between 1500 and 1800 look similar to the stagnating southern, central and eastern parts of Europe rather than the developing northwestern parts. In the advanced parts of India and China, grain wages were comparable to those in northwestern Europe, but silver wages, which conferred purchasing power over tradable goods and services, were substantially lower. The high silver wages of northwestern Europe were not simply a monetary phenomenon, but reflected high productivity in the tradable sector. The ‘Great Divergence’ between Europe and Asia was already well underway before 1800.

How Did the United States and Germany Overtake Britian? A Sectoral Analysis of Comparative Productivity Levels, 1870–1990

A sectoral analysis of comparative labor productivity levels over the period 1870 to 1990 suggests mechanisms of catching-up and forging ahead that are rather different from those found in the conventional literature. Both Germany and the United States caught up with and overtook Britain in terms of aggregate labor productivity largely by shifting resources out of agriculture and improving their relative productivity position in services rather than by improving their position in manufacturing. Although capital played some role, the changes in comparative labor productivity also reflected changes in comparative total factor productivity, related to technology and organization.

Manufacturing and the Convergence Hypothesis: What the Long Run Data Show

The commonly accepted chronology for comparative productivity levels based on GDP data does not apply to the manufacturing sector, where there is evidence of a much greater degree of stationarity of comparative labour productivity performance among the major industrialized countries of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. These results for manufacturing suggest that convergence of GDP per worker must have occurred through trends in other sectors and through compositional effects of structural change. The persistent large labour productivity gap between the US and Europe cannot be explained simply by differences in capital per worker, but is related to technological choice.

Britain's Productivity Gap in the 1930s: Some Neglected Factors

This article proposes a reinterpretation of the failure of interwar British productivity levels to match those of the United States. We argue that key elements in poor British productivity performance included inadequate human capital, a bargaining environment that allowed workers to maintain restrictive practices, and collusive agreements that limited the exit of inefficient firms. We suggest that weaknesses in the structure of British firms pointed out by Chandler and his followers have been overemphasized and that more attention should be given to the role of the market environment in determining the conduct of business.

British economic policy and industrial performance in the early post-war period

n analyses of British productivity performance in the 1930s, we have argued that the policy framework adopted in response to macroeconomic shocks was understandable and quite effective in ameliorating short-term adjustment problems but harmful in terms of its long-run supply side implications for the growth of productive potential (Broadberry and Crafts, 1990; 1992). In this paper we wish to develop similar themes in the context of the early postwar period. In particular, we suggest that the overriding need to cope with balance of payments problems and a monetary overhang in the context of the postwar settlement precluded desirable supply side reforms in the areas of industrial relations and competition policy. On the other hand, the macropolicy framework was highly successful in terms of its inflation and unemployment outcomes. When detailed analysis of cross sectional productivity performance in British manufacturing is undertaken, weaknesses are seen particularly in terms of human capital and in the incentive structure which the bargaining environment gave to firms and unions with respect to productivity improvement. Again, these problems are a continuation of the 1930s experience which tend to inhibit catch-up growth.

The Cambridge economic history of modern Europe

Unlike existing textbooks on the economic history of modern Europe, which offer a country-by-country approach, The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe rethinks Europes economic history since 1700 as unified and pan-European, with material organised by topic rather than by country. The first volume is centred on the transition to modern economic growth, which first occurred in Britain before spreading to other parts of western Europe by 1870, whilst the second tracks Europes economic history through three major phases since 1870. Each chapter is written by an international team of authors who cover the three major regions of northern Europe, southern Europe, and central and eastern Europe. The two volumes together provide a comprehensive and accessible introduction to the key themes in modern economic history from trade, urbanisation, economic growth and business cycles to sectoral developments, and population and living standards.

The Economics of World War I: The economics of World War I: an overview

Introduction: economic factors in the war This book deals with two issues in the economics of twentieth-century warfare. First is the contribution of economics to victory and defeat of the great powers in World War II. Second is the impact of the war upon long-run economic trends and postwar institutions in the economies of the great powers. What was the contribution of economics to the outcome of the war? As far as this first question is concerned, the authors share a broad understanding of ‘economies’, which comprises the national requirements of the war, the quantity and quality of resources, their availability and mobilization, and the institutions and policies which mobilized them for wartime purposes. As for resources, we understand them to include not only physical resources such as minerals, materials, and fixed capital assets, and financial stocks and flows, but also the human resources represented by the working population, its health and literacy, its degree of skill, training, and education, as well as assets represented by scientific knowledge and technological know-how. How important were these economic factors in deciding who won the war, and who lost? In answering this question it has always made sense to distinguish two periods of the conflict. In the first period, economic considerations were less important than purely military factors. This was the phase of greatest success for the powers of the Axis, and it lasted roughly until the end of 1941 or into 1942 (the exact turning point differed by a few months among the different regional theatres).

From the Counting House to the Modern Office: Explaining Anglo-American Productivity Differences in Services, 1870–1990

The United States overtook Britain in comparative aggregate productivity levels primarily as a result of trends in services rather than trends in industry. This occurred during the transition from customized, low-volume, high-margin business organized on the basis of networks to standardized, high-volume, low-margin business with hierarchical management from the 1870s. This transformation from the counting house to the modern office was dependent on technologies that improved communications and information processing. The technologies were slower to diffuse in Britain as a result of lower levels of education and stronger labor-force resistance to intensification.

Anglo-German productivity differences 1870–1990: A sectoral analysis

This paper sets out the evolution of Anglo-German comparative labour productivity levels since 1870, using a nine-sector disaggregation. Germany caught up with and overtook Britain in terms of aggregate labour productivity largely by shifting resources out of agriculture and improving her relative productivity position in services rather than by improving her position in manufacturing. The key role attributed by many economic historians and growth economists to technology transfer in manufacturing as a major factor driving convergence of productivity and living standards is called into question.

Lancashire, India, and Shifting Competitive Advantage in Cotton Textiles, 1700–1850: The Neglected Role of Factor Prices

In the early eighteenth century, wages in Britain were more than four times as high as in India, the worlds major exporter of cotton textiles. This induced the adoption of more capital-intensive production methods in Britain and a faster rate of technological progress, so that competitive advantage had begun to shift in Britains favour by the late eighteenth century. However, the completion of the process was delayed until after the Napoleonic Wars by increasing raw cotton costs, before supply adjusted to the major increase in demand for inputs.