Ray A. Warner

Comment on "Evidence for Neutrinoless Double Beta Decay"

We comment on the recent claim for the experimental observation of neutrinoless double-beta decay. We discuss several limitations in the analysis provided in that paper and conclude that there is no basis for the presented claim.

Discrimination of naturally occurring radioactive material in plastic scintillator material

Plastic scintillator material is used in many applications for the detection of gamma rays from radioactive material, primarily due to the sensitivity per unit cost compared to other detection materials. However, the resolution and lack of full-energy peaks in the plastic scintillator material prohibits detailed spectroscopy. Therefore, other materials such as doped sodium iodide are used for spectroscopic applications. The limited spectroscopic information can, however, be exploited in plastic scintillator materials to provide some discrimination. The discrimination between man-made and naturally occurring sources would be useful in reducing alarm screening for radiation detection applications that target man-made sources. The results of applying the limited energy information from plastic scintillator material for radiation portal monitors are discussed.

Overview of portal monitoring at border crossings

The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection has the task of interdicting illicit radioactive material at ports of entry. Items of concern include radiation dispersal devices (RDD), nuclear warheads, and special nuclear material (SNM). The preferred survey method screens all vehicles in primary and diverts questionable vehicles to secondary. This requires high detection probability in primary while not overwhelming secondary with alarms, which could include naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) found in acceptable cargo and radionuclides used in medical procedures. Sensitive alarm algorithms must accommodate the baseline depression observed whenever a vehicle enters the portal. Energy-based algorithms can effectively use the crude energy information available from a plastic scintillator to distinguish NORM from SNM. Whenever NORM cargo limits the alarm threshold, energy-based algorithms produce significantly better detection probabilities for small SNM sources than gross-count algorithms. Algorithms can be best evaluated using a large empirical data set to 1) calculate false alarm probabilities, 2) select sigma-level thresholds for operationally acceptable false alarm rates, and 3) determine detection probabilities for marginally detectable pseudo sources of SNM.

Automated separation and measurement of radioxenon for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

A fully automatic radioxenon sampler/analyzer (ARSA) has been developed and demonstrated for the collection and quantitative measurement of the four xenon radionuclides,131mXe(11.9 d),133mXe(2.2 d),133Xe(5.2 d), and135Xe(9.1 hr), in the atmosphere. These radionuclides are important signatures in monitoring for compliance to a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Activity ratios of these radionuclides permit source attribution. Xenon, continuously and automatically separated from the atmosphere, is automatically analyzed by electron-photon coincidence spectrometry providing a lower limit of detection of about 100 μBq/m3. The demonstrated detection limit is about 100 times better than achievable with reported laboratory-based procedures for the short-time collection intervals of interest.

Delayed neutron data from TRISTAN

Abstract Half-lives and Pn values are presented for 38 precursors among the low yield fission products. Pn values are based on a beta-neutron coincidence technique.

Field testing of collection and measurement of radioxenon for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, with guidance and support from the U.S. Department of Energys NN-20 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Research and Development program, has developed and demonstrated a fully automatic sampler-analyzer (ARSA) for the collection and quantitative measurement of the four xenon radionuclides,131mXe (11.9 d),133mXe (2.19 d),133Xe (5.24 d), and135Xe (9.10 h), in the atmosphere. These radionuclides are important signatures in monitoring for compliance to a CTBT, and may have applications in stack monitoring and other areas where xenon radionuclides are present. The activity ratios between certain of these radionuclides permit discrimination between radioxenon originating from nuclear detonations and that from nuclear reactor operations, nuclear fuel reprocessing, or from medical isotope production and usage. With the ARSA system, xenon is continuously and automatically separated from the atmosphere at flow rates of about 100 lpm by sorption-bed techniques. Samples collected in 8 hours are automatically analyzed by electron-photon coincidence spectrometry to provide detection sensitivities as low as 100 μBq/m3 of air. This sensitivity is about 10-fold better than achieved with reported laboratory-based procedures1 for the short time collection intervals of interest. Gamma-ray energy spectra and gas analysis data are automatically collected.

The Majorana neutrinoless double-beta decay experiment

The proposed Majorana double-beta decay experiment is based on an array of segmented intrinsic Ge detectors with a total mass of 500 kg of Ge isotopically enriched to 86% in 76Ge. A discussion is given of background reduction by material selection, detector segmentation, pulse shape analysis, and electroformation of copper parts and granularity. Predictions of the experimental sensitivity are given. For an experimental running time of 10 years over the construction and operation oft he Majorana setup, a sensitivity of T1/20ν∼4×1027 yr is predicted. This corresponds to 〈mν〉∼0.003−0.004 eV according to recent QRPA and RQRPA matrix element calculations.

Glass-fiber-based neutron detectors for high- and low-flux environments

Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) has fabricated cerium-activated lithium silicate scintillating fibers via a hot-downdraw process. These fibers typically have a operational transmission length (e-1 length) of greater than 2 meters. This permits the fabrication of devices which were not possible to consider. Scintillating fibers permit conformable devices, large-area devices, and extremely small devices; in addition, as the thermal-neutron sensitive elements in a fast neutron detection system, scintillating fibers can be dispersed within moderator, improving neutron economy, over that possible with commercially available 3He or BF3 proportional counters. These fibers can be used for national-security applications, in medical applications, in the nuclear-power industry, and for personnel protection at experimental facilities. Data are presented for devices based on single fibers and devices made up of ribbons containing many fibers under high-and low-flux conditions.

The Majorana Project

Building a Ovββ experiment with the ability to probe neutrino mass in the inverted hierarchy region requires the combination of a large detector mass sensitive to Ovββ, on the order of 1-tonne, and unprecedented background levels, on the order of or less than 1 count per year in the Ovβ β signal region. The MAJORANA Collaboration proposes a design based on using high-purity enriched 76Ge crystals deployed in ultralow background electroformed Cu cryostats and using modern analysis techniques that should be capable of reaching the required sensitivity while also being scalable to a 1-tonne size. To demonstrate feasibility, the collaboration plans to construct a prototype system, the MAJORANA DEMONSTRATOR, consisting of 30 kg of 86% enriched 76Ge detectors and 30 kg of natural or isotope-76-depleted Ge detectors. We plan to deploy and evaluate two different Ge detector technologies, one based on a p-type configuration and the other on n-type.

A description of the DOE Radionuclide Aerosol Sampler/Analyzer for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

Radionuclide monitoring, though slower than vibrational methods of explosion detection, provides a basic and certain component of Comprehensive Test Ban treaty (CTBT) verification. Measurement of aerosol radioactive debris, specifically a suite of short-lived fission products, gives high confidence that a nuclear weapon has been detonated in or vented to the atmosphere. The variable nature of wind-borne transport of the debris requires that many monitoring stations cover the globe to insure a high degree of confidence that tests which vent to the atmosphere will be detected within a reasonable time period. To fulfill the CTBT aerosol measurement requirements, a system has been developed at PNNL to automatically collect and measure radioactive aerosol debris, then communicate spectral data to a central data center. This development has proceeded through several design iterations which began with sufficient measurement capability (<30 μBq/m3140Ba) and resulted in a system with a minimal footprint (1 m×2 m), minimal power requirement (1600W), and support of network infrastructure needs. The Mark IV prototype (Fig. 1) is currently the subject of an Air Force procurement with private industry to partially fulfill US treaty obligations under the CTBT. It is planned that the system will be available for purchase from a manufacturer in late 1997.