Juha Saatsi

Realism about Structure: The Semantic View and Nonlinguistic Representations

The central concern of this article is whether the semantic approach has the resources to appropriately capture the core tenets of structural realism. Chakravartty (2001) has argued that a realist notion of correspondence cannot be accommodated without introducing a linguistic component, which undermines the approach itself. We suggest that this worry can be addressed by an appropriate understanding of the role of language in this context. The real challenge, however, is how to incorporate the core notion of ‘explanatory approximate truth’ in such a way that the emphasis on structure is retained.

Miraculous Success? Inconsistency and Untruth in Kirchhoff’s Diffraction Theory

Kirchhoff’s diffraction theory is introduced as a new case study in the realism debate. The theory is extremely successful despite being both inconsistent and not even approximately true. Some habitual realist proclamations simply cannot be maintained in the face of Kirchhoff’s theory, as the realist is forced to acknowledge that theoretical success can in some circumstances be explained in terms other than truth. The idiosyncrasy (or otherwise) of Kirchhoff’s case is considered. 1 Introduction 2 The Naïve Optimist 3 Kirchhoff’s Theory 4 Inconsistency and Untruth in Kirchhoff’s Theory 4.1 The inconsistency puzzle 4.2 The error-tolerance puzzle 5 Ramifications for Realism 6 Conclusion 1 Introduction 2 The Naïve Optimist 3 Kirchhoff’s Theory 4 Inconsistency and Untruth in Kirchhoff’s Theory 4.1 The inconsistency puzzle 4.2 The error-tolerance puzzle 4.1 The inconsistency puzzle 4.2 The error-tolerance puzzle 5 Ramifications for Realism 6 Conclusion

Ramseyfication and Theoretical Content

Model theoretic considerations purportedly show that a certain version of structural realism, one which articulates the nvtion of structure via Ramsey sentences, is in fact trivially true. In this paper we argue that the structural realist is by no means forced to Ramseyfy in the manner assumed in the formal proof. However, the structural realists reprise is short-lived. For, as we show, there are related versions of the model theoretic argument which cannot be so easily blocked by the structural realist. We examine various ways in which the structural realist may respond, and conclude that the best way of blocking the model theoretic argument involves formulating his Ramseyfied theories using intensional operators. 1. Introduction2. The model theoretic arguments3. On Ramseyfying away predicates4. The model theoretic argument bites back5. Restricting the second order quantifiers 5.1Naturalness 5.2Intrinsic 5.3Qualitative 5.4Contingent and causal6. Intensional operators and relations between properties7. Conclusion Introduction The model theoretic arguments On Ramseyfying away predicates The model theoretic argument bites back Restricting the second order quantifiers 5.1Naturalness 5.2Intrinsic 5.3Qualitative 5.4Contingent and causal 5.1Naturalness 5.2Intrinsic 5.3Qualitative 5.4Contingent and causal Intensional operators and relations between properties Conclusion

Reassessing Woodward’s Account of Explanation: Regularities, Counterfactuals, and Noncausal Explanations

We reassess Woodward’s counterfactual account of explanation in relation to regularity explananda. Woodward presents an account of causal explanation. We argue, by using an explanation of Kleiber’s law to illustrate, that the account can also cover some noncausal explanations. This leads to a tension between the two key aspects of Woodward’s account: the counterfactual aspect and the causal aspect. We explore this tension and make a case for jettisoning the causal aspect as constitutive of explanatory power in connection with regularity explananda.

On the Pessimistic Induction and Two Fallacies

The Pessimistic Induction from falsity of past theories forms a perennial argument against scientific realism. This paper considers and rebuts two recent arguments—due to Lewis (2001) and Lange (2002)—to the conclusion that the Pessimistic Induction (in its best known form) is fallacious. It re‐establishes the dignity of the Pessimistic Induction by calling to mind the basic objective of the argument, and hence restores the propriety of the realist program of responding to PMI by undermining one or another of its premises.

Living in Harmony: Nominalism and the Explanationist Argument for Realism

According to the indispensability argument, scientific realists ought to believe in the existence of mathematical entities, due to their indispensable role in theorising. Arguably the crucial sense of indispensability can be understood in terms of the contribution that mathematics sometimes makes to the super‐empirical virtues of a theory. Moreover, the way in which the scientific realist values such virtues, in general, and draws on explanatory virtues, in particular, ought to make the realist ontologically committed to abstracta. This paper shows that this version of the indispensability argument glosses over crucial detail about how the scientific realist attempts to generate justificatory commitment to unobservables. The kind of role that the Platonist attributes to mathematics in scientific reasoning is compatible with nominalism, as far as scientific realist arguments are concerned.

Replacing recipe realism

Many realist writings exemplify the spirit of ‘recipe realism’. Here I characterise recipe realism, challenge it, and propose replacing it with ‘exemplar realism’. This alternative understanding of realism is more piecemeal, robust, and better in tune with scientists’ own attitude towards their best theories, and thus to be preferred.

On Explanations from Geometry of Motion

This article examines explanations that turn on non-local geometrical facts about the space of possible configurations a system can occupy. I argue that it makes sense to contrast such explanations from geometry of motion with causal explanations. I also explore how my analysis of these explanations cuts across the distinction between kinematics and dynamics. 1. Introduction2. Toy Example3. Geometry of Motion in Classical Mechanics4. Beyond Classical Mechanics5. Conclusion: A Worthwhile Distinction Introduction Toy Example Geometry of Motion in Classical Mechanics Beyond Classical Mechanics Conclusion: A Worthwhile Distinction

Historical inductions, Old and New

I review prominent historical arguments against scientific realism to indicate how they display a systematic overshooting in the conclusions drawn from the historical evidence. The root of the overshooting can be located in some critical, undue presuppositions regarding realism. I will highlight these presuppositions in connection with both Laudan’s ‘Old induction’ and Stanford’s New induction, and then delineate a minimal realist view that does without the problematic presuppositions.

Scientific Realism and Historical Evidence: Shortcomings of the Current State of Debate

This chapter discusses three shortcomings of the current state of the debate regarding historical evidence against scientific realism. Attending to these issues will direct the debate away from over-generalising wholesale arguments.