Ralf Emmers

ASEAN and the securitization of transnational crime in Southeast Asia

This article studies the securitization of transnational crime by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) since 1996–97. It first introduces transnational crime as a criminal matter before positioning it within the international security debate through an elaboration of the Copenhagen School and its securitization theory. It then examines whether transnational crime has been articulated in security terms in the ASEAN rhetoric. The article demonstrates that the member states have made statements in which they make claims about security in the context of crime. Yet, there is little evidence that this has encouraged regional policy-makers to adopt common security responses. ASEAN has failed to implement joint actions due to domestic circumstances but also because of its own consensus model and resistance to institutional reforms. Finally, the article suggests that the problem of transnational crime could be dealt with more effectively if it was approached primarily as a criminal matter rather than as a security issue.

The ASEAN Regional Forum and Preventive Diplomacy: Built to Fail?

Abstract Various reasons purport to explain why the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF) has failed to evolve from confidence building to preventive diplomacy (PD). These include the ARFs large membership, its strict adherence to sovereignty and noninterference principles that contradict any effective implementation of PD, and contrasting strategic perspectives among its participants. Although these factors have certainly hindered security cooperation, none are sufficient conditions by themselves to explain the forums ambivalence toward PD. The authors argue that these factors do not tell the whole story, not least when they have not stood in the way of experiments in PD by other processes in the Asia-Pacific. The claim here is that the ARF has evolved into a highly inflexible forum, which in turn has led to the formalization of its approach to PD. This has severely inhibited the adoption of a PD agenda and actionable measures under the ARF framework.

The Asian and global financial crises: consequences for East Asian regionalism

This article provides a comparative study of the consequences of the Asian and global financial crises for East Asian regionalism. It explains how and why the effects of the two crises on regional institutions were divergent. The differences derived from the origins of the two upheavals, internal versus external to the region, and from the depth of their impact on the affected countries. These generated contrasting expectations of how regional institutions might respond, which led in turn to diverse perceptions on the need for institutional change. The Asian financial crisis underscored the need for new overlapping arrangements capable of better defending the region against future financial instability. The less severe crisis affecting East Asia in 2008, in contrast, has led to a more dispersed and nationally driven institutional response. The competing proposals have been driven more by a perceived shift in the global power distribution than by any renewed or reinforced sense of regional vulnerability or common identity.

The Influence of the Balance of Power Factor within the ASEAN Regional Forum

While the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) may be seen as an A SEAN attempt to expand to the wider region its approach to co-operative security, its establishment also involved power-balancing considerations. The Forum was created with the denial of hegemony in mind but not in a conventional sense. In deed, the constraining of power was expected to be dependent on political rather than military means. The ARF was conceived as an instrument for ensuring a continued American involvement in the region and to encourage China in the practice of good international behaviour. Beyond the founding moments of the ARF, the role of the balance of power factor has carried over to the working of the institution. Significantly, China has perceived the Forum as a vehicle for promoting multipolarity in the Asia-Pacific to counter Americas unipolar status in the post-Cold War world. Introduction This article attempts to analyse the influence of the balance of power factor on the formation and working of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The balance of power factor within co-operative security involves a denial of intramural hegemony. This consideration is intended to contain a disposition to hegemony on the part of a rising power by integrating it within a rule-based arrangement that provides sufficient incentive to constrain hegernonic ambitions. It will be claimed that the ARF was conceived as an instrument for ensuring a continued U.S. involvement in East Asia, and for including the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) in a rule-based arrangement to encourage it in the practice of good international behaviour. The relevance of the balance of power factor will also be examined through the workings of the ARF and the existence among some participants of alternative views on the role of the institution. This article consists of three sections. The first briefly introduces an understanding of the balance of power factor within co-operative security. The second section discusses the role of the balance of power factor in the formation of the ARF, noting, in particular, the chairmans statement at the ASEAN-PMC Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) in May 1993. Beyond the founding moments of the ARF, it is considered how the role of the balance of power factor has carried over to the workings of the institution. It is suggested that the ARF may have failed as an instrument for constraining China in a corresponding way to ASEANs degree of success with Indonesia. Finally, attention is given to the existence of different perceptions within the framework of the ARF, and specifically to Chinas preference for multipolarity in the Asia-Pacific that may be defined with particular reference to the United States. The Balance of Power Factor within Co-operative Security Beyond its conventional understanding, the balance of power may also be interpreted in political terms. This is based on the premise that potential hegemonic dispositions can be restrained through political and institutional means and without the use of war, the traditional instrument of the balance. Attention needs to be given to the differences between balance of power in its conventional interpretation and practice and the balance of power factor within co-operative security arrangements. This factor may be defined as the disposition to promote countervailing arrangements to deny hegemony within co-operative security even if devoid of direct military content. The necessity to focus on the constraining of power through political channels results from the fact that co-operative security arrangements remain diplomatic associations lacking any form of common military power. As a result, the method by which power is constrained within co-operative security distinguishes the balance of power factor from a more c onventional application of the concept. The balance of power factor within co-operative security needs to be identified in the context of norms and principles promoted by an associative arrangement. …

