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Dive into the research topics where Matthias G. Raith is active.

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Featured researches published by Matthias G. Raith.


European Journal of Operational Research | 2001

Group preference aggregation with the AHP – implications for multiple-issue agendas

Anne Chwolka; Matthias G. Raith

Abstract We extend different group preference aggregation procedures applied in the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) to multiple-issue decision problems. We demonstrate how existing procedures that are specifically developed for single-issue decisions will generally fail to generate Pareto optimal agreements when applied to multiple issues. By relating these procedures to formal concepts of social choice theory, we develop a utilitarian weighted arithmetic mean method of aggregation that ensures efficiency. Our approach thus provides a theoretical basis for designing the AHP to implement social choice functions in practice.


European Economic Review | 2003

Should high-tax countries pursue revenue-neutral ecological tax reforms?

Thorsten Bayindir-Upmann; Matthias G. Raith

Abstract A politically intriguing question concerning the effects of a revenue-neutral ecological tax reform is whether such a political measure may succeed in providing a double dividend: to improve environmental quality and increase employment simultaneously. Theoretical studies reveal that for a competitive labor-market a green tax reform hardly yields a positive employment effect, whereas for a non-competitive market such an effect may well be obtained. However, little attention has focused on whether the ecological dividend remains attainable when an employment dividend accrues. We show for three different non-competitive labor-market scenarios that a positive employment effect can be expected, but that, for high-tax countries, environmental quality plausibly deteriorates when a revenue-neutral ecological tax reform is implemented.


Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization | 2001

Optimizing multi-stage negotiations

Reinhard John; Matthias G. Raith

Abstract We consider procedures where issues of varying importance and risk are negotiated in stages. Negotiation at any stage requires an agreement at each previous stage. If negotiation terminates, players realize the benefits from all earlier agreements. We formalize this process by a strategic n -stage negotiation game. The expected subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome is characterized by an intuitive, compact formula, which aggregates all the structural elements of the multi-stage process. We describe the optimal negotiation agenda for a given decomposition of the bargaining problem, and we derive intuitive prescriptions for an optimal decomposition.


Economic Record | 2005

Unemployment and Pollution: Is One Policy Suited for Two Problems?*

Thorsten Bayindir-Upmann; Matthias G. Raith

Frequently, hope is expressed that a revenue-neutral ecological tax reform may serve as a remedy for both unemployment and pollution. The idea is to recycle the proceeds from green taxes by cutting taxes on labour, thus boosting employment while discouraging polluting activities. We investigate this issue in a general-equilibrium framework with different non-competitive labour markets. For all scenarios, we show that a decrease in the labour tax increases employment without letting net-wage incomes fall. However, this leads to a positive aggregate income effect, which plausibly raises both clean and dirty consumption, leading to a lower environmental quality than before.


A Quarterly Journal of Operations Research | 2008

A Decision-Analytic Approach to Blue-Ocean Strategy Development

Matthias G. Raith; Thorsten Staak; Helge Wilker

The potential value created with a new product or service provided by a firm is given by the difference between its (monetary) benefit, in the view of the firm’s customers, and the unit production cost to the firm. To what extent this potential value can be exploited as a market opportunity depends on the firm’s success in obtaining a competitive advantage over other firms in the market. In order to acquire a competitive advantage, a firm must outperform its rivals in value creation (cf. Besanko et al. [1]).


Archive | 2011

A Framework for Telestroke Network Design

Franziska Günzel; Stephan Theiss; Georg Rose; Matthias G. Raith

Stroke is the third leading cause of death and leading cause of adult long-term disability in western industrialized countries. In stroke units providing special expertise, stroke patients receive highly efficacious care (Pollack et al., 2007). However, stroke units cannot be implemented in particular in sparsely populated rural areas because of a shortage of experienced neurologists (Audebert & Schwamm, 2009). As compensatory measures, telemedical solutions are increasingly applied within “telestroke” networks to provide neurological expertise from “hubs” to small primary care hospitals (“spokes”) (Audebert 2006; Muller et al., 2006). Due to various environmental factors and personal preferences, different types of telestroke networks have emerged especially in Europe and the United States within the last ten years (Schwamm et al., 2009a; Gunzel et al., 2010). In these networks, various pilot studies have demonstrated that valid decisions on thrombolytic therapy, the most important and time-critical therapy for the majority of acute stroke patients, and on a variety of further special interventions can be made accurately with the aid of telemedical expert support (Audebert et al., 2006; Audebert et al., 2009). Since telemedicine has proven to be a valid supplemental procedure in the treatment of acute stroke patients, primary care hospitals, especially in less populated regions, increasingly show interest in complementing their range of care by teleconsultations (Ickenstein et al., 2010). Those primary care hospitals may have totally different characteristics, some are e.g. small and located far away from the next certified stroke unit, while others are mediumsized and have neurology experts available on weekdays, but need support for night shifts and weekends. From a health economic point of view, these and many other different types of hospitals could benefit from telestroke care. However, current telemedicine networks focus in their approaches mostly on one specific group of primary care hospitals, thereby excluding others and thus withholding specialized stroke care from a large number of stroke patients. The situation may even worsen when national reimbursement regulations for telestroke care within the DRG system will be introduced. Those regulations will most likely be tied to current practice of the dominant telestroke network design in the respective country, thereby raising an entry barrier for all other primary care hospitals. To address these important issues for the first time, comparative health economic research into optimizing health care provision by both local stroke units and combinations of established telestroke network concepts is needed – and it must specifically take into account different regional environments. In this study, we first attempt to systematically characterize telestroke network structures and identify parameters describing different


