Richard E. Nisbett

Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes

Evidence is reviewed which suggests that there may be little or no direct introspective access to higher order cognitive processes. Subjects are sometimes (a) unaware of the existence of a stimulus that importantly influenced a response, (b) unaware of the existence of the response, and (c) unaware that the stimulus has affected the response. It is proposed that when people attempt to report on their cognitive processes, that is, on the processes mediating the effects of a stimulus on a response, they do not do so on the basis of any true introspection. Instead, their reports are based on a priori, implicit causal theories, or judgments about the extent to which a particular stimulus is a plausible cause of a given response. This suggests that though people may not be able to observe directly their cognitive processes, they will sometimes be able to report accurately about them. Accurate reports will occur when influential stimuli are salient and are plausible causes of the responses they produce, and will not occur when stimuli are not salient or are not plausible causes.

The Halo Effect: Evidence for Unconscious Alteration of Judgments

Although the halo effect is one of the oldest and most widely known of psychological phenomena, surprisingly little is known about its nature. The halo effect is generally defined as the influence of a global evaluation on evaluations of individual attributes of a person, but this definition is imprecise with respect to the strength and character of the influence. At one extreme, the halo effect might be due simply to an extrapolation from a general impression to unknown attributes. Global evaluations might color presumptions about specific traits or influence interpretation of the meaning or affective value of ambiguous trait information. Thus, if we like a person, we often assume that those attributes of the person about which we know little are also favorable. (Politicians often seem to capitalize on this tendency by appearing warm and friendly but saying little about the issues.) Such a phenomenon could best be described as a de

The use of statistical heuristics in everyday inductive reasoning

In reasoning about everyday problems, people use statistical heuristics, that is, judgmental tools that are rough intuitive equivalents of statistical principles. Statistical heuristics have improved historically and they improve ontogenetically. Use of statistical heuristics is more likely when (a) the sample space and the sampling process are clear, (b) the role of chance in producing events is clear, or (c) the culture specifies statistical reasoning as normative for the events. Perhaps because statistical procedures are part of peoples intuitive equipment to begin with, training in statistics has a marked impact on reasoning. Training increases both the likelihood that people will take a statistical approach to a given problem and the quality of the statistical solutions. These empirical findings have important normative implications.

The influence of culture: holistic versus analytic perception.

There is recent evidence that perceptual processes are influenced by culture. Westerners tend to engage in context-independent and analytic perceptual processes by focusing on a salient object independently of its context, whereas Asians tend to engage in context-dependent and holistic perceptual processes by attending to the relationship between the object and the context in which the object is located. Recent research has explored mechanisms underlying such cultural differences, which indicate that participating in different social practices leads to both chronic as well as temporary shifts in perception. These findings establish a dynamic relationship between the cultural context and perceptual processes. We suggest that perception can no longer be regarded as consisting of processes that are universal across all people at all times.

Culture, control, and perception of relationships in the environment

East Asian cognition has been held to be relatively holistic; that is, attention is paid to the field as a whole. Western cognition, in contrast, has been held to be object focused and control oriented. In this study East Asians (mostly Chinese) and Americans were compared on detection of covariation and field dependence. The results showed the following: (a) Chinese participants reported stronger association between events, were more responsive to differences in covariation, and were more confident about their covariation judgments; (b) these cultural differences disappeared when participants believed they had some control over the covariation judgment task; (c) American participants made fewer mistakes on the Rod-and-Frame Test, indicating that they were less field dependent; (d) American performance and confidence, but not that of Asians, increased when participants were given manual control of the test. Possible origins of the perceptual differences are discussed.

