Robert K. Merton

The Matthew Effect in Science: The reward and communication systems of science are considered

This account of the Matthew effect is another small exercise in the psychosociological analysis of the workings of science as a social institution. The initial problem is transformed by a shift in theoretical perspective. As originally identified, the Matthew effect was construed in terms of enhancement of the position of already eminent scientists who are given disproportionate credit in cases of collaboration or of independent multiple discoveries. Its significance was thus confined to its implications for the reward system of science. By shifting the angle of vision, we note other possible kinds of consequences, this time for the communication system of science. The Matthew effect may serve to heighten the visibility of contributions to science by scientists of acknowledged standing and to reduce the visibility of contributions by authors who are less well known. We examine the psychosocial conditions and mechanisms underlying this effect and find a correlation between the redundancy function of multiple discoveries and the focalizing function of eminent men of science—a function which is reinforced by the great value these men place upon finding basic problems and by their self-assurance. This self-assurance, which is partly inherent, partly the result of experiences and associations in creative scientific environments, and partly a result of later social validation of their position, encourages them to search out risky but important problems and to highlight the results of their inquiry. A macrosocial version of the Matthew principle is apparently involved in those processes of social selection that currently lead to the concentration of scientific resources and talent (50).

The Matthew Effect in Science, II: Cumulative Advantage and the Symbolism of Intellectual Property

HE SUBJECT OF THIS ESSAY is a problem in the sociology of science that has long been of interest to me. That problem, a candid friend tells me, is somewhat obscured by the formidable title assigned to it. Yet, properly deciphered, the title is not nearly as opaque as it might at first seem. Consider first the signal emitted by the Roman numeral II in the main title. It informs us that the paper follows on an earlier one, “The Matthew Effect in Science, ” which I finally put into print a good many years ago.’ The ponderous, not to say lumpy, subtitle goes on to signal the direction of this follow-on. The first concept, cumulative advantage, applied to the domain of science, refers to the social processes through which various kinds of opportunities for scientific inquiry as well as the subsequent symbolic and material rewards for the results of that inquiry tend to accumulate for individual practitioners of science, as they do also for organizations engaged in scientific work. The concept of cumulative advantage directs our attention to the ways in which initial comparative advantages of trained capacity successive increments of 7 s

Social Time: A Methodological and Functional Analysis

The category of astronomical time is only one of several concepts of time. Such concepts differ in the fields of philosophy, psychology, and economics. An operational definition of expressions of time in common usage shows that social phenomena are frequently adopted as a frame of reference so that units of time are often fixed by the rhythm of collective life. The need for social collaboration is at the root of social systems of time. Social time is qualitatively differentiated according to the beliefs and customs common to the group. Social time is not continuous but is interrupted by critical dates. All calendrical systems arise from and are perpetuated by social requirements. They arise from social differentiation and a widening area of social interaction. It is possible that the introduction of social time as a methodological category would enhance the discovery of social periodicities.

Mass persuasion : the social psychology of a war bond drive

The purpose of this book is to uncover the structure and dynamics of mass persuasion in our society. The case study for analysis was the Third War Loan appeal made by Kate Smith.

The Bearing of Empirical Research upon the Development of Social Theory

H ISTORY has a certain gift for outmoding stereotypes. This can be seen, for example, in the historical development of sociology. The stereotype of the social theorist high in the empyrean of pure ideas uncontaminated by mundane facts is fast becoming no less outmoded than the stereotype of the social researcher equipped with questionnaire and pencil and hot on the chase of the isolated and meaningless statistic. For in building the mansion of sociology during the last decades, theorist and empiricist have learned to work together. What is more, they have learned to talk to one another in the process. At times, this means only that a sociologist has learned to talk to himself since increasingly the same man has taken up both theory and research. Specialization and integration have developed hand in hand. All this has led not only to the realization that theory and empirical research should interact but to the result that they do interact.

The ambivalence of scientists.

