Pierre Tremblay

Risks of Arrest across Drug Markets: A Capture-Recapture Analysis of “Hidden” Dealer and User Populations

Capture-recapture methodologies have been used to estimate the size of the hidden population of active offenders on the basis of the observed properties of the truncated distribution of arrested offenders. We use this approach to estimate the odds of arrest of marijuana, cocaine, crack, and heroin dealers and users in one Canadian province (Quebec). Findings indicate that risks of being arrested are much higher for sellers than for consumers and that this gap widens for the more harmful drugs. Findings also show, however, that vulnerability to arrest was significantly higher for marijuana users than for others users and that dealers in the smaller but more harmful drug markets (crack and heroin) manage to experience lower aggregate risks of arrest than cocaine or marijuana dealers.

The size and influence of a criminal organization: a criminal achievement perspective

It is difficult to measure the size, influence and growth patterns of criminal organizations embedded in illegal markets. In this paper, we argue that measuring the influence of a criminal organization by its size (in number of employees, or ‘members’) may under- or overestimate its sphere of influence in illegal markets. Self-report survey and size of population methodologies are combined to assess the regional economic influence of a criminal organization (Hells Angels) in three illegal drug markets (the cocaine trade, the cannabis trade and the cannabis cultivation industry) in the province of Québec. Findings suggest that a relatively small organization by conventional standards can nonetheless achieve a large influence on criminal markets. We then analyse how factors other than violence play a role in explaining differences in achieving economic influence across criminal organizations. Finally, we suggest that turning our attention to measuring economic influence provides some insights into the duration and intensity of the violent conflicts occurring in these markets.

The stability of punishment: A follow-up of Blumstein's hypothesis

Because of the intrinsic relativity of social tolerance toward crime, the rate of punishment that a given society inflicts on its criminals is expected to remain relatively constant over the long term, in spite of social changes and increasing or decreasing crime rates. This paper reconstructs the penal behavior of Montreals criminal justice from 1845 to 1913 and finds that the stability hypothesis, all things considered, works quite well and has much heuristic value. Three problems, somewhat bypassed in the existing literature, are dealt with here: the reliability of penal statistical time series, the direct empirical evidence of stabilization processes, and a rather crude way of measuring prison punishment. It is suggested, furthermore, that the stability hypothesis include in its future argument the impact of increasing policing and that it be confined tentatively to modern western societies.

Market offenses and limits to growth

The purpose of this article is to explore various factors that may regulate or stabilize levels in market offenses. Instead of assuming that illegal markets are ‘out of control’, evidence is advanced to demonstrate, on the contrary, that there are indeed limits to growth in criminal markets. This is presented along three principal and interconnected arguments. First, social norms limit the ability of suppliers to shape demand for illicit goods and services. Using public opinion surveys, it is concluded that the more objectionable the moral status of an illegal market, the smaller the pool of potential consumers and sellers. Second, there are considerable obstacles that confront suppliers of illegal goods and services accumulating capital and upward mobility. The consequences of product illegality inhibit the organizational growth capacities as well as the geographic expansion of illicit firms. Third, while impunity via corruptible alliances do cancel some of the effects of product illegality, this impunity is not a constant that can always be depended upon. To the extent that corruption varies across jurisdictions and over time, illegal entrepreneurs may come to realize that impunity is intrinsically limited in scope and volatile in nature and over which they essentially have very limited control.

Épisodes d'inactivité et revenus criminels dans une trajectoire de délinquance

The instability of criminal activity over time is already well documented. However, little is known of the circumstances that can explain these short-term variations. It is possible that short-term transitions and changes precede turning points in criminal careers. For example, conditions that account for the temporary interruption of criminal activity might help explain a more definitive desistance from crime. Therefore, it appears appropriate to improve our knowledge of these factors. The study is based on the trajectories of 172 offenders involved in lucrative forms of crime. It focuses on changes in criminal earnings and episodes of temporary desistance within a window period of 36 months. The life history calendars method, combined with hierarchical models, is used for the analysis of the role of static (individual characteristics) and dynamic (life circumstances) factors in order to understand variations in criminal activity on a monthly basis. Results highlight the importance of events that mark offenders’ lifestyles and the parameters that characterize criminal involvement in predicting variations in observed trajectories. They also emphasize the importance of criminal achievement in explaining the decision of offenders to temporarily stop their illegal activities.