Quanbao Jiang

Demographic Consequences of Gender Discrimination in China: Simulation Analysis of Policy Options.

The large number of missing females in China, a consequence of gender discrimination, is having and will continue to have a profound effect on the country’s population development. In this paper, we analyze the causes of this gender discrimination in terms of institutions, culture and, economy, and suggest public policies that might help eliminate gender discrimination. Using a population simulation model, we study the effect of public policies on the sex ratio at birth and excess female child mortality, and the effect of gender discrimination on China’s population development. We find that gender discrimination will decrease China’s population size, number of births, and working age population, accelerate population aging and exacerbate the male marriage squeeze. These results provide theoretical support for suggesting that the government enact and implement public policies aimed at eliminating gender discrimination.

Bride price in China: the obstacle to ‘Bare Branches’ seeking marriage

Throughout Chinese history, the countrys patrilineal family system has lead to the practice of paying for brides, a social phenomenon closely related to the issue of surplus males in China. This article attempts to analyze the fluctuations in bride prices over the last 50 years, and at the same time investigate the two vicious cycles involving ‘bare branches’ and the ways in which they find money to pay a bride price. The following points are concluded: 1. The prevalence of paying a bride price is closely related to Chinas shortage of females. Due to the difficulty involved in finding a wife, bride prices have consistently risen since the 1980s. 2. Males in poor rural areas are afflicted by two vicious cycles. The first is the ‘poor—bare branch—poorer’ cycle. Specifically, poverty prevents them from finding a spouse; this effectively turns them into bare branches, after which they become even poorer. The second is the ‘inability to pay the bride price—bare branch—need to pay a higher bride price’ cycle. Unable to pay a bride price because they are poor, they are forced to postpone getting married to save enough money. After they become bare branches, they find themselves in a more disadvantaged position, and as a result must pay a higher bride price when seeking a wife. 3. In order to pay a bride price, many families are forced to scrimp and save for decades, to borrow money or to take out other types of loans. In extreme circumstances, they will even resort to obtaining money illegally in order to pay a bride price.

Marriage Squeeze, Never-Married Proportion, and Mean Age at First Marriage in China

China’s sex ratio imbalance and the surplus of males have received a great deal of attention, but measures of the extent of the marriage squeeze do not take into account the marital status of population. In this paper, we devise an index of the marriage squeeze for the never-married population and use it to project the male marriage squeeze from 2000 to 2060. From the predicted population and nuptiality tables, we estimate trends in the proportion of men that never marry by age 50 and the mean age at first marriage. We find that the marriage squeeze is much more intense if only the never-married population is considered, rather than including all people without distinguishing their marital status. As the lifelong never-married proportion increases, mean age at first marriage rises first and then declines.

Fertility in China: An uncertain future

As one of the world’s two population ‘billionaires’, the future of China’s population is truly of global significance. With its very low fertility and a rapidly ageing population, it might appear that the country’s famous (or notorious) family planning restrictions are somewhat anachronistic. Here, we explore the process of reform seen over the past three decades and, most recently, in late 2013. We suggest that the popular notion that the family planning restrictions are acting as a pressure valve suppressing a pent-up demand for childbearing, particularly in rural China, is likely to be inaccurate. We also suggest that further reform of the restrictions will not solve the problems of population ageing or many of the other issues widely associated with the restrictions. We conclude that the prospects for further reform are wide-ranging, but likely to be beset by many challenges.

Fertility Intention, Son Preference, and Second Childbirth: Survey Findings from Shaanxi Province of China

Abstract China is characterized by a low fertility intention, a strong preference for sons, as well as a stringent birth control policy. In this study, we used data from a Fertility Intention and Behavior Survey of 2101 questionnaires conducted in 2013 in Shaanxi Province of northwestern China, and event history analysis methods to examine the effect of fertility intention and preference for sons on the probability of having a second child. The results not only validate the correlation of fertility intention with having a second child empirically, even in the low fertility intention and stringent birth control context of China, but also show that women with a preference for sons were less likely to have a second child. Women with son preference turn to sex-selective abortion to ensure that their first child is a son, thus reducing the likelihood of a second child and decreasing the fertility rate. Our findings also shed light on China’s potential fertility policy adjustment.

MARRIAGE SQUEEZE IN CHINA'S FUTURE

The preference for sons in China and discrimination against girls have resulted in a male marriage squeeze. This paper develops two new indices of the sex ratio among potential first marriage partners by normalising first marriage frequencies and by eliminating the tempo effect in first marriage. Using two newly developed indices and two existing ones, the authors predict Chinas marriage squeeze for the period 2000–2100. The authors find that the new indices produce almost the same results as the existing ones when measuring the sex ratios of marriageable males to females. For the years 2015 to 2050, the sex ratio of potential males to females is over 1.15, and then fluctuates around 1.1 after 2060. From 2015 to 2045, China will face an annual surplus of one million males. However, if the high sex ratio at birth cannot be controlled, the male marriage squeeze will be much more severe.

Can China afford rapid aging

Abstract China’s rapid aging has caused widespread concern, but it seems that the situations and consequences of rapid aging are not adequately acknowledged. This study analyzed the problem of ageing in China from the aspects of elderly people’s health status, income source, daily care, suicide, the weak social security system in terms of pension, health expenses, and long-term care costs as well as incoming accelerating ageing process in China. All these factors indicate that it is difficult for China to afford the issue of a rapidly aging population.

The risk of mothers losing an only child in china

Chinas one-child policy has been quite successful in bringing down the countrys fertility level but has produced a large number of one-child families. The risk of one-child families losing their only child has not received enough attention. In this paper, using an extension of Goldman & Lord (1983)s method to measure widowhood, period life-table data from Chinas 2000 population census are used to examine age-specific and cumulative probabilities of mothers losing their only child. It is found that a mother faces a 14.94% probability of losing a son, and 12.21% probability of losing a daughter. As the age of first-time mothers increases, the probability of losing a child declines. Urban and rural mothers have different indices regarding the loss of children. Based on these findings the prospects for Chinas one-child policy are discussed.

China's Population Policy at the Crossroads: Social Impacts and Prospects.

Chinas total fertility rate fell below replacement level in the 1990s. From the 1970s the fertility rate declined dramatically, mainly as a consequence of the national population policy whose aim has been to limit birth numbers, control population growth and boost economic growth. Having achieved such a low fertility rate, how will Chinas population policy evolve in the future? This paper first reviews the history of Chinas population policy since 1970 in terms of three stages: 1970-1979; 1980-1999; and after 2000. We explore the impacts of Chinas population policy, including relief of pressure on Chinas environment and resources, fertility decline, the unexpectedly high male-biased sex ratio at birth (SRB), the coming shortage of labor force, and the rapid aging of the population. We also investigate ethical issues raised by the implementation of the policy and its results. Finally we introduce the controversy over potential adjustment of the policy, acknowledging the problems faced by western countries with low fertility and countermeasures they have taken. We offer some suggestions that might be appropriate in the Chinese context.

Female fertility history and mid-late-life health: Findings from China

ABSTRACT China’s middle-aged and older women suffer from poorer health than men. Using national baseline data from the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS), a survey conducted from 2011 to 2012, this article applies logistic models to investigate the association between female fertility history (parity, early childbearing, late childbearing) and middle-aged and late-life health. We find that parity is related to the mid-late-life health of women. Women with four children or more are more likely to suffer from activities of daily living (ADL) impairment and poorer self-rated health than those with one to three children. Early childbearing is associated with ADL impairment; however, the correlation is mediated by socioeconomic status. Early childbearing is related to self-rated health in later life by an indirect-only mediation effect via educational attainment and personal income.