Peter M. Blau

The Cost of Inequality: Metropolitan Structure and Violent Crime

The hypothesis tested is that variations in rates of urban criminal violence largely result from differences in racial inequality in socioeconomic conditions. Data on the 125 largest American metropolitan areas (SMSAs) are used to ascertain whether this hypothesis can account for three correlates of violent crime differently interpreted in the literature. Criminal violence is positively related to location in the South, which has been interpreted as the result of the Southern tradition of violence. It is positively related to the proportion of blacks in an SMSA, which has been interpreted as reflecting a subculture of violence in ghettos. And it is positively related to poverty, which has been interpreted as the emphasis on toughness and excitement in the culture of poverty. The analysis reveals that socioeconomic inequality between races, as well as economic inequality generally, increases rates of criminal violence, but once economic inequalities are controlled poverty no longer influences these rates, neither does Southern location, and the proportion of blacks in the population hardly does. These results imply that if there is a culture of violence, its roots are pronounced economic inequalities, especially if associated with ascribed position.

A FORMAL THEORY OF DIFFERENTIATION IN ORGANIZATIONS

The expanding size of organizations gives rise to increasing subdivision of responsibilities, facilitates supervision and widens the span of control of supervisors, and simultaneously creates structural differentiation and problems of coordination that require supervisory attention. Large size, therefore, has opposite effects on the administrative component, reducing it because of an economy of scale in supervision, and raising it indirectly because of the differentiation in large organizations. The administrative costs of differentiation have feedback effects, which reduce the savings in administrative overhead large size effects, on the one hand, and stem the influence of size on differentiation, on the other. These inferences are derived from quantitative research on the employment security agencies in the United States and their subunits. The endeavor in this paper is to construct a systematic theory of differentiation in organizations consisting of two basic generalizations and nine propositions derivable from them, which can account for a considerable number of empirical findings. The two basic generalizations are: (1) increasing organizational size generates differentiation along various lines at decelerating rates; and (2) differentiation enlarges the administrative component in organizations to effect coordination.

A Macrosociological Theory of Social Structure

Social structure is conceptualized as the distributions of a population among social positions in a multidimensional space of positions. This quantitative conception of social structure is the basis for a deductive theory of the macrostructure of social associations in society. The likelihood that people engage in intergroup associations under specifiable structural conditions can bededuced from analaytic propositions about structural properties without any assumption about sociopsychological dispositions to establish intergroup associations, indeed, on the assumption that people prefer ingroup relations. Group size governs the probability of intergroup relations, a fact that has paradoxical implications for discrimination by a majority against a minority. Inequality impedes and heterogeneity promotes intergroup relations. The major structural condition that governs intergroup relations is the degree of connection of parameters. Intersecting parameters exert structural constraints to participate in intergroup relations; consolidated parameters impede them. The more differentiation of any kind penetrates into the substructures of society, the greater is the probability that extensive social relations integrate various segments in society.

Structural contexts of opportunities

Preface 1: Macrostructural Concepts 2: Formal Theory of Population Structure 3: Testing Theoretical Implications 4: Occupational Chances 5: Structural Context and Organizations 6: Social Exchange 7: Historical Developments Bibliography Author Index Subject Index

HETEROGENEITY AND INTERMARRIAGE

public use sample of the 1970 U.S. Census. The two theoretical predictions are: (1) a groups relative size is inversely related to the proportion of its members who are outmarried; and (2) an SMSAs heterogeneity is directly related to the rate of intermarriage in it. The underlying assumption is that the structural constraints of size distributions affect marriage notwithstanding cultural values promoting ingroup marriages. The data confirm the two predictions (corroborating the underlying assumption) for most size differences and most forms of heterogeneity examined. Thus, heterogeneity in national origins, mother tongue, birth region, industry, and occupation raise intermarriage rates in these respects. Although racial heterogeneity does not have this predicted effect, the reason is that the great socioeconomic differences between races consolidate racial boundaries and thereby counteract the influence of heterogeneity on intermarriage. Empirical evidence supports this explanation: when racial income differences are controlled, the predicted positive relationship between racial heterogeneity and intermarriage becomes apparent.