It is a high privilege to be invited to give the lecture that annually commemorates the first great president of this first authentic university in the United States. This is especially so for someone from a comparatively new academic discipline, a discipline which was installed in this university a short time ago with the appointment of Professor James S. Coleman (who, it is agreeable to note, is himself outstanding among the graduates of our department at Columbia). I like to think that the double recognition thus accorded sociology by the Johns Hopkins is only another bit of testimony to the far-seeing vision of Daniel Coit Gilman. We should remember, for one thing, that he had prophetically described the “study of man in his relations to society” as one of “the modern humanities”; that later, only three years after he became president of this new university be agreed to become president of the American Social Science Association; and finally, that, in his famous address on ‘Research’ almost sixty years ago, he conceived the expanding domain of science to include sociology which (in his words) was beginning to “employ the scientific method, with increasing success, and [to] demand recognition in the surrogate’s court, as the next of kin.” But since I have not been asked here to present the sociologist’s credentials as kin to the older sciences represented at the School of Medicine, I must proceed to my subject.

The Role of Applied Social Science in the Formation of Policy: A Research Memorandum

1. Rationale of the Inquiry. Although the application of social science to practical problems of policy and action is still in its early stages, a large body of experience has been accumulated. Social science has been applied, in diverse spheres and with diverse results. The experience is there, but it has not been systematically reviewed and codified. Consequently, no one knows the present status of applied social science or, more importantly, its potentialities. Social scientists have been so busy examining the behavior of others that they have largely neglected the study of their own situation, problems and behavior. Foundations, government and commercial enterprises have been so concerned with research directed toward pressing problems that they have failed to take systematic inventory of the achievements and potentialities represented by this large body of researches. The hobo and the saleslady have been singled out for close study, but not the social science expert. Sociological monographs document the problems and perforance of the professional thief and the professional beggar but not the problems and performance of the professional social scientist. Yet it would seem that clarity might well begin at home. Quite apart from the direct intellectual merits of the problem, the most varied groups have a stake in an analysis of the present and potential role of applied social science in American society. Most prominently, social scientists themselves stand to gain by such inquiry. Perhaps owing to the absence of any systematic appraisal of their role, social scientists are sometimes beset with exaggerated doubts and harassed by exaggerated claims concerning their contributions to solutions for the problems of our day. The actual workaday relations between basic and applied social science must for them be largely matters of opinion, sometimes well-founded, at other times not, simply because these relations have not been made the object of systematic investigation. Foundations and other philanthropic agencies engaged in endowing social

Puritanism, pietism, and science

I his prolegomena to a cultural sociolc^y Alfred Weber has discriminated between the processes of society, culture, and civilization.* Since his primary inter^t lay in differentiating these categories of sociological phenomena, Weber in large measure ignored their specific inter-relationships; a field of study which is fundamental for the sociol«^ist. It is precisely this interaction between certain elements of culture and civilization, with especial reference to seventeenth-century England, which constitutes the object-matter of the present essay.

Fluctuations in the Rate of Industrial Invention

I. Socio-economic problems of rates of invention and shifts of inventive interest, 454; limitations of the use of patent statistics as indexes of the rate of invention, 455. — II. The data used, 457; analysis of the data, 458; pattern of technical change within an industry, 460. — III. Factors which account for this pattern, 464.

On Discipline Building: The Paradoxes of George Sarton

THE PROCESSES BY WHICH KNOWLEDGE is institutionalized have yet to be explored in any systematic way. It is easier to sense than to articulate those characteristic changes in cognitive structure and social function which any field of learning undergoes as its legitimacy is established. Yet certain features may be delineated. The most obvious is the set of shifts that a field of learning experiences as it changes from being a diffuse, unfocused area of inquiry, at best tangential to the true intellectual concerns of its occasional votaries, to being a conceptually discrete discipline, able to command its own tools, techniques, methodologies, intellectual orientations, and problematics. This creation of a cognitive identity is only one facet of the institutionalization of a field of learning. A parallel set of shifts, which most often occurs at a later period in time, revolves around the creation of a professional identity for the new enterprise. This latter set of shifts has normally provided the focus for discussions of the professionalization of science.3 However, the creation of a professional identity is only one part of the process by which a discipline or group of disciplines are institutionalized.