Archive | 2007

Procedural Design for Conflict Resolution

Matthias G. Raith

Negotiation over conflicting interests and demands involves two separate but interacting dimensions. One dimension is given by the problem, which includes the content and the structure of the negotiation. The other dimension comes with the players, and it characterizes how the game is approached. This perspective offers a broader understanding of the negotiators’ behavior because it allows one to distinguish between the actual actors in negotiation and the role they are playing in the conflict. Consequently, there are two components of bargaining power, which Underdal [27] classifies as structural and behavioral, that have an influence on the negotiated agreement. Since the roles are part of the structure (i.e., the problem), structural bargaining power is what remains when the players of the game are exchanged. To what extent the structure affects the outcome, of course, depends on the players’ individual bargaining skills. However, if negotiators are similar in their skills—a situation one might expect in high-level negotiations—then the outcome of negotiation will be determined by the structure. Moreover, only knowledge of the game allows one to assess how well negotiators play and to appreciate the quality of their agreement—Is it fair? Is it satisfactory? Who won? and so forth. In order to give negotiators advice on how to achieve their desired outcome, one needs an analytical approach that is focused on the game (the problem), while at the same time acknowledging that it is being played by real players (the negotiators), who are interacting with one another in some way.


Industry and higher education | 2016

Commercial transfer – A business model innovation for the entrepreneurial university

Olaf Gaus; Matthias G. Raith

While knowledge-intensive societies rely heavily on universities for the creation of knowledge, its translation into economic value is typically performed by firms in the market. Since universities increasingly depend on additional funds for new and expensive research, current policies urge them to interact proactively with the market. The authors analyse how an entrepreneurial university creates, delivers and captures value by characterizing its business model. They develop a business model of the university as a research and teaching institution, with which they contrast purely private and purely public universities as two business model archetypes to show how these archetypes determine incentive and governance structures. They examine how the inclusion of commercial transfer as the ‘third mission’ affects the university’s income structure and thereby its objective and incentive structure. Within their business model framework, the authors derive strategic implications for the implementation of commercial transfer and the transition to the new business model.


intelligent systems design and applications | 2010

Predicting acute neurological diseases with Bayesian networks

Stephan Theiss; Georg Rose; Sebastian Schwarz; Jessika Grunwald; Matthias G. Raith

Emergency physicians in small primary care hospitals seeing patients with acute neurological symptoms have difficulty differentiating ischemic from hemorrhagic strokes and from stroke mimics. Telestroke consults with experienced neurologists supplemented by computerized decision support may aid in this time critical situation. Here we present a Stroke Bayesian Network (SBN) based on a na¨ıve Bayesian classifier to predict the most likely stroke etiology-ischemia, hemorrhage or stroke mimic-in an emergency room (ER) setting. As a proof of concept, this probabilistic network was evaluated in a pilot study on a cohort of 44 acute neurological patients admitted to three primary care hospitals associated with the TASC telestroke network in Saxony-Anhalt. In this cohort, the SBN correctly classified 31 of 36 ischemic stroke patients, and all five stroke mimics, but failed to identify three hemorrhages. For the frequent and significant ischemic stroke type, 97% classification precision and 86% sensitivity were obtained. To properly evaluate the SBN performance, a randomized controlled clinical trial should be conducted on a cohort of patients admitted to the ER.


Archive | 2014

Wertschöpfung und Businessplanung

Matthias G. Raith

Die Entwicklung eines neuen Produktes oder einer neuen Dienstleistung ist Teil eines Wertschopfungsprozesses. Gegenstand dieses Kapitels ist die konzeptionelle Gestaltung und praktische Umsetzung dieses Prozesses. Durch die Analyse des sogenannten Geschaftsmodells eines Unternehmens wird sichtbar, wo im Wertschopfungsprozess das Produkt angesiedelt ist und welche Einflussfaktoren auf die Produktentwicklung einwirken. Auf diese Weise wird die okonomische Bedeutung der Produktentwicklung nicht nur zum Vorschein gebracht, sondern es wird auch ein Ansatz beschreiben, diese zu quantifizieren und strategisch einzusetzen.

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Anne Chwolka

Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg

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Olaf Gaus

Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg

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Bernd Neutschel

Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg

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Georg Rose

Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg

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Stephan Theiss

Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg

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Sándor Vajna

Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg

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Helge Wilker

Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg

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