Peverill Squire

Measuring State Legislative Professionalism: The Squire Index Revisited

In this article, I revisit a widely used measure of legislative professionalism that I developed over a decade ago (Squire 1992a). I argue that professionalism has different implications for legislators than for legislatures and that the concept is distinct from careerism. I then discuss the mechanics of compiling the measure, its reliability and validity, and potential criticism of the measure. Finally, I provide scores on the measure for 1979, 1986, 1996, and 2003, as well as scores for 1979 and 2003 for a revised measure that is theoretically appropriate for use in dynamic analyses.

Legislative Professionalization and Membership Diversity in State Legislatures

Proponents of state legislative professionalization thought it would increase membership diversity. I assess whether this expectation has been met by examining the relationship between the level of professionalization and the numbers of blacks, women, and various occupational groups elected to the state legislature. I begin by proposing a new measurement of professionalization, one which uses the United States Congress as a baseline against which to measure the salary, staff, and time in session of all 50 state legislatures. Level of professionalization is found to be positively related to the percentage of blacks in a legislature but negatively related to the proportion of women serving. Occupational diversity also decreases as level of professionalization increases, because more members identify their occupation as full-time legislator.

Residential Mobility and Voter Turnout

We examine the characteristics of a largely ignored low-turnout group—people who have recently moved. We find that neither demographic nor attitudinal attributes explain their lower turnout. Instead, the requirement that citizens must register anew after each change in residence constitutes the key stumbling block in the trip to the polls. Since nearly one-third of the nation moves every two years, moving has a large impact on national turnout rates. We offer a proposal to reduce the effect of residential mobility on turnout and estimate that turnout would increase by nine percentage points if the impact of moving could be removed. The partisan consequences of such a change would be marginal.

Professionalization and Public Opinion of State Legislatures

Using a seven-state survey I examine how closely people follow the activities of the state legislature, how much contact they have with its members, and how they evaluate its performance. In particular, I investigate whether legislative professionalization level or district size influences how people see their legislature. Professionalization has a positive relationship with contact but has a negative relationship with attention level and performance rating. Constituency size exhibits little influence except on contacts.

The Effect of Partisan Information on Voters in Nonpartisan Elections

How does partisan information affect individual voting behavior in nonpartisan elections? Using data from a 1982 California Poll survey on state supreme court confirmation elections we demonstrate that nonpartisan elections are easily turned into partisan contests in the minds of voters. Partisan information increases the probability of an individual holding an opinion on the elections, and results in votes which are based on the respondents partisan identification and opinion of the governor who appointed the justice. The implications of these results for nonpartisan elections in general and merit retention contests in particular are also discussed.

The Theory of Legislative Institutionalization and the California Assembly

How do legislative bodies change over time? Polsbys (1968) examination of institutionalization in the U.S. House provides an organizational framework to assess how a legislature develops. I argue that the process of legislative institutionalization is driven by the memberships career goals. Because members of the California Assembly have different career ambitions than U.S. Representatives, application of institutionalization to the Assembly produces important contrasts with the House. Examination of data collected on the Assembly from 1951 to 1985, particularly with an interrupted time-series model, reveals that the Assembly has increased internal complexity, and, on many but not all measures, it has established well-defined boundaries. But, while the Assembly meets some minor standards of universalistic criteria and automatic methods, it fails to employ seniority as the main rule for the distribution of positions of power. Seniority does not matter because, I argue, more discretionary and particularistic methods better serve the career needs of the Assembly membership. This analysis suggests important implications for the utility of the concept of institutionalization.

WHY THE 1936 LITERARY DIGEST POLL FAILED

The Literary Digest poll of 1936 holds an infamous place in the history of survey research. Despite its importance, no empirical research has been conducted to determine why the poll failed. Using data from a 1937 Gallup survey which asked about participation in the Literary Digest poll I conclude that the maga- zines sample and the response were both biased and jointly pro- duced the wildly incorrect estimate of the vote. But, if all of those who were polled had responded, the magazine would have, at least, correctly predicted Roosevelt the winner. The current rele- vance of these findings is discussed. The 1936 campaign concluded with the Literary Digest (1936a) publish- ing survey results forecasting a landslide victory for the Republican presidential candidate, Alf Landon. The actual election was, of course, won by the incumbent, Franklin Roosevelt, by a large margin. Thus the Literary Digest poll gained an infamous place in the history of survey research. Almost every book on presidential elections or survey methodology contains some scathing reference to the poll and gives reasons why it failed to forecast the correct results. Some claim the error resulted from a biased sample. A few assert that the sample was acceptable but that the low response rate produced the incorrect forecast. Many others state that a combination of these problems was responsible. Surprisingly, these claims are mere speculation; no analysis has been conducted to determine why the Literary Digest poll was wrong. Con- sequently, we have some ideas-really competing hypotheses-as to why the poll failed but no empirical research by which to determine the source of the error.

Member Career Opportunities and the Internal Organization of Legislatures

Legislatures employ a variety of organizational schemes to determine how positions of power are distributed within them. I propose and test a theory relating the internal organization of a legislature to the political career goals of its members. Examining the lower legislative house in California, Connecticut, and New York, I demonstrate that each body offers its members a different political career path, and that the particular ambition is promoted by the internal organization of the legislature. New York assemblymen have career ambitions and seniority matters in gaining positions of power in that body. California assemblymen have progressive goals and operate in a system which allows any member to gain power quickly. In Connecticut, where legislators have discrete ambitions, seniority is not important and power is centralized.

Comparing Gubernatorial and Senatorial Elections

Drawing on several data sources we-compare elections for governor and United States senator We attempt to explain why governors are somewhat more electorally vulnerable than are senators. We show that voters are more likely to know and have an opinion of their states chief executive than of their senators. Governors, however, tend to be evaluated less favorably. In addition, voters are more apt to know and vote for a gubernatorial challenger than a Senate challenger, regardless of the challengers political background or quality. Voter defection rates clearly give senators an advantage over gover nors in getting reelected. We tie these relationships to differences in media coverage of the two offices.

Competition and Uncontested Seats in U. S. House Elections

Most theories of democracy assume that voters are offered parties, candidates, or issue positions among which to choose in an election. Between 1978 and 1988, 14% of races for the U.S. House of Representatives were uncontested. Although this number represents a drop from the higher figures of two decades ago, it still suggests a significant violation of democratic principles. Probit analysis of data collected on the 1978 to 1984 elections reveals that uncontested races are more likely to occur in districts where the incumbent received a high percentage of the vote in the previous election, where the incumbent is a Democrat, and in the South. A majority of representatives who are unchallenged in one election, however, are opposed in the next campaign. Because the vast majority of House members will face a challenger in some future election, the incentive for representation provided by potential opposition and defeat is maintained.