Peter Vickers

A Confrontation of Convergent Realism

For many years—and with some energy since Laudan’s “Confutation of Convergent Realism” (1981)—the scientific realist has sought to accommodate examples of false-yet-successful theories in the history of science. One of the most prominent strategies is to identify ‘success fueling’ components of false theories that themselves are at least approximately true (judging by our current understanding). In this article I develop both sides of the debate, introducing new challenges from the history of science as well as suggesting adjustments to the divide et impera realist strategy. A new ‘recipe’ for the prospective identification of (at least some) working/idle posits is considered.

Miraculous Success? Inconsistency and Untruth in Kirchhoff’s Diffraction Theory

Kirchhoff’s diffraction theory is introduced as a new case study in the realism debate. The theory is extremely successful despite being both inconsistent and not even approximately true. Some habitual realist proclamations simply cannot be maintained in the face of Kirchhoff’s theory, as the realist is forced to acknowledge that theoretical success can in some circumstances be explained in terms other than truth. The idiosyncrasy (or otherwise) of Kirchhoff’s case is considered. 1 Introduction 2 The Naïve Optimist 3 Kirchhoff’s Theory 4 Inconsistency and Untruth in Kirchhoff’s Theory 4.1 The inconsistency puzzle 4.2 The error-tolerance puzzle 5 Ramifications for Realism 6 Conclusion 1 Introduction 2 The Naïve Optimist 3 Kirchhoff’s Theory 4 Inconsistency and Untruth in Kirchhoff’s Theory 4.1 The inconsistency puzzle 4.2 The error-tolerance puzzle 4.1 The inconsistency puzzle 4.2 The error-tolerance puzzle 5 Ramifications for Realism 6 Conclusion

Frisch, Muller, and Belot on an Inconsistency in Classical Electrodynamics

This paper follows up a debate as to whether classical electrodynamics is inconsistent. Mathias Frisch makes the claim in Inconsistency, Asymmetry and Non-Locality ([2005]), but this has been quickly countered by F. A. Muller ([2007]) and Gordon Belot ([2007]). Here I argue that both Muller and Belot fail to connect with the background assumptions that support Frischs claim. Responding to Belot I explicate Frischs position in more detail, before providing my own criticisms. Correcting Frischs position, I find that I can present the theory in a way both authors can agree upon. Differences then manifest themselves purely within the reasoning methods employed. 1. Introduction2. Features of the Theory3. Frischs Inconsistency Claim4. Defending Frisch 4.1. Muller4.2. Belot5. Difficulties for Frisch and a Compromise6. Conclusion Introduction Features of the Theory Frischs Inconsistency Claim Defending Frisch 4.1. Muller4.2. Belot Muller Belot Difficulties for Frisch and a Compromise Conclusion

Are There No Things That are Scientific Theories

The ontological status of theories themselves has recently re-emerged as a live topic in the philosophy of science. We consider whether a recent approach within the philosophy of art can shed some light on this issue. For many years philosophers of aesthetics have debated a paradox in the (meta)ontology of musical works (e.g. Levinson [1980]). Taken individually, there are good reasons to accept each of the following three propositions: (i) musical works are created; (ii) musical works are abstract objects; (iii) abstract objects cannot be created. However it seems clear that, if one wants to avoid inconsistency, one cannot commit to all three. Following up recent developments courtesy of Cameron ([2008a]), we consider how one might respond to the corresponding set of propositions in the (meta)ontology of scientific theories. 1 Introduction 2 Setting up the Problem 3 What to Reject?   3.1 Scientific theories are not created?   3.2 Scientific theories are not abstract objects?   3.3 Abstract objects can be created? 4 A Fourth Way: Truth-maker Theory 5 Objections and Replies   5.1 What are the truth-makers?   5.2 Objections from World 3   5.3 Fictionalism   5.4 Concrete/abstract 6 Conclusion 1 Introduction 2 Setting up the Problem 3 What to Reject?   3.1 Scientific theories are not created?   3.2 Scientific theories are not abstract objects?   3.3 Abstract objects can be created?   3.1 Scientific theories are not created?   3.2 Scientific theories are not abstract objects?   3.3 Abstract objects can be created? 4 A Fourth Way: Truth-maker Theory 5 Objections and Replies   5.1 What are the truth-makers?   5.2 Objections from World 3   5.3 Fictionalism   5.4 Concrete/abstract   5.1 What are the truth-makers?   5.2 Objections from World 3   5.3 Fictionalism   5.4 Concrete/abstract 6 Conclusion

