Peter Munk Christiansen

From Corporatism to Lobbyism? Parliaments, Executives, and Organized Interests in Denmark and Norway

The integration of organized interests into the formation and implementation of public policies is a core institutional trait of the Scandinavian countries. However, significant changes have taken place in the relations between organized interests and public authorities in Denmark and Norway during the last two decades. The use of traditional corporatist structures of interest intermediation has been reduced in favor of a corresponding increase in lobbyism. At the same time a marked increase in the frequency and intensity of contacts between organized interests and parliamentary actors has taken place. The shift in focus mirrors the increasing role played by the two parliaments in public policy formation and a less positive assessment of the outcomes of strongly institutionalized corporatist policy making by administrative decision makers.

A Prescription Rejected: Market Solutions to Problems of Public Sector Governance

The New Public Management includes the idea of incorporating market mechanisms in public sector governance. In the Danish case, market reforms have scarcely been used; private sector supplies of public services have not increased during the last decade. The lack of success of market reform in Denmark is explained by the strong institutions of traditional public sector governance operating at the micro-level. Formal and informal hierarchy and formal and informal corporatism hold a strong grip on public sector governance. The very decentralized structure of the Danish public sector decreases the importance of central government in terms of reform strategies. Strong interests and institutional constraints keep reforms in the Danish public sector within a hierarchical mode of governance.

Coping With Corporatism in Decline and the Revival of Parliament Interest Group Lobbyism in Denmark and Norway, 1980–2005

Denmark and Norway have experienced significant political changes during the past three decades, changes that affect the constraints and opportunities organized interests are facing. Corporatist representation in the policy-making process has declined, and changes in executive-legislative relations have increased the power of parliaments. Organized interests are expected to adapt to these changing circumstances to maintain their political influence. This article shows how Danish and Norwegian interest groups have coped with the decline of corporatism and the revival of parliaments. Representation in corporatist policy-making committees and lobbying toward civil servants in government ministries have been supplemented and in some cases substituted by political lobbyism directed toward elected representatives in the parliament and the government. The analysis is based on panel data from several surveys carried out among nationwide interest groups in Denmark and Norway.

Behind the Veil of Vagueness: Success and Failure in Institutional Reforms

The difficulties of implementing large institutional reforms are legendary. Reform programs may face strong resistance from designated losers, falter at successive veto points, or stall when multiple decision makers have diverse goals. Institutional theories have successfully accounted for failure of reform in many settings, but scholars have paid less attention to how the strategic design of a reform process can have a positive effect on reform initiatives. We seek to fill this gap by studying the impact of planned ambiguity in reform processes. We hypothesize that reform proposals are more likely to succeed when policy entrepreneurs strategically hide the cost-benefit profile of a reform proposal behind a veil of vagueness until the final stages of the process. Designated losers with limited information about the impact of proposed reforms are less likely to succeed in thwarting the reform. We test the theory on four institutional reforms or reform attempts in Denmark.

From classic to modern corporatism. Interest group representation in Danish public committees in 1975 and 2010

ABSTRACT Involving interest groups in public committees is a crucial feature of policy-making in many democratic systems. This article investigates how the composition of committees in Denmark has developed from 1975 to 2010, with specific focus on interest group seats. We argue that the committee system has been adapted in response to societal changes. We expect relatively better representation of citizen groups over time and a decline in the level of concentration in access. These expectations are tested in an analysis of the composition of all public committees in the two years. We find remarkable stability in the 35-year period, but also an adaptation of the committee system largely in the expected direction. This traditional corporatist institution appears less weakened than often assumed.

Does politics crowd out professional competence? The organisation of ministerial advice in Denmark and Sweden

Abstract The use of politically appointed ministerial advisors has increased noticeably in many Western countries, but we know little about how this development has affected the civil servants recruited on merit. The article asks whether political appointees accentuate or blur the line between politics and administration. Do political appointees take over political-tactical advice and leave policy advice to the permanent civil service, or do they cause permanent civil servants to be even more influenced by political considerations? And do political appointees make it easier or more difficult for the permanent civil service to be politically responsive? A Most Similar Systems Design comparison of Denmark and Sweden allows an assessment of the effects of political appointees. It is found that a large number of political appointees decreases functional politicisation of the permanent civil service; that functional politicisation tends to crowd out tasks related to more classic policy advice; and that functional politicisation increases political responsiveness.

How corporatist institutions shape the access of citizen groups to policy makers: Evidence from Denmark and Switzerland

ABSTRACT Traditional corporatist groups such as business groups and unions still play an important role in many countries, and the rumors exaggerate the decline of corporatist structures. Nevertheless citizen groups have grown in number and political importance. The authors show that Danish and Swiss citizen groups have gained better access to the administrative and parliamentary venues in the period 1975–1985 through 2010, but with Swiss citizen groups more successful than their Danish counterparts, particularly with regard to the parliamentary venue. Danish and Swiss neo-corporatism has confronted similar socio-economic and political challenges during this period, but the political opportunity structure is more favorable towards citizen groups in Switzerland than in Denmark. The Swiss referendum institution makes parliamentarians more open to popular demands while in Denmark strong unions, a strong parliament and frequent minority governments make it more difficult for citizen groups to be heard.