See Seng Tan

The ASEAN Regional Forum and Preventive Diplomacy: Built to Fail?

Abstract Various reasons purport to explain why the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF) has failed to evolve from confidence building to preventive diplomacy (PD). These include the ARFs large membership, its strict adherence to sovereignty and noninterference principles that contradict any effective implementation of PD, and contrasting strategic perspectives among its participants. Although these factors have certainly hindered security cooperation, none are sufficient conditions by themselves to explain the forums ambivalence toward PD. The authors argue that these factors do not tell the whole story, not least when they have not stood in the way of experiments in PD by other processes in the Asia-Pacific. The claim here is that the ARF has evolved into a highly inflexible forum, which in turn has led to the formalization of its approach to PD. This has severely inhibited the adoption of a PD agenda and actionable measures under the ARF framework.

Interstate and Intrastate Dynamics in Southeast Asia's War on Terror

Recent studies highlight the relative dearth of counterterrorism cooperation between member nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Acknowledging that more can and should be done by Southeast Asian governments in interdicting terrorism, the authors nevertheless argue that hitherto collaboration between and among security and intelligence services of ASEAN and partner countries in the war on terror has been fairly effective, as evidenced by the capture of key Jemaah Islamiyah militants. On the other hand, weak state capacity and legitimacy as well as bureaucratic competition and rivalry continue to debilitate rather than facilitate national and regional counterterrorism efforts. Moreover, the apparent circumspection of regional responses to terrorism is partly a reaction to the highly militarized counterterrorism strategy embraced by the United States. Finally, the authors contend that radical Islamist terrorism can only be successfully countered by the adoption of a comprehensive approach that addresses a host of real or perceived social, economic, political and ultimately, ideological challenges.

Rescuing constructivism from the constructivists: a critical reading of constructivist interventions in Southeast Asian security

Abstract Constructivist contributions to the study of Southeast Asian security raise much-needed awareness of identity concerns and introduce conceptual and methodological innovations into the study of identity. However, their shared rationalist proclivity to couple subjectivity with sovereignty revives the enduring problem of treating agency as ultimately pre-given. Contrary to their professed aim to restore to security studies an appreciation for history and practice, the contributions of many Southeast Asia constructivists are quite tellingly essentialist, particularly their concessions to state-centrism and ideational/normative determinism, both due partly to an uncritical emulation of rationalist constructivist perspectives in International Relations (IR) theory. In granting ontological priority to states, Southeast Asia constructivists cannot fully transcend reification because their denaturalizing of international anarchy or regions comes at the expense of a reified state. In reifying either the state or ideas/norms, their claim to privilege practice in their analyses of Southeast Asian security becomes suspect. But if process and practice are to be taken seriously, then Southeast Asia constructivists must avoid presuming a preordained subjectivity that invalidates their claim to study social construction.

The Keystone of World Order

Traditional U.S. allies, including Singapore, have long perceived the United States as the regions great stabilizer and honest broker. As the keystone of regional and world order, however, Washington must have an appreciation for moderation and restraint.

IS ASIA-PACIFIC REGIONALISM OUTGROWING ASEAN?

Abstract ASEAN has proved an enduring regional architecture, but the Asia-Pacific increasingly faces a series of interrelated political and security challenges for which the organisation may be outmoded. See Seng Tan asks whether ASEAN centrality enhances regionalism or merely rationalises the status quo in which it enjoys pride of place.

NGOs in conflict management in Southeast Asia

Changes in the nature and context of conflicts in the post-Cold War era have led to the reformulation of conflict management modalities. This has involved the growing participation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in UN mandated peace missions. The implications of this trend for Southeast Asia, a region where conflict management has long been viewed as the exclusive preserve of governments and militaries, are explored in this study. It shows that longstanding official resistance against involvement by NGOs in conflict management may no longer be unequivocally assumed for two reasons. The first has to do with specific region-wide institutional developments, some undertaken in response to certain post-Cold War challenges confronting the region, that may be paving the way towards greater civilian participation in conflict management. The second has to do with an attitudinal adjustment, discernible among military actors throughout the region, towards favouring increased NGO involvement in peace operations. Together, these developments argue for greater coordination and coherence in the relationship between NGOs and international military peacekeeping forces in future peace missions in the Southeast Asian region. Nevertheless, whether these developments will continue to evolve and consolidate remains uncertain.

