Radha Sinha

Arab agriculture -- prospects for self-sufficiency

Abstract The article points out that, although the relative importance of the agricultural sector in the Arab world is declining as the importance of oil rises, it is still vital to Arab countries. Selfsufficiency in agriculture is desirable because of a possible cutoff of food imports for political reasons by the food-exporting countries. The article examines the possibilities for Arab selfsufficiency and suggests several alternative strategies.

Competing ideology and agricultural strategy: current agricultural development in India and China compared with Meiji strategy

For over twenty years the two largest countries of the world have been engaged in a conscious effort at improving the material (and spiritual) conditions of life of the masses. What makes the experiences of these countries interesting, is that their attempts at economic development are being made under two distinct political and economic ideologies. While Chinese leaders believe in a continuing revolution and the ultimate establishment of a Communist society through the dictatorship of the proletariat, Indian leaders aim at evolving towards a ‘Socialist’ society through a parliamentary democracy which allows for the coexistence of political parties of differing ideologies, within the framework of the Indian Constitution. The successes and failures of these experiments, together with the Japanese experience (and in more recent years the Taiwanese), widely acclaimed as a ‘model’ for the developing countries, have influenced and certainly will influence academic thinking on problems of economic development and policy-making in other developing countries. Questions are already being asked as to whether these experiences can serve as ‘models’ for the so-called ‘Third World’. This paper, in an attempt to provide a somewhat tentative answer to this question, underlines the basic similarities of approaches in these three countries, and at the same time stresses the inherent pitfalls in comparisons between countries with different natural endowments, social and cultural traditions, and current economic and political ideologies. Since the future pattern and pace of development are largely dictated by the base from which a country starts, it is necessary to begin with a brief account of the levels of yield and agricultural technology already achieved in China and India by the middle of the present century and to compare them with the situation in Meiji Japan. We intend to show that in terms of pre-modern agricultural technology around the 1880s there was not much difference between the three countries. In fact there are insufficient grounds for suggesting that at the time of the Meiji Restoration in 1868 Japan was on a higher plane in terms of agricultural technology, or that the rate of growth of agricultural output in the Meiji era was appreciably greater than that of India or China either then or in the last twenty years, or that Meiji agricultural strategy, based on indigenous resources, was a more realistic one in view of Japan’s factor endowments. In fact for most of the Meiji era there was a lack of strategy and a relative neglect of agriculture by the State, at least as compared with India during the same period. The major breakthrough in Japanese agriculture came after the 1920s and in particular after the Second World War as a result of the massive use of modern inputs, like chemical fertilizers, pesticides and hybrid seeds. As such there was nothing unique about Japanese strategy. The next stage in our argument is to show that in both China and India there was a fairly clear understanding of the problems of agriculture, institutional or otherwise. In spite of ideological differences, the strategies were similar. It is ironic that even the mistakes committed were in similar directions and in correcting these the two countries moved towards a similar strategy. In our view there were two main reasons for the relatively ‘slow’ rate of growth of agriculture: (i) a lack of proper appreciation of the high

Africa: A Continent in Transition

Abstract The African continent is attempting to telescope into decades the process of agricultural development that spread over centuries in Asia and Europe. This paper highlights some of the potential problems of this rapid process, discussing the factor endowments of the continent, the food and nutrition situation, the population situation, import requirements and finally, the prospects and conditions for success in increasing agricultural production.

China as an Economic Threat

Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the United States lacked substantial business interests in China, the British and the Japanese being the two main forces dominating trade and investment. The United States was, as evidenced by its ‘Open Door’ policy, content mainly with ensuring its access to the Chinese market. US businessmen saw a much more important trading partner in Japan and regarded the Japanese invasion of China as a great opportunity to expand US trade with Japan. Only after the Japanese march into Southeast Asia threatened the supply of raw materials to the United States did American businessmen change their tune.

