Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro

Lacking Information or Condoning Corruption: When Do Voters Support Corrupt Politicians?

What explains persistent political corruption in many young democracies? Focusing on the effects of corruption on individual-level attitudes, we present two hypotheses for why citizens might be willing to cast ballots for corrupt politicians. On the one hand, voters may simply lack information about corruption. On the other hand, voters may knowingly overlook corruption when politicians otherwise perform well in office, delivering public goods to their constituents. We test these hypotheses using an embedded experiment in a nationwide survey in Brazil. The survey finds that the vast majority of voters express a willingness punish corrupt politicians, regardless of politician performance. High income voters form a partial exception to this overall rejection of corruption; they react less negatively to information about corruption and more strongly to information about competence than the general population. Our findings imply that specific, credible, and accessible information will lead most voters to punish corrupt politicians at the polls.

Why Primaries in Latin American Presidential Elections

In a context where primaries are not mandated, why do some parties use them to select presidential candidates? In this paper, we argue that the use of primary elections is likely to reflect the existence and intensity of divisions within political parties. We focus on several characteristics of political parties and party systems that are often associated with intraparty divisions. We find that these characteristics are correlated with the decision of Latin American parties to use primaries in selecting their presidential nominees. In particular, we find that coalitions and large, centrist parties are more likely to hold primaries, whereas primaries are less likely in institutional settings that facilitate exit from existing parties.

Who’s in Charge Here? Direct and Indirect Accusations and Voter Punishment of Corruption

There is a growing consensus that voters withdraw support from a politician when they receive clear information that the politician has engaged in corruption. But will voters punish an elected official for corrupt acts carried out under his or her watch even if the politician is not personally implicated in corruption? To answer this question, we present the results of an embedded experiment from a nationally representative survey in Brazil. Using vignettes that describe a hypothetical mayor, we find that citizens punish all mayors who are linked to corruption but that punishment is attenuated when members of the municipal administration, and not the mayor per se, are charged with corruption. The difference is particularly pronounced when corruption information comes from a credible source and among politically sophisticated respondents. Our findings highlight that both the nature of information and the characteristics of citizens who receive that information have implications for political accountability.

Who's in Charge Here? Voter Punishment of Municipal Corruption

There is a growing consensus that voters withdraw support from a politician when they receive clear information that the politician has engaged in corruption. But do voters punish an elected executive for corrupt acts carried out under his or her watch, even if the executive is not personally implicated in corruption? To answer this question, we present the results of an embedded experiment from a nationally-representative survey in Brazil. Using vignettes that describe a hypothetical mayor, we find that citizens appear willing to punish a mayor who is involved in corruption, but that punishment of the mayor is attenuated if members of the municipal administration, and not the mayor per se, are charged with corruption. The difference is particularly pronounced when corruption information comes from a credible source and among politically sophisticated respondents. Our findings point to the importance of the availability of specific and credible information in facilitating political accountability.