Reidar Maliks

Liberal Revolution: the Cases of Jakob and Erhard

This article explores the writings of Ludwig Heinrich Jakob and Johann Benjamin Erhard, two young Kantians who produced original defences of resistance and revolution during the 1790s. Comparing these two neglected philosophers reveals a crucial divergence in the liberal theory of revolution between a perspective that emphasises resistance by the individual and another that emphasises revolution by the nation. The article seeks to contribute to a more nuanced view of the political theory of the German Enlightenment, which has often been presented as excessively obedient to authority. The historian Charles Ingrao repeated a common perception when, in an article on enlightened absolutism, he speculated that, ‘the Germans greater acceptance of authority both then and now may be rooted in their own distinctive national culture’ (Ingrao 1986: 165). This idea of the obedient German has been promoted especially by those who seek cultural explanations for the authoritarian bent of German society in the 20 th century (such as Mandt 1974 and Lepenies 2006). But the idea has a longer history. Herder described Germany as the land of obedience, and Kant wrote that, ‘in keeping with their penchant for law and order, they [the Germans] will rather submit to despotic treatment than venture on innovations (especially wilful reforms of government)’ (Kant 1974: AA 7: 318). By ‘wilful reforms of government’ Kant meant revolution. Madame de Stael later observed that Germans ‘join the greatest boldness of thought to the most obedient character’ (Stael Holstein 1813: 35). As Frederick Beiser has shown, this view, which was repeated by Heine and Marx, came to dominate the historiography (Beiser 1992: 7).

Two theories of resistance in the German Enlightenment

ABSTRACT Can there be a legal or a moral right to resist the government? Scholarly interest in the right of resistance has rarely focused on German philosophy, which has often been considered unusually committed to authority. Yet, during the Enlightenment German philosophers regularly attempted to justify not just conscientious refusal but also revolution. This essay explores the two dominant justifications, which were based in Wolffian perfectionism and Kantian relational theory. It argues that we can best understand the complexity of these theories of resistance by exploring their contrasting views on the state’s purpose: providing material and spiritual welfare, or establishing freedom as independence.

Kant, the State, and Revolution

This paper argues that, although no resistance or revolution is permitted in the Kantian state, very tyrannical regimes must not be obeyed because they do not qualify as states. The essay shows how a state ceases to be a state, argues that persons have a moral responsibility to judge about it and defends the compatibility of this with Kantian authority. The reconstructed Kantian view has implications for how we conceive authority and obligation. It calls for a morally demanding definition of the state and asserts that the primary personal responsibility is not to evaluate the morality of every single law but to evaluate the moral standing of the polity.

Prussian polis Kant's democratic republicanism

This article argues that Kants republicanism provides a foundation for democratic procedures. The conclusion is reached through an investigation of Critique of the Power of Judgment, which allows us to interpret Kants notion of the state as a self-determining organic community, and not merely an aggregate of individuals. The article rejects Isaiah Berlins interpretation of Kant as an authoritarian thinker, and reveals a republican theory centered on liberal freedom expressed within a self-organizing political community.