Reinhard John

The Concave Nontransitive Consumer

The preference of a concave nontransitive consumer is represented by a skew-symmetric and concave-convex bifunction on the set of all commodity bundles. This paper characterizes finite sets of demand observations that are consistent with the demand behavior of such kind of consumer by a generalized monotonicity property.

The weak axiom of revealed preference and homogeneity of demand functions

Abstract We characterize (a weak version of) the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference for demand functions which are not necessarily homogeneous. We relate this property to the validity of the Weak Axiom and to the negative semidefiniteness of the Slutsky substitution matrices. In particular, it is shown that the Weak Axiom implies homogeneity.

Optimizing multi-stage negotiations

Abstract We consider procedures where issues of varying importance and risk are negotiated in stages. Negotiation at any stage requires an agreement at each previous stage. If negotiation terminates, players realize the benefits from all earlier agreements. We formalize this process by a strategic n -stage negotiation game. The expected subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome is characterized by an intuitive, compact formula, which aggregates all the structural elements of the multi-stage process. We describe the optimal negotiation agenda for a given decomposition of the bargaining problem, and we derive intuitive prescriptions for an optimal decomposition.

Local and Global Consumer Preferences

Several kinds of continuous (generalized) monotone maps are characterized by partial gradient maps of skew-symmetric real-valued bifunctions displaying corresponding (generalized) concavity-convexity properties. As an economic application, it is shown that two basic approaches explaining consumer choice are behaviorally equivalent.

Uses of Generalized Convexity and Generalized Monotonicity in Economics

This chapter presents some uses of generalized concavity and generalized monotonicity in consumer theory and general equilibrium theory. The first part emphasizes the relationship between generalized monotonicity properties of individual demand and axioms of revealed preference theory. The second part points out the relevance of pseudomonotone market excess demand to a well-behaved general equilibrium model. It is shown that this property can be derived from assumptions on the distribution of individual (excess) demands.

A first order characterization of generalized monotonicity

Abstract.It is shown that pseudomonotone and quasimonotone maps can be characterized by a first order property provided they are regular. This result extends the well known characterization of nonvanishing generalized monotone maps to an essentially larger class. The paper supplements a recent contribution by Crouzeix and Ferland (1996) and solves a related open problem concerning homogeneous excess demand functions which occur in general equilibrium theory.

Quasimonotone Individual Demand

Quasimonotone individual demand correspondences are characterized as those which can be rationalized (in a weak sense) by a complete, upper continuous, monotone, and convex preference relation. Moreover, it is shown that an arbitrary set of demand ob-servations can be rationalized by a reflexive, upper continuous, monotone and convex preference if and only if it is properly quasimonotone

On the second optimality theorem of welfare economics

Abstract To what extent does the second optimality theorem of welfare economics (every Pareto optimal allocation can be repesented as a Walras equilibrium allocation) remain valid when preferences are allowed to be locally satiated? It is always valid for an exchange economy, and is valid for a production economy if there is a consumer who is not locally satiated, but not in general for a production economy where all consumers are locally satiated. A generalized equilibrium is defined, which includes the Walras equilibrium as a special case. Every Pareto optimum can be represented as a generalized equilibrium allocation. Furthermore, every Pareto optimal utility distribution can be realized by a Walras equilibrium allocation.