Comprehensive security and resilience in Southeast Asia: ASEAN's approach to terrorism 1

Abstract This paper explores how the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has tackled the threat of terrorism since 9/11 and the Bali bombings. It claims that ASEAN has applied its traditional approach to security, based on comprehensive security and the principle of resilience, when addressing this challenge. The resilience concept underpins the nexus between national and regional security and emphasizes domestic regime consolidation re-enforced by regional consultations. In their pursuit of resilience, member states have sought in various degrees to address terrorism domestically through a mixture of security, law enforcement, socio-economic, ideological, and educational policies. It is noted that Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore have tackled terrorism more comprehensively than Thailand and Malaysia. Reflecting the synergy between national and regional resilience, ASEAN has operated as an umbrella organization meant to complement domestic and sub-regional efforts. It has been committed rhetorically, has produced frameworks of action, as well as reached agreements with the great powers. The paper is not overly optimistic, however, about ASEANs role in promoting regional resilience against the threat of terrorism in Southeast Asia.

The changing power distribution in the South China Sea: Implications for conflict management and avoidance

This article focuses on the changing distribution of power in the South China Sea and assesses the implications this has for conflict management and avoidance. Power is discussed here both in terms of naval military resources and with reference to behaviour and influence. The article argues that there is a growing asymmetry of naval power in the South China Sea to the advantage of China. Southeast Asian claimants are concerned about the rapidly changing power distribution and fear that overwhelming naval capabilities could one day be used by the PRC (People’s Republic of China) to resolve the sovereignty question militarily. The article therefore examines how the Southeast Asian nations have sought, with some success, to manage the unequal power distribution in the South China Sea through the activities of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its model of conflict management and avoidance.

Institutional Arrangements to Counter Human Trafficking in the Asia Pacific

In recent years there has been a marked increase in human trafficking across the borders of Asia-Pacific states. In addressing this problem, regional states have found that unilateral actions are insufficient to stem the flows of trafficked persons. In response to this shortfall in capacity a number of arrangements have been initiated by regional institutions. The purpose of this article is to analyse the efficacy of these institutional arrangements. This article discusses the problem of human trafficking and its patterns within the region, before assessing the current anti-trafficking programmes and policies developed by regional institutions in East Asia and the South Pacific. The article then reviews trans-regional efforts being undertaken through the ASEAN Regional Forum, including the Asia-Europe Meeting and the Bali Process. In concluding, it is suggested that while the regional institutions remain captured by state interests they are nonetheless an important vehicle in combating human trafficking in the Asia Pacific.

