Piergiovanna Natale

A New Cinderella Story: Joint Ventures and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm

Joint ventures (JVs) are a common form of inter‐firm collaboration and, unsurprisingly, the subject of a vast literature, extending from economics to management and business studies. Issues of control are central to the definition of JVs, and this naturally calls for an interpretation in the context of the property rights theory (PRT) of the firm. In a series of seminal papers, Grossman, Hart and Moore (GHM) offer a rigorous framework to predict the allocation of control rights. Notably, under the standard assumptions of GHM, JVs are suboptimal. However, JVs are not suboptimal in more general settings where a number of the original frameworks assumptions are relaxed. In the context of PRT, this paper surveys more than 20 contributions that address the optimality of JVs under contract incompleteness. The surveyed papers question the assumptions of GHM and reveal the circumstances in which JVs outperform sole ownership. Although contributions are scattered over time and bibliographical sources, we believe sufficient material has accumulated over 25 years of economic modelling to encourage some systematization. The discussion is organized in an intuitive and non‐technical way; in particular, effort is devoted to analysing each paper in detail and providing a unified framework.

Incomplete Information in Monetary Policy Games: Rules Rather Than a Conservative Central Banker

Time inconsistency in monetary policy can be addressed appointing a conservative central banker. But incomplete information about the central bankers preferences impairs the performance of delegation schemes. Firstly, the ensuing ex ante variability of monetary response lowers welfare. Secondly, partial independence schemes may prove inadequate because reputation--not only legal arrangements--defines the actual degree of independence. The incumbent may exploit his reputation to impose too conservative policies, whereas if he lacks reputation, partial independence forces him to accommodate. As a result, simple rules may be preferred. Copyright 1998 by Scottish Economic Society.

Macroeconomics and Politics Revisited. Do Central Banks Matter

This paper provides a model encompassing both partisan influences on monetary policy and the issue of central bank independence. In a regime of partial independence, central banks policy responses are not immune from partisan influences. Still, the latter fail to affect systematically the expected output level in election years. The predictions of the model are consistent with the empirical literature on partisan cycles and account for some of its controversial findings. Copyright 2000 Blackwell Publishers Ltd..

A nominal income growth target for a conservative ECB? When the policy mix matters

This paper contributes to the goal-versus-instrument independence debate for the ECB, exploring how alternative monetary arrangements perform when the fiscal authority pursues a strategy of debt reduction in the long term but retains fiscal flexibility in response to supply shocks. If fiscal policy is countercyclical, a constant nominal income growth target should be assigned to a conservative central banker. In fact, as the fiscal authority and the central bank act independently in setting their countercyclical policies, an activist central banker causes excess volatility of inflation.

Joint Ventures and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm: A Review of the Literature

Joint ventures (JVs) are a very common form of inter-firm collaborations and, not surprisingly, the object of a vast literature, spanning from economics to management and business studies. Issues of control are central to the definition of JV, which naturally begs an interpretation in the context of the property rights theory (PRT) of the firm. In a series of seminal papers, Grossman, Hart and Moore (GHM) offer a rigorous framework to predict the allocation of control rights. Notably, under the standard assumptions of GHM, JVs are suboptimal. However, JVs are not suboptimal in more general settings where some of the original framework’s assumptions are relaxed. In the context of the PRT, this paper surveys more than 20 contributions that deal with the optimality of JVs under contract incompleteness. Questioning GHM’s assumptions, the authors of these contributions unveil relevant circumstances in which JV outperforms sole ownership. Despite contributions being scattered over time and bibliographical space, we believe enough material has accumulated over 25 years of economic modelling to encourage some systematization. The discussion is organized in an intuitive and non-technical way; particular effort is devoted to analyse each contribution in detail and to provide a unitary framework.

Optimal Ownership Regime in the Presence of Investment Spillovers

In the context of the property rights theory of the firm, we study the role of investment spillovers in shaping the efficiency ranking of ownership regimes. In our model, spillovers arise from asset-embodied investment and footloose investment. Under the former, the benefits of investment can be appropriated only through asset control; under the latter, the benefits of investment can be appropriated independently of asset control. Our model predicts that asset-embodied investment favors the adoption of non-integration, while joint ownership may prevail in the presence of footloose investment.

New Facts about BRIC Multinationals: From Macro to Micro Evidence

Abstract Purpose In this chapter, we document the growing importance of FDI from BRIC countries in relation to FDI from both developed and developing countries and investigate the types of firms that are responsible for BRIC FDI. Methodology/approach We follow a two-step empirical approach. First, we provide macro evidence on FDI from BRIC countries. We use UNCTAD data to highlight the patterns of FDI flows and stocks. Second, we provide firm-level evidence on FDI. Using ORBIS data, we elaborate a rich taxonomy of FDI that accounts for the decision to invest abroad and for the location, ownership, and number of foreign subsidiaries. Thus, we characterize BRIC multinationals’ involvement in FDI and examine the relationship between FDI and performance at the firm level. Findings We unveil new facts about BRIC multinationals. BRIC multinationals are in the minority in their home countries, but they outperform domestic enterprises. Within the group of BRIC investors, those firms that invest in developing countries, that operate in joint ventures, or that have more than five foreign subsidiaries are in the minority, but they outperform those firms that select other FDI strategies. Research limitations/implications Our estimates document a positive and robust correlation between FDI and performance; however, the cross-sectional nature of our data does not permit a proper causality analysis. Originality/value Our work contributes to the International Economics literature on internationalization and firm performance as well as to the International Business literature on FDI from emerging economies. With respect to the former, we innovate by studying the relation between FDI strategies and firm performance. In relation to the latter, we innovate by introducing firm-level data and a cross-country approach that lets us illustrate the roles and features of FDI from BRIC countries.

Disegno delle istituzioni e stabilità finanziaria nell'Unione Monetaria Europea

In this paper, the consequences on financial stability of the institutional design envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty - which implicitly assigns the objective of financial stability to the National Central Banks (NCBs) - are assessed. The Maastricht Treaty spells out precisely the role of the European Central Bank (ECB) and NCBs within the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) as to achieve the objective of price stability, but it is not equally clear as far as the objective of financial stability is concerned. In an area like EMU with a high degree of financial and economic integration, the actions undertaken by NCBs in the fields of regulation, prudential supervision and Lending of Last Resort are characterized by relevant externalities across jurisdictions. The present institutional design does not allow EMU to benefit from the internalization of these spillovers since NCBs do not face incentives to undertake properly banking policy activities. Applying the principle of subsidiarity to the problem of power sharing between ECB and NCBs, the following suggestions for a revision of the institutional design are obtained: i) ECB should be assigned the task of coordinating regulation activities to avoid regulatory arbitrage, while prudential supervision should be managed jointly in a two-tier system by ECB and NCBs; the decision process pertaining the use of discount window and the Lending of Last Resort function should be centralized; ii) the rules pertaining the working of TARGET and EMS 2 should be changed in order to limit the risk of a financial crises imported from preins countries.

Monetary Regimes as Insurance Schemes. Old Wine in New Bottles

This paper applies the tools of insurance economics to address the trade-off between commitment and flexibility arising in monetary policy. Monetary regimes are considered as alternative insurance policies designed to stabilize output. This approach provides a simple and straightforward reinterpretation of some seminal contributions to the literature on time inconsistency--such as the desirability of monetary policy delegation to an independent conservative central banker--and it accounts for some novel results deriving from informational asymmetries about the central bankers degree of conservatism. Copyright 1998 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd and The Victoria University of Manchester