Culture and point of view

East Asians and Westerners perceive the world and think about it in very different ways. Westerners are inclined to attend to some focal object, analyzing its attributes and categorizing it in an effort to find out what rules govern its behavior. Rules used include formal logic. Causal attributions tend to focus exclusively on the object and are therefore often mistaken. East Asians are more likely to attend to a broad perceptual and conceptual field, noticing relationships and changes and grouping objects based on family resemblance rather than category membership. Causal attributions emphasize the context. Social factors are likely to be important in directing attention. East Asians live in complex social networks with prescribed role relations. Attention to context is important to effective functioning. More independent Westerners live in less constraining social worlds and have the luxury of attending to the object and their goals with respect to it. The physical “affordances” of the environment may also influence perception. The built environments of the East are more complex and contain more objects than do those of the West. In addition, artistic products of the East emphasize the field and deemphasize individual objects, including people. Western art renders less of the field and emphasizes individual objects and people.

The Effects of Statistical Training on Thinking about Everyday Problems

People possess an abstract inferential rule system that is an intuitive version of the law of large numbers. Because the rule system is not tied to any particular content domain, it is possible to improve it by formal teaching techniques. We present four experiments that support this view. In Experiments 1 and 2, we taught subjects about the formal properties of the law of large numbers in brief training sessions in the laboratory and found that this increased both the frequency and the quality of statistical reasoning for a wide variety of problems of an everyday nature. In addition, we taught subjects about the rule by a “guided induction” technique, showing them how to use the rule to solve problems in particular domains. Learning from the examples was abstracted to such an extent that subjects showed just as much improvement on domains where the rule was not taught as on domains where it was. In Experiment 3, the ability to analyze an everyday problem with reference to the law of large numbers was shown to he much greater for those who had several years of training in statistics than for those who had less. Experiment 4 demonstrated that the beneficial effects of formal training in statistics may hold even when subjects are tested completely outside of the context of training. In general, these four experiments support a rather “formalist” theory of reasoning: people reason using very abstract rules,

The dilution effect: Nondiagnostic information weakens the implications of diagnostic information

In a series of studies, subjects were asked to make predictions about target individuals. Some subjects were given information about the target which pretest subjects had judged to be “diagnostic’‘-that is, had judged to be usefully predictive of the outcome. Other subjects were given a mix of information judged to be diagnostic and information judged to be “nondiagnostic” by pretest subjectsthat is, judged to be of little value for predicting the outcome. Subjects given mixed information made much less extreme predictions than did subjects given only diagnostic information. It was argued that this “dilution effect” occurs because people make predictions by making simple similarity judgments. That is, they compare the information they have about the target with their conception of outcome categories. The presence of individuating but nondiagnostic information about the target reduces the similarity between the target and those outcomes that are suggested by the diagnostic information. One of the major implications is that stereotypes and other “social knowledge structures” may be applied primarily to

Cognitive manipulation of pain

Abstract The experiment tests the notion that naturally occurring states of physiological arousal are manipulable in the same way that drug-induced arousal states have proven to be. The state of arousal studied is that produced by pain from electric shock. All subjects were given a placebo before the shock experience and half were told that the side effects would cause arousal symptoms such as palpitation, tremor, etc. The other half expected no such symptoms. Subjects believing themselves to be in an artificial state of arousal failed to attribute their shock-created arousal to the shock, and found the shock less painful and were willing to tolerate more of it. This “relabeling” of a naturally occurring state was shown to occur only for subjects in a relatively low state of fear.

Culture and Change Blindness.

Research on perception and cognition suggests that whereas East Asians view the world holistically, attending to the entire field and relations among objects, Westerners view the world analytically, focusing on the attributes of salient objects. These propositions were examined in the change-blindness paradigm. Research in that paradigm finds American participants to be more sensitive to changes in focal objects than to changes in the periphery or context. We anticipated that this would be less true for East Asians and that they would be more sensitive to context changes than would Americans. We presented participants with still photos and with animated vignettes having changes in focal object information and contextual information. Compared to Americans, East Asians were more sensitive to contextual changes than to focal object changes. These results suggest that there can be cultural variation in what may seem to be basic perceptual processes.