America’s Discovery: the Globalization of Trade and Misery

The discovery of the Americas, which heralded a new age of immense progress in wealth, standards of living, science, and technology in Europe and America, owed as much to the lure of profits as to the intellectual transformation taking place in Europe at the beginning of the fifteenth century. For centuries Europe traded with Asia; and for centuries it remained a oneway trade. An insatiable European demand for luxuries – silk, cotton textiles, and spices – was met by payment in gold and silver, for the Asians did not need much that was produced in contemporary Europe. The lion’s share of the profits invariably went to the Muslim traders who controlled the routes to the East; therefore, ‘to eliminate the exorbitant profits of these oriental middlemen by the establishment of some direct means of contact with the east became an inevitable object of economic desire.’2

Human Rights – a Tool of Diplomacy

The defense of human rights and fundamental freedoms has been one of the basic responsibilities of the United Nations since its very inception. But the great powers behind the formation of the United Nations saw the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as ‘merely an incidental aspiration of the new organization.’ Only pressure from American non-governmental organizations such as the American Jewish Congress and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People led to human rights being given a prominent place in the UN Charter.2

Why Does America Need Enemies

September 11, 2001 became a day of infamy when nearly 3000 innocent people were brutally massacred by highjackers who slammed civilian airplanes into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York, the citadel of capitalism, and the Pentagon complex in Washington, the nerve center of the mightiest army on Earth. The loss of life on American soil alone reached a magnitude unparalleled in its history since the Civil War. The mere symbolism of the attack and the choice of the date 9/11 – the telephone number to call the police in the United States in case of emergency – were infuriating. Naturally, this was seen as an ‘attack on America’ and President George W. Bush declared a ‘War against Terrorism’ – a war not particularly of the president’s choosing but one that was God-sent for a president whose legitimacy was in doubt.2 Numb with a tragedy the people had so vividly experienced through the television, the country solidly supported the president. The country has a tradition of supporting the president in times of war and President Bush’s popularity immediately soared to an unprecedented height. The ‘War on Terrorism’ that began with the invasion of Afghanistan has already moved to Pakistan and the Philippines, and with the passage of time new theatres of war might be added. We are told the war against this elusive enemy will continue for a long time, possibly as long as the Cold War. At last, America had found the enemy it was looking for.

Enemies Become Strategic Partners

From the very inception of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, both China and the United States wanted to improve their relationship, but ideological differences, mutual suspicions, and the lack of adequate knowledge about each other prevented a rapprochement. The dominance of the conservatives in the US Senate and their commitment to Nationalist China and their domestic anti- Communist jihad were the other complicating factors. The machinations of the Soviet Union, ever desirous of inserting a wedge between China and the United States, also thwarted China’s efforts to normalize relations with the United States. The outbreak of the Korean War hardened attitudes on both sides. At the end of World War II, Korea, though independent of the Japanese occupation, found itself divided at the 38th parallel. The Soviet forces had reached Korea first and had crossed the 38th parallel, but on the arrival of the American forces several weeks later had retreated north of the parallel.2

China as a Security Threat

China’s rapid economic growth over the next two or three decades may enable the country to catch up with the United States or possibly overtake it. Obviously, China would be able to devote considerably more financial resources to the modernization of its armed forces, possibly undermining America’s role as the global superpower or threatening US interests in East Asia. This chapter examines whether China will have the capability of fielding a military comparable to the United States’ and posing a military threat to US interests.

Clinton and Bush: Contrasts in World View

By the time President Clinton took office in 1993, the world had changed immeasurably. In December 1988, Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev gave an assurance that he would withdraw the Soviet forces from Afghanistan within a year in his speech to the United Nations General Assembly. Renouncing ‘class-conflict’ as the basis for Soviet foreign policy, he stressed that he would convert the Soviet armament-economy into an economy of disarmament. The year 1989 proved to be momentous. It not only saw the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, but also witnessed the beginning of multi-party elections, ending the political monopoly of the Communist Party in the USSR and in Poland, where the Solidarity-led coalition came to power by defeating the Communists. A peaceful political transition from Communism to democracy came rather quickly in all the Eastern European countries except Romania, where the struggle ended with the execution of Communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife. Gradually, Ukraine and other Central Asian republics became independent. As one of his critics later pointed out, ‘the Soviet Union that Gorbachev inherited in 1985 was a global power, perhaps somewhat tarnished in that image, but still strong and united and one of the world’s two superpowers.