Philip Cowley

Too Spineless to Rebel? New Labour's Women MPs

The 1997 British general election saw a record 120 women returned to the House of Commons, 101 of them Labour. Yet if the most striking feature of the 1997 intake into the House of Commons was the number of newly elected women, then the most striking feature of the backbench rebellions in that parliament was the lack of these women amongst the ranks of the rebels. They were less than half as likely to rebel against the party whip as the rest of the Parliamentary Labour Party; even those who did, did so around half as often. Attempts to explain this difference fall into two broad groups: (i) those that attempt to explain the difference away, as resulting from other characteristics of the women, and (ii) those that attempt to explain it – indeed, celebrate it – as evidence of a different, womens, style of political behaviour. Attempts at (i) are largely unconvincing: most of the supposed explanations for the difference do not stand up to empirical verification. Although difficult to prove, a belief in (ii) is dominant amongst the new women themselves.

Rebels and rebellions: Conservative MPs in the 1992 Parliament

During the 1992 Parliament the Conservative Party lost its reputation for unity. The parliamentary party, said by some to be unusually rebellious, got the blame. This article places the levels of dissent in the division lobbies of the House of Commons in historical perspective, comparing the 1992 Parliament with those before. Contrary to received wisdom, Conservative MPs were not noticeably more rebellious after 1992. The article also considers the ideological and factional basis of the rebellions. Because the rebellions in Parliament focused almost exclusively on Europe, the party remained one of tendencies, albeit well-organised and cohesive tendencies, rather than factions; and the extent to which the rebellions cut across existing ideological cleavages has been overstated.

The Politics of Local Presence: Is there a Case for Descriptive Representation?

The case for greater descriptive representation of groups such as women and ethnic minorities has become widely, though not wholly, accepted in much of the academic literature and in the ‘real world’ of politics in most advanced democracies. In the UK the goal of greater descriptive representation of women has often become framed as a zero-sum game against men, especially local men, with consequences for the descriptive representation of women. This article examines whether claims made for the descriptive representation of women and black candidates can and should apply to local candidates, whatever their sex or race. It draws a distinction between the representation of a territory (common to most representative systems) and the representation of a territory by someone from that territory, a similar distinction to the difference common in the gender and politics literature between the representation of women by an elected representative and the representation of women by women representatives. The article also distinguishes between a hard and a soft form of this argument. The latter applies to almost every constituency in the UK, but it is a claim not based on arguments for the presence of the disadvantaged. However, the case for a local candidate to represent a more disadvantaged constituency, the harder form of the argument, can be made on almost all of the criteria applied to other excluded groups identified in the politics of presence literature.

Arise, Novice Leader! The Continuing Rise of the Career Politician in Britain

In late 2010 the leaders of the major British political parties were the most inexperienced of the post-war era. This short article discusses this development. It shows how unusual this is, comparing the leaders of 2010 to their post-war predecessors. It demonstrates that this development is unlikely to be some fluke, before considering the causes of the transformation, which it suggests can be attributed to two things: the changes in the election methods used by the political parties – which seem to have led to less experienced candidates being elected – as well as the changing nature of political ‘experience’, with career politicians gaining political experience before entering the Commons.

Peasants' Uprising or Religious War? Re-examining the 1975 Conservative Leadership Contest

This article analyses the nature of the support given to the candidates in the 1975 Conservative leadership contest, in which Margaret Thatcher replaced Edward Heath. In contrast to the orthodox account of the contest – which interprets it as largely non-ideological – the article argues that there were clear ideological forces at work. The right strongly supported Thatcher in both rounds; the left strongly backed Heath and then Whitelaw. Region, experience and education also influenced the voting. The traditional accounts, which explain those voting for Thatcher as doing so simply because she was not Heath, have, therefore, to explain why only certain types of MPs felt this way. Margaret Thatcher may have won because she was not Ted Heath; but she did not win solely because she was not Ted Heath.

Voting in the House or Wooing the Voters at Home: Labour MPs and the 2001 General Election Campaign

Part of Labours strategy for winning a second full term of government at the 2001 general election in the UK involved encouraging its MPs, especially those holding marginal seats, to spend considerable time in their constituencies in the preceding years, contacting voters and promoting the partys cause. Given the size of its majority in 1997, it was able to afford for many MPs to be absent from divisions in the House of Commons. This article looks at the voting records of Labour MPs who stood for re-election in 2001 during the two preceding parliamentary sessions. It reports that backbench MPs representing marginal constituencies were much more likely to be absent from the House during the last session prior to the election. Those absences were also apparently related to their performance at the election: the more often they absented themselves from parliamentary votes in that session (compared to the previous session) the better their performance at the 2001 election relative to national trends.

In Place of Strife? The PLP in Government, 1997–2001

After entering government in 1997, the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) acquired a reputation for acquiescence. This article attempts to answer two related questions. Was this an accurate picture of the PLP under Blair? And if so, what explained it? The number of back-bench revolts was certainly low. Excluding the short parliaments of 1964 and February 1974, we have to go back to 1955 to find a parliament with fewer rebellions by government back benchers than the one elected in 1997 – but those rebellions that did occur were sizeable. Rebellion was also widespread amongst the PLP: 133 MPs rebelled at some point in the Parliament. There are four explanations for this compliant pattern of behaviour, in order of increasing importance: the issues on the legislative agenda; the composition of the PLP; the governments behaviour; and a desire on the part of most of the PLP to appear united.

In the Brown Stuff?: Labour Backbench Dissent Under Gordon Brown, 2007–10

Based on examination of the division records and elite-level interviewing, this article examines the nature of backbench dissent in the House of Commons during the government of Gordon Brown, covering its range and scope, the composition of those defying their whip, as well as placing it in its political context. It reveals a high level of rebellion by Labour MPs—higher than that seen in any previous post-war Parliament—along with showing the degree to which the government were forced to negotiate with, and concede to, their backbenchers in order to prevent rebellion reaching even higher levels.

Whither the ‘new role’ in policy making? Conservative MPs in standing committees, 1979 to 1992

Examining the behaviour of Conservative MPs in 5,306 standing committee divisions between 1979 and 1992, this article determines whether the Commons’ ‘new role’ in policy making, identified by Schwarz in 1980, survived the Thatcher years and Major months. One hundred and forty five Conservative MPs cast 684 dissenting votes in 103 bills, inflicting 56 defeats spread over 29 bills. (A further 11 defeats occurred without Conservative dissent.) The extent and intensity of the dissent is explained, showing why so many dissenting votes did not result in more defeats. Partly this is due to the nature of the dissent (too many isolated rebellions, votes sometimes not cast with the opposition). But mainly it is due to the size of the majorities enjoyed by the Thatcher Government, particularly after 1983, and the Governments ability to control the size of committees. Because of this, in both absolute and relative terms the dissent from 1979 to 1992 is less effective than that identified by Schwarz.

Legislator dissent as a valence signal

Existing research suggests that voters tend to respond positively to legislator independence due to two types of mechanism. First, dissent has an indirect effect, increasing a legislator’s media coverage and personal recognition among constituents ( profile effects ). Secondly, constituents react positively to dissent when this signals that the legislator has matching political or representational preferences ( conditional evaluation ). This article presents a third effect: dissent acts as a valence signal of integrity and trustworthiness. Consistent with the valence signalling mechanism, it uses new observational and experimental evidence to show that British voters have a strong and largely unconditional preference for legislators who dissent. The findings pose a dilemma for political systems that rely on strong and cohesive parties.