The Indochinese enlargement of ASEAN: security expectations and outcomes

The article examines the extent to which Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia have gained from their participation in ASEAN. To assess the security and diplomatic benefits of their membership, it identifies three expectations held by the Indochinese states—enhanced international status, improved security and relations vis-à-vis other ASEAN members, and more room for manoeuvre when dealing with non-member states. The study demonstrates, however, that while Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are less isolated internationally after joining ASEAN, the actual benefits in terms of their relations with the other ASEAN members as well as non-member states have been more ambiguous. With ASEAN in mind, the article concludes by discussing the possible costs and drawbacks of enlargement that can transform any international organisation into a less influential and cohesive institution.

Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea: Strategic and Diplomatic Status Quo

The Working Paper argues that the maritime disputes over the South China Sea are characterised by a strategic and diplomatic status quo. China does so far not have the necessary power projection to impose naval hegemony in the South China Sea. None of the ASEAN claimants can rely on sufficient naval power or an external military alliance to impose their claims in the Spratly Islands. A similar situation of status quo exists on the diplomatic front. China and the ASEAN countries have been negotiating for years to conclude a code of conduct for the South China Sea. The 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea is based on a multilateral dimension as well as on a convergence of views on the need to peacefully manage the dispute. While a step in the right direction, the declaration is only an interim political agreement and it is still to be seen whether the parties will sign a detailed and binding code of conduct for the South China Sea. The Working Paper starts by reviewing the nature of the maritime disputes. It then describes the security environment in the South China Sea by examining the changing strategic conditions of the disputes. Its final section discusses the long diplomatic road toward the 2002 Declaration. The Working Paper concludes that the South China Sea has remained primarily a political rather than a military issue thanks to China’s desire to accommodate the Southeast Asian countries and the limited naval capabilities available to the different claimants. ******************** Ralf Emmers is Assistant Professor at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He completed his MSc and PhD in the International Relations Department of the London School of Economics (LSE). His research interests cover security studies, international institutions in the Asia-Pacific, and the international relations of Southeast Asia. His publications include Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF (RoutledgeCurzon, 2003) and Non-Traditional Security in the Asia-Pacific: The Dynamics of Securitization (Eastern University Press, 2004). He is the author of journal articles in The Pacific Review, Asian Survey, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Pointer and Dialogue + Cooperation and of numerous chapters in edited volumes. He is also one of the authors of an IDSS monograph on A New Agenda for the ASEAN Regional Forum. His forthcoming publications include a co-edited book with Joseph Liow titled Order and Security in Southeast Asia: Essays in Memory of Michael Leifer (RoutledgeCurzon) and a co-edited book with Mely C. Anthony and Amitav Acharya called Understanding Non-Traditional Security in Asia: Dilemmas in Securitization (Ashgate). Dr Emmers teaches a course on The Study of International Institutions as part of the MSc in International Relations at IDSS and lectures at the SAFTI Military Institute and the Home Team Command and Staff Course, Singapore.

Indonesia's role in ASEAN: A case of incomplete and sectorial leadership

Abstract Indonesia is often regarded as the natural leader of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in light of its geographical dimensions, large population, strategic position and natural resources. The country has felt entitled to a position of leadership and has generally been recognized by the other ASEAN members as first among equals. While the de facto leadership of Indonesia has traditionally been accepted as conventional wisdom, little attention has been given to the extent to which Jakarta has actually succeeded in exercising leadership in ASEAN and how its attempt to do so has been perceived by the other Southeast Asian states. The paper explores this question by focusing on Indonesias ability to provide international public goods in the areas of security and economics, engage in conflict management and promote institution building. It argues that the country has sought to establish a stable and autonomous security environment, to conduct conflict meditation efforts in the Cambodian conflict and the South China Sea disputes, and to develop institutional mechanisms to promote security, democracy and human rights among other issues. Still, Indonesias leadership in ASEAN has been incomplete due to resistance from some members to its preference for an autonomous regional order and in recent years a democratic form of domestic governance. Its leadership has so far also been limited to the political and security spheres, leaving other sectors, like the economy, to others.