Özge Kemahlıoğlu

Why Primaries in Latin American Presidential Elections

In a context where primaries are not mandated, why do some parties use them to select presidential candidates? In this paper, we argue that the use of primary elections is likely to reflect the existence and intensity of divisions within political parties. We focus on several characteristics of political parties and party systems that are often associated with intraparty divisions. We find that these characteristics are correlated with the decision of Latin American parties to use primaries in selecting their presidential nominees. In particular, we find that coalitions and large, centrist parties are more likely to hold primaries, whereas primaries are less likely in institutional settings that facilitate exit from existing parties.

Winds of Change? The June 2015 Parliamentary Election in Turkey

Held in an environment of growing social polarisation, fears of emergent authoritarianism, and economic challenges, Turkey’s June 2015 election ended the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi’s (AKP’s) parliamentary majority, challenging its single-party rule for the first time in 13 years. This article first provides information on the background to the election, focusing on debates about the authoritarian tendencies of AKP, economic conditions, and the competition for the Kurdish vote. Then, a brief overview of the campaign period is presented, followed by an analysis of election results at the sub-national level. The article concludes with some preliminary discussion of the causes of the loss of AKP’s majority.

Jobs in politicians’ backyards: Party leadership competition and patronage

What are the factors that lead to variation in the clientelistic use of state resources in electoral contexts? In this article I provide one answer to this question by focusing on the role of intra-party politics and analyzing the empirical case of patronage jobs in the Argentine provinces between 1984 and 2001. Patronage jobs in provincial administrations help governors build political support both in their own party and with the general public. However, when governors need their party (leader)’s support for their political careers and when the national party leadership position is open to competition, they reduce their clientelistic efforts not to lose the party’s (or party leader’s) support. The statistical analysis of public employment confirms this prediction that patronage is lower when the party’s (or party leader’s) support is important for politicians and when the leadership position within parties is open to competition.