Peter-J. Jost

Organisation und Koordination

ausforderungen für die Polizei und die Mitarbeiter des Einsatzreferats des Innenministeriums in den letzten Jahren war die Fußballeuropameisterschaft 2008. Sportgroßveranstaltungen, Demonstrationen, Staatsbesuche, Popkonzerte und andere öffentliche Veranstaltungen, bei denen viele Menschen zu erwarten sind, erfordern den Einsatz geschlossener Polizeieinheiten im Rahmen des „großen Sicherheitsund Ordnungsdienstes“ (GSOD). Der Einsatz der geschlossenen Polizeieinheiten wird von den Mitarbeitern des Einsatzreferats koordiniert. „Unsere Aufgabe ist es, die notwendigen Kräfte für den Einsatzort aufzustellen und erforderlichenfalls Kräfte aus anderen Bundesländern zuzuteilen“, sagt GSOD-Referent Oberstleutnant Mag. Christian Preischl. Die Polizisten werden für den GSOD trainiert und haben eine besondere Ausrüstung zur Verfügung. Die Herausforderung bei der EURO 2008 in Österreich war, „neben den einheimischen Kräften die unterstützenden ausländischen Polizeieinheiten zu koordinieren und die Zusammenarbeit mit den Landesleitzentralen und Stäben in den Bundesländern aufrecht zu erhalten“, berichtet Preischl. Der Polizeioffizier war während der EURO im BMI-Stab tätig und nahm danach an mehreren Projekten teil, die sich mit der Evaluierung der sicherheitspolizeilichen Maßnahmen im Zusammenhang mit Sportgroßveranstaltungen befasste. Ziel war dabei, Nutzen für weitere Großveranstaltungen zu ziehen.

Mergers in Patent Contest Models with Synergies and Spillovers

We consider mergers in an innovation contest between n firms in the presence of synergetic effects. We assume that a merger may affect the R&D efficiency of the merging firm due to increasing returns to scale in R&D. We show that mergers are beneficial for the merging firms even if the efficiency gains of the merging firms are not substantial, and that merging reduces R&D costs by only 6%. We also consider the influence of unintended knowledge flows in R&D. In the presence of knowledge spillovers, we show that higher efficiency gains are needed to make the merger profitable.

Monitoring, Appeal, and Investigation: The Enforcement and Legal Process

In this article, I consider a model of law enforcement in which a regulatory agency faces the following problem: To induce firms which are required to adopt a certain level of environmental care, the agency can make spot checks. This monitoring, however, measures a firm‘s degree of protection only with error. On the basis of the observed signal, the agency then has to decide whether or not to fine a firm for taking insufficient protection. If it fines a firm which has actually met the level of environmental protection, the firm has the right to lodge an appeal. To plead the cause, the agency then is required to investigate at high cost the actual degree of the firm‘s protection.In this context we ask how the regulatory agency allocates resources between different enforcement activities. We show how the structure of the optimal enforcement policy depends on the cost of the enforcement activities, on the uncertainty of observation, on its enforcement budget and other factors.

Crime, coordination, and punishment An economic analysis

Abstract In the standard economic theory of crime and punishment, a risk-neutral individual will commit an offense if and only if his private benefit exceeds the expected sanction for doing so. To the extent that several individuals simultaneously choose whether or not to commit the offense, it is assumed that their decisions are independent of each other. The purpose of this paper is to investigate a situation in which an individual’s propensity to engage in an illegal activity may depend also on the behavior of other individuals. We consider a two-period model: In each period, individuals decide simultaneously whether to commit the offense. A police authority is in charge for the arrest and conviction of offenders. We assume that the police authority has a limited enforcement budget such that it cannot arrest and convict every offender. In this situation, the expected payoff of an individual from committing the offense is higher the more individuals also decide to behave illegally. We analyse the interactive behavior in this model and answer the following questions: When are individuals responding to others’ behavior, when are they influencing others’ behavior. And, what is the optimal enforcement policy to forestall interactive behavior.

Regulatory enforcement in the presence of a court system

The responsibilities of a regulatory agency involved in the law enforcement process vary considerably. In this paper we consider three different legal procedures in the process of law enforcement: First, we assume that the regulatory agency is in charge of the detection of offenses. Conviction takes place via court trial. Second, we assume that the regulatory agency has the power to fine an individual if there is some evidence that he did not comply with the law. An individual who has been fined by the agency has the right to lodge an appeal. If he makes use of this right, the question whether or not he complied with the law will be reconsidered. Here we discuss two different legal procedures: The case is decided by court, and the regulatory agency is required to provide sufficient evidence for its decision. Or, the agency reconsiders its decision and decides whether or not to press charges in court. We formalize these three legal procedures in a game-theoretic context and analyze the implications of the procedural regulations on the decision of a potential offender to behave illegally.

Disclosure of Information and Incentives for Care

Abstract This article studies discovery rules that govern pretrial disclosure of private information in legal disputes. We analyze the effect of discovery rules on the incentives for accident prevention by potential injurers. Two discovery procedures are considered: Under private disclosure, the plaintiff has the right to compel discovery (e.g., with the help of an expert). Under public disclosure, the plaintiff can ask for discovery by a public authority. We argue that if government officials act in the public interest, public administration in best suited to compel the disclosure of private information.

Simultaneous- versus Sequential-Move Tournaments with Heterogeneous Agents

This paper extends the discussion of simultaneous-move tournaments by focusing on the analysis of heterogeneous instead of homogeneous contestants. We show that the principal will not implement first-best efforts even though the agents are risk neutral and not limited in wealth, and despite the principal being able to implement an efficient outcome. At a second step, we compare our results with the equilibrium findings for sequential-move tournaments. We show that agents’ strategic behavior differs significantly in the two setups. In the sequential-move tournament, an underdog can realize a first-mover advantage, but the underdog is never better off in the simultaneous-move tournament. We also discuss the principal’s preferences for the different types of tournaments.

Preemptive Behavior in Sequential Tournaments

Rank-order tournaments are usually modeled simultaneously. However, real tournaments are often sequentially. We show that agents’ strategic behavior significantly differs in sequential tournaments compared to simultaneous tournaments. In a sequential tournament, under certain conditions the first acting agent chooses a preemptively high effort so that the following agent gives up. In general, the principal will prefer simultaneous tournaments in which preemptive behavior is impossible.

Organization of Project Evaluation and Implementation under Moral Hazard

We examine the optimal organizational form of project evaluation and implementation under moral hazard. In the evaluation phase, two fallible risk-neutral agents sequentially screen projects. The approved projects are subsequently implemented in the development phase. We show that moral hazard renders the organization as a polyarchy less attractive than as a hierarchy. Furthermore, given moral hazard, task assignment becomes relevant: For identical agents, the principal always delegates implementation to the agent who works first in the evaluation phase.

The Economics of Motivation and Organization

In this unique book, Peter-J. Jost provides a comprehensive economic-psychological approach for successfully managing employees. Based on the analysis of the employee’s individual work behavior, he illustrates that instead of treating employees as input elements of production, and managing and controlling their work, organizations need to motivate their employees to act in the interest of the firm and in accordance with its goals.