Rajan Menon

The New Great Game in Central Asia

Greater Central Asia - the region consisting of the five Central Asian states, plus Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Xinjiang, and Afghanistan - has been strategically transformed. American strategic interests in Central Asia, marginal before the 11 September terrorist attacks, have suddenly become substantial. To continue the campaign against terrorism, the United States retained the Central Asian bases it acquired to destroy the Taliban. Central Asias authoritarian governments are determined to deepen American involvement - as a safeguard against militant Islam and Russian hegemony. Russia is understandably anxious about the deployment of American troops on its southern periphery. Newly ensconced in a turbulent region, the United States faces the perennial problem of the powerful: preventing engagement from culminating in entrapment.Greater Central Asia - the region consisting of the five Central Asian states, plus Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Xinjiang, and Afghanistan - has been strategically transformed. American strategic interests in Central Asia, marginal before the 11 September terrorist attacks, have suddenly become substantial. To continue the campaign against terrorism, the United States retained the Central Asian bases it acquired to destroy the Taliban. Central Asias authoritarian governments are determined to deepen American involvement - as a safeguard against militant Islam and Russian hegemony. Russia is understandably anxious about the deployment of American troops on its southern periphery. Newly ensconced in a turbulent region, the United States faces the perennial problem of the powerful: preventing engagement from culminating in entrapment.

In the Shadow of the Bear: Security in Post-Soviet Central Asia

I n 1991 five new Central Asian states-Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan-rose from the rubble of the Soviet empire. The region’s security will be shaped by the interplay between Russia’s politics and the degree of stability in Central Asia. The stability of Central Asia hinges on three variables: Uzbek hegemony and irredentism, the balance between political institutionalization and social mobilization, and the extent of disorder generated by the wrenching postSoviet economic transition. The key questions regarding Russia’s politics are these: how robust is Russia’s democratization? How influential are its pro-imperial elites? Will a discredited democracy be supplanted by an ultra-nationalist, authoritarian regime? Preponderant Russian power is an important constant-an enabling condition-but in itself tells us little about the nature of future Russian policy in Central Asia. In this article, after providing a brief background on Central Asia to set the context, I outline the principal determinants of Central Asian security. I then illustrate their significance with four scenarios of Russian-Central Asian relations. Throughout this inquiry, the prospects for a neo-imperial Russian policy remain a key preoccupation.’ For this reason, I assess the ways in which Central

Chaos in the North Caucasus and Russia's future

Chechen-style turmoil is spreading across the rest of the North Caucasus, and the Kremlin seems incapable of coping with the mounting chaos, or even understanding its causes - among them poverty, unemployment, ethnic tensions, corrupt pro-Moscow elites and high-handed policies by local authorities. Islam has become an increasingly powerful political force, and some Islamist groups are unquestionably radical and violent, and seek a sharia-based Caliphate uniting the North Caucasus. Their tactics include assassinations, kidnappings, bombings and armed attacks against towns. But there is a bigger issue at stake. Russia has many millions of Muslims, and xenophobic, anti-Muslim organisations and sentiment are increasingly prominent in the Russian political landscape. The spread of the North Caucasus crisis to other Muslim regions, such as Bashkortostan and Tatarstan, could affect Russias entire political trajectory.

The limits of neorealism: Understanding security in Central Asia

This paper specifies the conditions for conflict in Central Asia. Given Russian preponderance this should be an easy case for neorealism. But we demonstrate that the consequences of Russias superior power will depend on the nature of its regime and domestic stability in Central Asia. The type of nationalism, the robustness of political institutions, and the success or failure of economic reform will be critical conditions for Central Asian stability. The paper also evaluates the prospects for conflict resolution and prevention.

The Limits of Chinese–Russian Partnership

Since 1996, Russia and China have been united in what both call a ‘strategic partnership’. But the current stage of their relationship will more than likely give way to another that could surprise us, as previous ones have. The direction of such shifts has generally defied expectations. While Beijing values its strategic partnership with Russia, particularly as a means for obtaining arms and energy, it has no illusions that Russia and China can create an effective counterweight to the United States. It still sees the United States as the worlds premier power, even as it finds some of Washingtons actions objectionable. The United States should expect the Sino-Russian strategic partnership to endure and even to expand, but should not equate it with an alliance and react with panic. Stability and peace between Russia and China are in Americas interest; they make the world in general and East Asia in particular safer places.

Russia's Ruinous Chechen War

The Russian Federation may be falling apart?and its war against Chechnya is showing why. Unfortunately, most observers of the war in Chechnya miss the larger implications, limiting their analysis to the struggle for independence of one small region. Moscow blames radical Islamists for the trouble. Despite the unde niable role of fundamentalists in the Caucasus, however, Moscow had a greater hand in the federations decline than it cares to admit. Russias latest war with Chechnya was sparked in August 1999 when radical Islamists, many of whom had infiltrated from Chechnya, staged uprisings in the neighboring southern Russian republic of Dagestan. Russian troops were sent and, despite Moscows reassurances that the conflict was under control, the operations had evolved by September into the second full-scale war between Russia and Chechnya in five years. The innumerable deaths, the relentless bombardment of cities, and the torrent of refugees are eerily familiar, recalling the horrors of the 1994-96 Russo-Chechen war. The Russian army?even while weakened and demoralized?has been more successful this time; Russian officials are proclaiming swift progress. But no real solution?military or political?is in sight. Instead,

Buffer zones: Anachronism, power vacuum, or confidence builder?

Amidst calls for containing an assertive Russia, politicians and pundits have been debating whether Ukraine should serve as a ‘buffer zone’ between the Russian and Western spheres of influence. These debates provide an opportunity to revisit the long and varied history of major powers’ efforts to manage buffer zones. We draw on this history to learn the conditions under which buffer zones succeed or fail to stabilise regions, how buffers are most successfully managed, and when alternative arrangements for borderlands work better.

The Specter of Relativism

Relativism represents a threat – often fatal – to democracy. Why? Because if every political and normative position comes to be seen as equally valid as any other, the moral cement necessary for so...