America the Indispensable: Singapore's View of the United States’ Engagement in the Asia-Pacific

This article argues that Singapore’s leaders value and encourage a dominant and interested America in the Asia-Pacific. A powerful and engaged America, they believe, keeps the region stable, enabling Singapore to freely pursue its interests. Though politically distinct entities—America as the world’s foremost liberal democracy, Singapore as an “enlightened” illiberal nation—the two countries nonetheless share a belief in market capitalism, stability and access within the global commons, rule of law, and the like. In May 2003 and July 2005, respectively, Singapore signed a free-trade agreement and a Strategic Framework Agreement with the United States that further expands their already considerable bilateral economic, political and security ties, making them allies in nearly every which way but in name. An official alliance is not in Singapore’s interest, given the political baggage that comes with it, much of it undesirable for any state in a region defined by competing interests and clashing ideologies, some of it potentially anti-American in orientation. Yet such prudence has not precluded the formation of an intimate partnership that, in key respects, extends beyond the quality of America’s ties with its Southeast Asian allies, Thailand and the Philippines. And although the historical exercise of U.S. foreign policy has occasionally

Untying Leifer's discourse on order and power

Abstract Neo-realists often appeal to a presumed unity and harmony in political realism. This imagined wholeness, with a modest allowance for diversity, conveniently ignores the ambivalent and contradictory aspects of realist discourse. Why this is so has to do with the rationalist–positivist commitment to the notion that some deep structure that is autonomous, objective, extra-historical and extra-political underlies and unifies the realist tradition. Conversely, the writings of the late Michael Leifer on order and power serve as a compelling reminder that antinomies and tensions animate that tradition in ways many realists either downplay or simply ignore. Thanks to the open-ended ‘nature’ of Leifers oeuvre, this essay argues, we find in it a basis for reflective examination of our own prior suppositions of realism as a tradition. Contra much of what stands for realism today, Leifers work, when subjected to a deconstructive reading, demonstrates a commitment to dialoguing with the world of Asian security even as it contributes to its objectification, as evidenced in his ambivalent reflections on regional order and the balance of power in the Southeast Asian, East Asian as well as Asia-Pacific contexts. In that respect, Leifers work draws critical attention to some of the metaphysical conceits of rationalist–positivist international relations theory and practice, which at times seems more interested in the pursuit of a purely instrumentalist control over an objectified reality rather than hearing what the ‘real world’ has to say in return.

Institutions for Asian Integration: Innovation and Reform

The formation of regional production networks in East Asia has occurred mainly through market forces, without much help from regional institutions in promoting the creation of a single Asian market. While this approach has served the region well in the past, the drastic changes experienced since the 2008–2009 financial crisis and the challenges Asian countries are facing—growing inequalities and competition, on the one hand, and enhanced threats to the environment and people’s health on the other—have rendered more urgent the need for intergovernmental cooperation at global and regional levels. Asia’s institutions for regionalism need strengthening through reform and innovation such as better governance and resourcing, greater and more effective participation and delegation of powers, overall streamlining of regional architecture, including the phasing out of outdated or irrelevant institutions and, where needed, the creation of new ones. Ultimately, given its rootedness in regional order, institutional efficacy is a function of the ability and willingness of its members, especially influential stakeholders, to collaborate.

Mailed Fists and Velvet Gloves: The Relevance of Smart Power to Singapore’s Evolving Defence and Foreign Policy

Abstract This paper critically assesses the conceptual utility of smart power to Singapore’s evolving defence and foreign policy and behaviour. First, as a political concept adopted by the United States for its post-Afghanistan strategy, smart power does not travel easily. With qualifications, however, the notion is relevant to Singapore’s policy pragmatism and its emphasis on deterrence and diplomacy. Second, Singapore’s willingness to employ its military assets in disaster relief and peacekeeping arguably hews most closely to smart power’s mix of hard and soft approaches. Third, Singapore’s contributions to global governance, albeit limited, imply a rethinking among its leaders on the place of values in its policy.