Peter Moser

Checks and balances, and the supply of central bank independence

Abstract The paper analyzes the institutional conditions under which policymakers can credibly commit to an independent central bank and thereby mitigate the well-known time consistency problem in monetary policy. It is shown theoretically that granting independence via a statute is only credible for legislative systems with at least two heterogeneous decision-making bodies which both have veto rights (for example bicameral systems). This thesis is supported by empirical evidence: The legal independence of central banks is significantly higher in those OECD countries whose legislative processes are characterized by extensive checks and balances. Furthermore, the negative relation between legal independence and inflation is larger in countries with checks and balances than in countries without checks and balances.

A theory of the conditional influence of the European Parliament in the cooperation procedure

I provide a public choice-based explanation of why the European Parliament is sometimes influential in the cooperation procedure. While a conservative Parliament can use its right of rejections to block a decision effectively whenever there is no consent in the Council, a Parliament in favor of change can successfully use its amendment right in the second reading whenever the constraints have been changed unexpectedly since the adoption of the common position such as to create an amendment win set. Then, the European Parliament can choose its most preferred policy in this set which is supported by the Commission, cannot be changed by the Council and is preferred against the status quo by a qualified majority in the Council.

The Co-operation Procedure in the EU: Why was the European Parliament Influential in the Decision on Car Emission Standards?

The conditional influence of the European Parliament (EP) in the co-operation procedure is a recognized empirical phenomenon in the literature. One explanation for such conditional influence is that the Parliament can successfully propose amendments only when the restriction which it faces changes during the decision-making process. We explore this argument and find that it is able to explain the influence of the EP in the decision on car emission standards.

The impact of legislative institutions on public policy: a survey

This paper surveys the application of spatial models for the analysis of economic policy decisions. Three topics are reviewed: the first is how the structure of the decision-making process contributes to stable and consistent policy choices. Both aspects are decisive prerequisites for the functioning of a market economy. Second, a review of the literature on US and European Union (EU) policy choices reveals how decision rules are decisive in predicting these choices. Third, a literature on the structure of legislative decision-making shows how the understanding of bureaucratic behavior is enhanced by the analysis of the rules which determine delegated discretion.

Constitutional protection of economic rights: The Swiss and U.S. experience in comparison

This paper analyzes the contribution of the Swiss and the U.S. Constitution to protect economic liberties, and compares the different strategies that both constitutions rely on to achieve this goal. Pertinent provisions in the Swiss Constitution are rather precise but relatively easy to change, whereas the U.S. Constitution is characterized by vaguely formulated constraints that are difficult to amend formally and that are interpreted by the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, the substantial constitutional changes that did occur in both countries seem to have followed strikingly similar patterns: Initially, regional integration through reciprocal market opening within both countries facilitated the constitutional protection of economic liberties. Subsequently, the constitutional protection of economic liberties eroded in both countries, especially against federal legislation, due to changes in the interpretation of the constitution through the courts, or by formal amendment. Lastly, both constitutions were not immune against sudden demands by special interest groups that were being raised during times of crisis or war.

Rational Choice and the Governance Structure of the European Union : An Introduction

The European Union is increasingly characterized by a complex system of countervailing institutions. One attempt to understand the relationships between the member states and competing institutions within the EU is the theory of strategic integration. The rational choice analysis of European integration encompasses both economics and political science and is largely devoted to institutional issues. This essay offers a brief introduction to the strategic study of the European Union and a selective review of the literature on this topic. We also summarize and discuss the main contributions in this volume and point out future areas of research.

Reasons for regional integration agreements

Regional integration agreements are commonplace in the world today. In 1996 there were 88 such agreements worldwide, covering a variety of forms from declarations of intent to unilateral preferential trade agreements, free trade treaties, customs unions, and the common market with its freedom of movement for labour and capital. Which factors have contributed to the great popularity of regional integration agreements?