Rafal Antczak

Theoretical Aspects of Currency Crises

The paper presents three generations of theoretical models of currency crises. The models were drawing on the real crises. The first-generation models were developed after balance-of-payment crises in Mexico (1973.82), Argentina (1978.81), and Chile (1983). The second-generation models arose after speculative attacks in Europe and Mexico in 1990s. Finally, first attempts to built the third-generation models started after the Asian crisis in 1997.98. The paper also explains the mechanism of currency crisis, provides an overview of the crises literature, and defines the types of crises. This work is intended to summarize the current level of knowledge on the theoretical aspects of currency crises.

Economic Reforms in Kyrgyzstan

This article describes Kyrgyzstans achievements in the stabilization and liberalization of the economy and the majority of progress in this area that occurred in the first half of 1994. One may include Kyrgyzstan in the group of states that have adopted the radical variant of transition to market economics, a group to which the majority of Central European states and the above mentioned Baltic states belong. Kyrgyzstan has become a clear leader in economic transformation in Central Asia. Moreover, the progress in this area has been accompanied by a broad democratization of political life and an open, pro-Western orientation in foreign policy. These economic and political reforms represent the effect of the political course embarked upon in 1991 by the president of the republic, Askar Akayev. Thus far, they have made Kyrgyzstan an oasis of democracy and social peace in a region wracked by powerful ethnic and religious conflicts and whose political and economic regimes are of a significantly less liberal and democratic character and possess strong elements of the post-communist or even neo-communist order.

Economic Transition in Russia, the Ukraine and Belarus in Comparative Perspective

The authors of this paper try to analyze the similarities and differences in the starting conditions, adopted policies, and achieved results of the above three countries. The first part of the paper will be devoted to the initial conditions: the economic heritage of the FSU (especially of the perestroika years), differences in the economic structures of the discussed countries, and the level of their mutual interdependence. The second part contains a comparative analysis of the liberalization, stabilization, and privatization processes in each country. The third part presents the differences in macroeconomic performance and the progress of the transition. In the final part we try to analyze the political and other reasons for the observed differences.

The Failure of the IMF in Preventing Currency Crises in CIS Countries

The IMF has supported the transition process in a number of FSU countries. This support has involved concessionary financing, policy advice and technical assistance. Notwithstanding temporary conflicts, cooperation between the Fund and FSU countries throughout the period has been described by the Fund as generally successful. It has been argued that it has contributed to macroeconomic and financial stabilization.1 However, the financial crisis of 1998 wiped out this stabilization and proved that previous policies had not been fully sustainable. This chapter attempts to answer the crucial question of why countries collaborating closely with the IMF and implementing policies supported by the Fund had to undergo deep currency crises.2 The question becomes even more intriguing if one takes into consideration the fact that this was a first-generation crisis (see chapters 5, 6, 11, 12 and 13 of this volume) — that is, one caused by bad policies that led to macroeconomic imbalances. While the core of the problems was domestic, a deterioration in external conditions was the trigger that started the inevitable collapse. True, however, it is also now well understood that vested interests, insufficient structural reforms and lack of political will were also crucial factors preventing necessary policy adjustments. But did the Fund influence the pace of structural reforms and fiscal tightening enough?