Raju G. C. Thomas

The Indian Navy in the Seventies

S INCE THE INDO-PAKISTAN WAR of September i965, the growth of the Indian Navy has been substantial and rapid. From a share of 4 per cent of the annual defense budgetary allocation in i965-66, the Navy now receives almost io per cent of the Revenue and Capital share of the three Indian Services. More important, since the Navy is more capital-oriented than the Army and even the Air Force, its capital share tends to be more indicative of the growing importance of its role in the defense of India. This share rose from 7 per cent in I 96364 to almost 49 per cent in I973-74.1 The present capital expenditure on the Navy may, however, appear unjustified in view of the new balance of forces in the subcontinent following the Indo-Pakistan war of December i97i and the creation of Bangladesh. The success of the i97i naval operations against Pakistan had provided the justification for the accelerated naval armaments program which began with the presentation of the i967-68 defense budget to the Lok Sabha; but ironically, it also removed the only visible naval threat to India. The traditional enemy had been cut in half and its naval force overwhelmed and eliminated by a superior Indian Navy. The severance of Pakistans eastern province has therefore further reduced Pakistans dependence on sea routes between Karachi on the Arabian sea and the former eastern ports of Chittagong and Khulna in the Bay of Bengal. In retrospect, it would now appear to have been a gross error on the part of Pakistani strategists to have neglected its naval force, given the separation of the two wings by the Indian peninsula. As in the case of India, the neglect of the Pakistan Navy was not unexpected. The British Indian Army tradition and outlook had dominated the Pakistani Services and continued to influence defense policy. Consequently, Pakistani military strategy always envisioned a major land operation against India.

Should India Sign the NPT/CTBT?

First the NPT, and then the CTBT. While India had always opposed the Non-Proliferation Treaty since its inception in 1968, does it make sense for India to oppose the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty finalized in 1996? India had always supported such a treaty ever since it was first considered in the 1950s and 1960s. Indeed, India was one of the earliest advocates of this Treaty back when Jawaharlal Nehru was its prime minister.

India and the NPT after the Cold War

American efforts to stem the spread of nuclear weapons would appear more likely to succeed in the post-cold war era than was the case during the cold war. Without the nuclear standoff based on mutual assured destruction between the United States and the former Soviet Union, western nuclear guarantees to third parties would now appear more credible. All states facing potential nuclear threats can be brought under a credible western nuclear umbrella, unless they fear nuclear threats from a U.S.-led West itself. With the West now having achieved undisputed military supremacy, one American “proliferation watcher” even suggested that the United States should not think just in terms of containing nuclear-weapon proliferation, but should attempt now to “win” the war against proliferation.1

The Renewed NPT: Old Wine in New Bottles?

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was opened for signature in 1968 and came into effect in 1970 following ratification by the required number of states. The NPT was to remain in force for 25 years and accordingly the original treaty expired in 1995. Following a meeting at United Nations headquarters in New York in April 1995, the NPT was renewed indefinitely without change to the text. The membership of the renewed NPT is now nearly unanimous with only three states of significance remaining outside: India, Pakistan and Israel. Although there were earlier predictions about the NPT’s imminent collapse, especially after India tested an atomic device in 1974, the Treaty has survived. Indeed, the NPT’s prospects at the beginning of the 21st century may be argued to be much less gloomy than in the early 1960s when predictions were made that by the turn of this century there would be more than 30 nuclear weapons states in the world. With the exception of India in 1974, no new states have conducted nuclear tests, and even India has refrained from further tests.

The struggle for Kashmir: Alternative interpretations and solutions

Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1846–1990. Alastair Lamb. Hertingfordbury: Roxford Books, 1991, 368 pp. Kashmir: Behind the Vale. M. J. Akbar. New Delhi: Viking Penguin India, 1991, 232 pp. The Kashmir Tangle: Issues and Options. Rajesh Kadian. New Delhi: Vision Books, 1992; London: Asia Publishing House, 1992, 200 pp.

Should India Sign the NPT

Would India be more secure within or outside the NPT? Would Indian security interests be enhanced if, in 1995, the NPT collapsed or was replaced by a new or amended treaty structure? Should India sign the NPT or strive to undermine or destroy the treaty, or to replace it with an alternative regime that could better serve Indian interests? Such questions have always been significant, because India is one of the most outspoken critics of the NPT regime. However, the question of whether India should sign the treaty took on particular significance at the beginning of 1989 when news reports in India alleged that Pakistan had acquired and stockpiled nuclear weapons or was about to acquire such weapons. To be sure, such Indian allegations have been made periodically over the last ten years, but the problem has taken on greater urgency and credibility at the present time because the Indian reports are supplemented by those from American sources.1 According to the American reports, the administration of President George Bush may have to discontinue its economic and military aid to Pakistan unless it can certify that Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons. Such a certification, as required by the Pressler Amendment, would be difficult to issue based on the present evidence available to the U.S. government.2

Indian Security Policy.

Professor Thomas relates security policy to the countrys economy and technological capacity, discusses the capabilities of each of the armed services, and considers the issue of arms importation vs. indigenous production. He also explores the prospects for the future under Rajiv GandhiOriginally published in 1987.The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.