Petra Persson
Research Institute of Industrial Economics
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Featured researches published by Petra Persson.
National Bureau of Economic Research | 2011
Petra Persson
When a decision-maker’s attention is limited, her decisions depend on what she focuses on. This gives interested parties an incentive to manipulate not only the substance of communication but also the decision-maker’s attention allocation. This paper models such attention manipulation. In its presence, competitive information supply can reduce the decision-maker’s knowledge by causing information overload. Further, a single information provider may deliberately induce information overload to conceal information. These findings, pertinent to consumer protection, suggest a role for rules that restrict communication, mandate not only the content but also the format of disclosure, and regulate product design.
Archive | 2015
Samuel Lee; Petra Persson
We study sex trafficking in a marriage market model of prostitution. When traffickers can coerce women to sell sex, trafficked prostitutes constitute a non-zero share of supply in any unregulated market for sex. We ask if regulation can eradicate trafficking and restore the equilibrium that would arise in an unregulated market without traffickers. While all existing approaches – criminalization of prostitutes (“the traditional model”), licensed prostitution (“the Dutch model”), and criminalization of johns (“the Swedish model”) – fail to accomplish this goal, we show that there exists an alternative regulatory model that does. Political support for regulation hinges on the level of gender income inequality.
Archive | 2012
Uliana Loginova; Petra Persson
Regulation to protect individuals from self-harm, such as euthanasia prohibitions and safety mandates, is widespread but controversial. Opponents and proponents are often believed to differ in their valuation of individual liberty. We model an authoritys decision to constrain or inform a population of agents prone to self-harm and propose an alternative view: A benevolent politicians decision to regulate an activity depends on whether she deems it a matter of preference or opinion. In the former case, she gives truthful advice and safeguards liberty; in the latter, she constrains liberty, believing that she acts in the populations interest.
Review of Financial Studies | 2016
Samuel Lee; Petra Persson
Archive | 2015
Petra Persson
The American Economic Review | 2018
Petra Persson; Maya Rossin-Slater
Journal of the European Economic Association | 2016
Petra Persson; Ekaterina Zhuravskaya
National Bureau of Economic Research | 2016
Rebecca Diamond; Petra Persson
Archive | 2014
Petra Persson; Maya Rossin-Slater
Archive | 2011
Samuel Lee; Petra Persson