Understanding the selective realist defence against the PMI

One of the popular realist responses to the pessimistic meta-induction (PMI) is the ‘selective’ move, where a realist only commits to the ‘working posits’ of a successful theory, and withholds commitment to ‘idle posits’. Antirealists often criticise selective realists for not being able to articulate exactly what is meant by ‘working’ and/or not being able to identify the working posits except in hindsight. This paper aims to establish two results: (i) sometimes a proposition is, in an important sense, ‘doing work’, and yet does not warrant realist commitment, and (ii) the realist will be able to respond to PMI-style historical challenges if she can merely show that certain selected posits do not require realist commitment (ignoring the question of which posits do). These two results act to significantly adjust the dialectic vis-à-vis PMI-style challenges to selective realism.

Towards a realistic success-to-truth inference for scientific realism

A success-to-truth inference has always been at the heart of scientific realist positions. But all attempts to articulate the inference have met with very significant challenges. This paper reconstructs the evolution of this inference, and brings together a number of qualifications in an attempt to articulate a contemporary (‘local’) success-to-truth inference which is realistic. I argue that this contemporary version of the inference has a chance, at least, of overcoming the historical challenges which have been proffered to date (and without moving all the way to structural realism). However, there is a price to pay: the developments which help the realist answer the historical challenges also serve to increase the number of non-historical challenges.

Theory flexibility and inconsistency in science

For several decades now philosophers have discussed apparent examples of internally inconsistent scientific theories. However, there is still much controversy over how exactly we should conceive of scientific theories in the first place. Here I argue for a new approach, whereby all of the truly important questions about inconsistency in science can be asked and answered without disagreements about theories and theory-content getting in the way. Three examples commonly described as ‘internally inconsistent theories’ are analysed in the light of this approach. In the process, the question ‘Is the theory inconsistent or not?’ is identified as a bad, or at least unimportant, question.

Is science inconsistent

There has always been interest in inconsistency in science, not least within science itself as scientists strive to devise a consistent picture of the universe. Some important early landmarks in this history are Copernicus’s criticism of the Ptolemaic picture of the heavens, Galileo’s claim that Aristotle’s theory of motion was inconsistent, and Berkeley’s claim that the early calculus was inconsistent. More recent landmarks include the classical theory of the electron, Bohr’s theory of the atom, and the on-going difficulty of reconciling Einstein’s general relativity and quantum theory. But over the past few decades philosophers have taken a particular and increasing interest in inconsistency in science. In 2002 this culminated in the first collection of articles specifically dedicated to the topic: Inconsistency in Science, edited by Joke Meheus, published by Kluwer, and featuring twelve articles on a range of topics in the philosophy of science and mathematics. Since then philosophic ...

Disarming the ultimate historical challenge to scientific realism.

Probably the most dramatic historical challenge to scientific realism concerns Arnold Sommerfeld’s ([1916]) derivation of the fine structure energy levels of hydrogen. Not only were his predictions good, he derived exactly the same formula that would later drop out of Dirac’s 1928 treatment (something not possible using 1925 Schrödinger–Heisenberg quantum mechanics). And yet the most central elements of Sommerfeld’s theory were not even approximately true: his derivation leans heavily on a classical approach to elliptical orbits, including the necessary adjustments to these orbits demanded by relativity. Even physicists call Sommerfeld’s success a ‘miracle’, which rather makes a joke of the so-called ‘no miracles argument’. However, this can all be turned around. Here I argue that the realist has a story to tell vis-à-vis the discontinuities between the old and the new theory, leading to a realist defence based on sufficient continuity of relevant structure. 1. Introduction2. No Realist Commitment Required?3. Enter the Physicists4. A New Approach to the Non-relativistic Success5. Relativity and Spin6. Structure and Realist Commitment7. Conclusion Introduction No Realist Commitment Required? Enter the Physicists A New Approach to the Non-relativistic Success Relativity and Spin Structure and Realist Commitment Conclusion

Quo Vadis Selective Scientific Realism

My current opinion is that the selective realist is in a strong position vis-a-vis the historical challenges. Certainly the realist needs to invoke some careful criteria for realist commitment, and various nuances concerning the nature of her epistemic commitment, and this may raise the ‘death by a thousand qualifications’ question mark. But the concern is unfounded: the qualifications are all independently motivated, and indeed necessary given the philosophical complexity. Qualifications are to be welcomed here; often the truth is far from simple!