The Hierarchy of Authority in Organizations

The unexpected finding of a previous study of 150 government agencies, that superior qualifications of the personnel increase the ratio of supervisors, was interpreted to imply that many supervisors improve upward communication,whereas few entail centralized management trough directives from the top down. A study of 250 government agencies of a different type confirms the inference that organizations requiring higher qualifications of their personnel are more decentralized, and it shows that the larger proportion of supervisors in them results partly from the narrower span of control of first-line supervisors and partly from the larger number of managerial levels in the hierarchy. Other correlates of a hierarchy with many levels are size, few major divisions, automation, and explicit promotion regulations that give much weight to merit and little to seniority. The implication is that large organizations developed multilevel hierarchies,which remove top management from the operating level, primarily if conditions in the agency, such as automation and personnel standards that assure minimum qualifications, make operations relatively self regulating and independent of direct intervention by management. Such conditions transfrom squat structures that are centrally governed into tall hierarchies with decentralized authority. These conclusions are supported by data on still another type of government agency, which reveal essentially the same correlations with multilevel hierarchy.

Occupational Choice: a Conceptual Framework

Publisher Summary The problem of explaining why people enter different occupations can be approached from various perspectives. It is possible to examine the ways in which changes in the wage structure and other economic factors channel the flow of the labor force into different occupations, in which case the psychological motives through which these socioeconomic forces become effective are treated. An approach would focus upon the stratified social structure, rather than upon either the psychological makeup of individuals or the organization of the economy, and would analyze the effects of parental social status upon the occupational opportunities of children. Each of these perspectives, by the nature of the discipline from which it derives, excludes from consideration some important variables that might affect occupational choice and selection. Representatives from the three disciplines—psychology, economics, and sociology—have collaborated in the development of a more inclusive conceptual framework.

Interdependence and hierarchy in organizations

Abstract The large size of organizations appears to promote structural differentiation and to stem the expansion of the administrative apparatus, but a differentiated structure tends to lead to the expansion of the administrative apparatus, so that the indirect effect of size, mediated by the differentiation accompanying it, counteracts its direct effect on administration. These conclusions are based on six sets of quantitative data on government bureaus, private firms, universities and colleges, and hospitals. Two basic theoretical hypotheses can explain the findings. First, differentiation of functions among interdependent subgroupings transforms a work organizations employees, who have little in common, into a coherent social enterprise and, in addition, has instrumental advantages for operations that make management interested in furthering such differentiation. Second, the initial investments in administrative time and effort required for organizing operations reduce the proportion of administrative man hours needed as the volume of operations increases. A refinement of the last principle is that a large volume of homogenous tasks produces administrative savings, whereas the heterogeneity of tasks has the opposite effect. In conclusion, the theory is put into deductive form.

Presidential Address: Parameters of Social Structure

Social structures are defined by their parameters the criteria underlying the differentiation among people and governing social interaction, such as sex, race, socioeconomic status, and power. The analysis of various forms of differentiation, their interrelations, and their implications for integration and change is the distinctive task of sociology. Two generic types of differentiation are heterogeneity and status inequality. Nominal parameters divide people into subgroups and engender heterogeneity. Graduated parameters differentiate people in terms of status rankings and engender inequality. The macrosocial integration of the diverse groups in modern society rests on its multiform heterogeneity resulting from many crosscutting parameters. For although heterogeneity entails barriers to social intercourse multiform heterogeneity undermines these barriers and creates structural constraints to establish intergroup relations. Crosscutting lines of differentiation thus foster processes of social integration, and they also foster processes of recurrent change. Strongly interrelated parameters impede these processes of integration and adjustment, however. (Such relationships between parameters for example, between the occupation and income of individuals must not be confused with the relationships between forms of differentiation for example, between the division of labor and income inequality in societies.) Pronounced correlations of parameters reveal a consolidated status structure, which intensifies inequalities and discourages intergroup relations and gradual change. The growing concentration of resources and powers in large organizations and their top executives poses a serious threat of structural consolidation in contemporary society.

THE STRUCTURE OF SMALL BUREAUCRACIES

An analysis of bureaucratic structure is based on data from 156 American public personnel agencies. Whereas a professional staff was expected to reduce the need for many managers, the opposite is actually the case. Lack of professionalization tends to lead to the centralization of official authority in the hands of relatively few managers. The division of labor, which typically accompanies growing size, promotes centralization of authority only if the staff is not professional. This finding suggests that a centralized authority structure is well suited for the coordination of tasks differentiated into simple routines but not for that of professional specialties. Structural complexities destroy the economic advantage that operating on a comparatively large scale otherwise has, but bureaucratic mechanisms of communication, such as a sufficient administrative staff, restore this advantage. W Hy does Webers analysis of bureau