Raymond A. Zilinskas

The Anti-Plague System and the Soviet Biological Warfare Program

The USSR possessed a unique national public health system that included an agency named “anti-plague system.” Its mission was to protect the country from highly dangerous diseases of either natural or laboratory etiology. During the 1960s, the anti-plague system became the lead agency of a program to defend against biological warfare, codenamed Project 5. This responsibility grew and by the middle 1970s came to include undertaking tasks for the offensive biological warfare program, codenamed Ferment. This article describes the anti-plague systems activities relevant to both aspects of the Soviet Unions biological warfare program, offense and defense, and analyzes its contributions to each.

Cuban Allegations of Biological Warfare by the United States: Assessing the Evidence

(1999). Cuban Allegations of Biological Warfare by the United States: Assessing the Evidence. Critical Reviews in Microbiology: Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 173-227.

Verifying Compliance to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

There are difficult technical problems inherent in verifying compliance to the Biological Weapons and Toxin Convention (BWC) that are making it difficult to reach international agreement on a verification protocol. A compliance regime will most likely involve the formation of an Organization for the Prevention of Biological Warfare (OPBW). Based in part on the experience of UNSCOM in Iraq, this article considers the value of establishing an OPBW and the problems that would be faced by such an international organization. It also reviews the types of verification measures that might be applied by the OPBW and their limitations and benefits for deterring biological weapons programs.

New Considerations in Infectious Disease Outbreaks: The Threat of Genetically Modified Microbes

Genetically altered microbes are used widely in the conduct of scientific study and have facilitated the development of new medical therapies, preventive strategies, and diagnostic tools. Unfortunately, such organisms may also cause infectious disease outbreaks as a result of accidental or intentional transmission to humans. The unique microbial properties of genetically altered pathogens and the clinical symptoms exhibited by persons infected with them may impede the usual diagnostic and clinical evaluations or preventive strategies. Practicing physicians and clinicians at microbiology laboratories, who would be the first to observe such infections, must consider the broad clinical possibilities of illnesses caused by deliberately altered microorganisms and the potential difficulty in confirming a diagnosis.

Anthrax in Sverdlovsk

An apparent epidemic of anthrax in Sverdlovsk, the suspected site of a Soviet biological warfare facility, has raised serious questions about the verification of arms control treaties.

Take Russia to 'task' on bioweapons transparency.

In the run-up to his reelection, Russian president Vladimir Putin outlined 28 tasks to be undertaken by his administration, including one that commanded the development of weapons based on “genetic principles.” Political pressure must be applied by governments and professional societies to ensure that there is not a modern reincarnation of the Soviet biological warfare program.

What Non-Proliferation Policy for the Soviet Anti-Plague System?

This article analyzes the proliferation challenges posed by the Soviet AP system and discusses possible nonproliferation strategies to prevent these threats.

The soviet anti-plague system : An introduction

This article describes the composition of the Soviet Anti-plague (AP) system and presents the methodology used by the authors in their study of the AP system.

Analysis of the Ecological Risks Associated with Genetically Engineered Marine Microorganisms

Research is proceeding throughout the world to develop genetically engineered marine microorganisms (GEMMs) for a wide variety of environmental and industrial uses. It is possible therefore that the first uncontained applications of transgenic organisms in the marine environment will involve microorganisms rather than fish or shellfish. As products are readied for experimental or commercial trials, regulators will be required to assess the potential ecological risks posed by these organisms as part of the approval process. This will present a challenge similar to that faced by risk assessors and regulators in 1984 and 1985 when the transgenic microorganism Pseudomonas syringae, also known as ice-minus, was developed for agricultural use in the terrestrial environment. At that time we knew almost nothing about interactions between wild and transgenic organisms, and methods for detecting and monitoring gene flow between transgenic and wild organisms were rudimentary. Similarly, little is known today about how GEMMs are likely to interact with wild marine micro- and macroorganisms or how gene flow occurs in the marine environment (Edwards, 1993). In fact, less is now known about marine ecology than was known about terrestrial ecosystem function in the mid-1980s. As a result, the level of scientific uncertainty, and the challenge to risk assessment, associated with transgenic marine microorganisms is greater than was the case with terrestrial products 15 years ago.

Symposium of United Nations Biological Weapons Inspectors: Implications of the Iraqi Experience for Biological Arms Control

As part of the annual meeting of the American Society for Microbiology (ASM), David L. Huxsoll and Raymond A. Zilinskas convened a roundtable of biological weapons inspectors who have served in recent United Nations inspections in Iraq. The roundtable was presented over a three-hour period on May 22, 1995. To give the audience a “feel” for what inspectors do and the conditions under which they work, the roundtable session opened with a 35 mm slide presentation. The photos were taken by Zilinskas in the course of two 1994 inspections of Iraqi biological research and production facilities.