Ralph Erber

Transactive memory in close relationships

Memory performance of 118 individuals who had been in close dating relationships for at least 3 months was studied. For a memory task ostensibly to be performed by pairs, some Ss were paired with their partners and some were paired with an opposite-sex partner from another couple. For some pairs a memory structure was assigned (e.g., 1 partner should remember food items, another should remember history items, etc.), whereas for others no structure was mentioned. Pairs studied together without communication, and recall was tested in individuals. Memory performance of the natural pairs was better than that of impromptu pairs without assigned structure, whereas the performance of natural pairs was inferior to that of impromptu pairs when structure was assigned.

The hyperaccessibility of suppressed thoughts

The accessibility of suppressed thoughts was compared with the accessibility of thoughts on which Ss were consciously trying to concentrate. In Experiment 1, Ss made associations to word prompts as they tried to suppress thinking about a target word (e.g., house) or tried to concentrate on that word. Under the cognitive load imposed by time pressure, they gave the target word in response to target-related prompts (e.g., home) more often during suppression than during concentration

On being cool and collected : Mood regulation in anticipation of social interaction

This study examined the influence of anticipated social interaction on the regulation of moods. Study 1 induced happy and sad moods through exposure to music. All participants expected to perform a second, unrelated experimental task either by themselves of with another participant. Participants who expected to do the task alone subsequently selected positive and negative news stories equally, but those who expected to interact preferred stories containing material incongruent with their mood. Study 2 confirmed this outcome, but showed it was confined primarily to anticipation of interaction with partners who are expected to be in neutral or good moods themselves. In Study 3, participants whose mood was not manipulated reduced self-exposure to cheerful or depressing videos when they expected to interact with another.

Effects of arousal on judgments of others' emotions.

Based on evidence that arousal cues information from memory associated with a similar level of arousal (Clark, Milberg, & Ross, 1983) and on evidence that people will base judgments on the information that is most available to them (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), it was hypothesized that (a) increases in arousal would increase the likelihood that subjects would interpret positive statements and positive facial expressions as indicating a positive emotion associated with high arousal (joy) rather than a positive emotion associated with low arousal (serenity), and (b) increases in arousal would increase the likelihood that subjects would interpret negative statements and negative expressions as indicating a negative emotion associated with high arousal (anger) rather than a negative emotion associated with low arousal (sadness or depression). Two studies are reported, each of which support the first hypothesis but not the second. Explanations for why arousal had the predicted effects on positive but not on negative stimuli are offered.

Effects of salience and time pressure on ratings of social causality

Abstract A model is proposed to account for the effects of a target persons salience on judgments of that target. It is argued that salience leads to more extreme inferences in the direction implied by prior knowledge that is relevant to the judgment. This knowledge may include both specific information about the target being rated and general information about the class of stimuli to which the target belongs. Two experiments supported these hypotheses. When subjects were under time pressure to make judgments of a target persons influence in a social situation, their judgments increased with the salience of the target when they had prior knowledge that the target was generally high in social influence. However, their judgments decreased with the targets salience when subjects had prior knowledge that the target was generally low in social influence. When subjects were given ample time to make their judgments, however, the effects of target salience were attenuated. Possible implications of these findings for prior research on salience effects are discussed.

Affect Regulation and Decision Making: Risk as a Social Constraint

The social constraints model of affect regulation is applied to decision making involving varying levels of risk in two studies. In Study 1 (N = 46) participants indicated a desire to attenuate both positive and negative induced moods when faced with a high-risk decision but not a low-risk decision. Study 2 (N = 64) provided evidence that attenuated affect helps individuals better identify decision-irrelevant information. Participants who were first made to feel happy or sad and then read a story that was incongruent with their mood were better at identifying decision-irrelevant information than participants who read a story that was congruent with their mood.

