Phanindra K. Mannava

A Simple Method for Parameterized Verification of Cache Coherence Protocols

We present a simple method for verifying the safety properties of cache coherence protocols with arbitrarily many nodes. Our presentation begins with two examples. The first example describes in intuitive terms how the German protocol with arbitrarily many nodes can be verified using a combination of Murphi model checking and apparently circular reasoning. The second example outlines a similar proof of the FLASH protocol. These are followed by a simple theory based on the classical notion of simulation proofs that justifies the apparently circular reasoning. We conclude the paper by discussing what remains to be done and by comparing our method with other approaches to the parameterized verification of cache coherence protocols, such as compositional model checking, machine-assisted theorem proving, predicate ion, invisible invariants, and cut-off theorems.

Experience with Applying Formal Methods to Protocol Specification and System Architecture

In the last three years or so we at Enterprise Platforms Group at Intel Corporation have been applying formal methods to various problems that arose during the process of defining platform architectures for Intels processor families. In this paper we give an overview of some of the problems we have worked on, the results we have obtained, and the lessons we have learned. The last topic is addressed mainly from the perspective of platform architects.