COMMENTARY: "The Wisdom of Social Psychology: Five Commonalities and One Concern"

In our invitation to this special issue, we asked the contributors to discuss some social psychology findings that could possibly help people as individuals or as groups live optimal lives. Clearly, the contributors were able to do this. Each delivered an interesting, coherent discussion of some wisdom growing out of social psychology. There was even a fair amount of agreement about which findings constituted wisdom. Unfortunately, there was another point with which a number of contributors agreed: Although social psychology has had little trouble producing wisdom, it could do a better job of disseminating that wisdom. In this article, we address that concern. We begin by synthesizing into five general categories the various findings discussed by the contributors. Then we examine some reasons why these categories of knowledge have not become a part of folk knowledge the way findings from other areas of psychology have. Finally, we offer some suggestions as to what our field might do to become more successful in disseminating its wisdom.

Introduction to the Psychology of Political Orientation

The feeling that we are strongly divided on political grounds seems to be growing. Differences between the left and right seem more extreme, and some would even argue that the political middle has begun to disappear. Given the growing role that political ideology may be playing in people’s lives, it seemed important to understand this ideology. How do the ideologies differ from one another? Why do some individuals endorse one ideology, whereas other individuals are drawn to a completely opposing set of ideas? What factors enhance, polarize, or defuse the operation of these ideologies? To addresses issues like these, we invited six target articles from authors who have developed coherent theoretical models related to political ideology. The target articles are followed by two questions from the editors, and finally by answers to these questions from the target authors. We hope that the inclusion of these different frameworks and their addressing of two common questions will give us some insight into political orientation and why it seems to be playing such a central role in the lives of many individuals today. In her article, Braithwaite moves beyond a single left–right political continuum. She suggests that we should consider two continua and the ways in which individuals attempt to balance between the two. Individuals who generally value security over harmony (e.g., willing to initiate war with little interest in the objections of allies) would be considered right wing, whereas individuals who generally value harmony over security (e.g., carefully weigh the impact on allies before determining defense options) would generally be considered left wing. Those who place a high value on both harmony and security are referred to as dualists, whereas those who place a low value on both are referred to as relativists. Although both dualists and relativists occupy the political middle, they differ in their way of engaging political institutions. Dualists are bridge builders who are willing to work with the left and the right, whereas relativists look for contextual details to determine their stances on specific issues and are not especially committed to making the political system work. Duckitt and Sibley also suggest we can best understand political ideology by considering two dimensions. For Duckitt and Sibley, though, these dimensions are Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO). The two dimensions may be related to one another, but need not be. Their interrelations allow us to move beyond a simple left– right dichotomy to understand more subtle distinctions in political ideology. Duckitt and Sibley discuss the roots of RWA and SDO in different social worldview beliefs, personality trait dimensions, and social environmental influences. They also discuss the different ways these ideologies might influence sociopolitical and intergroup behavior (e.g., prejudice) under different conditions (e.g., threat). Haidt, Graham, and Joseph note that researchers have generally taken one of two strategies toward understanding political orientation. Some have started with people’s self-identifications (i.e., liberal, conservative) and have moved down to examine the more specific traits that are associated with the identifications. Other researchers have started with lower level meanings, strivings, and personal narratives and have asked how individuals who endorse these end up adopting a particular political orientation. Haidt et al. suggest an integration of the two approaches. They do so using Dan McAdams’s three-level account of personality and their own Moral Foundations Theory. In brief, they propose that consideration of single left–right dimension can help us understand some lower level associations (e.g., right-wing authoritarianism and openness to experience) but that a fuller understanding of ideology requires us to look at the narratives individuals construct and internalize as they develop, join groups, and share ideologies. Janoff-Bulman starts with the assumption that liberals and conservatives differ in their basic motivational orientation. Liberals are generally approach oriented,

Two Questions About the Psychology of Political Orientation

Given the larger-than-usual number of target articles for this issue, we decided to forgo the typical set of commentaries. Instead, the editors constructed two questions that we hoped would be equally relevant to each of the target articles. These questions were not designed to be “gotcha” questions. They were designed to allow the authors to elaborate upon their ideas and perhaps allow readers to draw direct connections among the various target articles.