Richard Kilminster

Culture, Modernity and Revolution Essays in Honour of Zygmunt Bauman

In Culture, Modernity and Revolution a group of distinguished sociologists and social philosophers reflect upon the major concerns of Zygmunt Bauman. Their essays not only honour the man, but provide important contributions to the three interlinked themes that could be said to form the guiding threads of Baumans life work: power, culture and modernity. Culture, Modernity and Revolution is both a remarkable sociological commentary on the problems facing East-Central Europe and an exposition of some of the key, hitherto neglected, features of the modern cultural universe.

Norbert Elias's Post-Philosophical Sociology: From ‘Critique’ to Relative Detachment

This paper argues that Eliass work presupposes a radical abandonment of philosophy as a vestige of magical–mythical thinking that has been rendered obsolete by the rise of sociology. For Elias, attempts by philosophers to claim a continuing non-empirical area of investigation are spurious and reflect only professional interests. The origins of Eliass position are traced to his rejection of neo-Kantianism and his participation in the Wissenssoziologie of Karl Mannheim in Weimar Germany. Focusing on the traditional ethical or normative questions, the paper shows how Eliass conception of the ‘detour via detachment’ enabled him to transcribe these issues (as well as traditional epistemological and ontological questions) into sociologically manageable terms. His strategy is further clarified through a comparison with the all-pervasive Critical Sociology approach to these matters, which emerges as severely handicapped by its reliance upon quasi-metaphysical, transcendental arguments. Also, its attributions of social blame generate fear images that reinforce conflict and its negative overstatements strengthen anxiety and frustration, thereby bolstering precisely what it is trying to change. The paper reveals the tacit function as a leftist code-word that the term ‘critical’ performs for many sociologists. Neo-Marxist ‘critique’ is shown to be a profoundly flawed attempt to deal with issues of theory and practice.

Praxis and method : a sociological dialogue with Lukács, Gramsci and the early Frankfurt School

Part 1: Marxs Theory of Praxis 1. A Starting Point 2. Praxis and Practice in Hegel and Marx Part 2: Georg Lukacs: Theoretician of Praxis 3. Lukacs to Hegel and Back 6. Towards Conscious Mediations 7. Sociology and Mythology in Lukacs Part 3: Antonio Gramsci: Practical Theoretician 8. Gramsci in Context 9. Hegemony and Civil Society 10. Analysing the Historical Bloc Excursus: Myths and the Masses 11. Towards The Ethical State 12. The Unity of Common Sense and Philosophy 13. Inequality and the Unity of Mankind Part 4: Early Critical Theory: The Sociology of Praxis 14. Horkheimer in Context 15. Praxis and Method 16. Sociological Facts and Mass Praxis Excursus: Historical Invariants 17. Philosophical Sociology and Sociological Philosophy 18. Conclusion: The Cunning of Praxis Notes. Bibliography. Index.

Theory and Practice in Marx and Marxism

The identification of theory and practice is a critical act, through which practice is demonstrated rational and necessary, and theory realistic and rational (Antonio Gramsci). In contemporary sociological and political theory the opposition of theory and practice refers to a number of aspects of the relationship between theories of various kinds and social life. It can refer, for example, to the relationships between the various sciences (particularly the social sciences) and their ‘objects’, between scientific knowledge and its necessary practical applications and broadly between social science and politics. Many Marxist writings since Lenin attempt to unite those three levels in a theory of the total society with a practical intent. This theory is intended to inform practical political activity in order radically to change the complex of social institutions which make the theory itself possible, in this way abolishing the theory in practice. That theory and practice in this sense can inseparably inform each other in this way within the politics of the labour movement, is one meaning in Soviet Marxism of the phrase ‘the unity of theory and practice’.

The dawn of detachment Norbert Elias and sociology’s two tracks

This article draws on Elias’s observations on the origins of political economy and sociology as well as his theory of involvement and detachment to supplement standard accounts of the history of sociology. It shows how, in the 1840s, sociology bifurcated into two tracks. Track I was the highly ‘involved’ partisan track associated with Marx and Engels and track II was the relatively ‘detached’, non-partisan track pursued by Saint-Simon, Comte, Lorenz von Stein and others. These two tracks continue to shape contemporary sociology as basic orientations. The polarization of class conflict predicted in Marx’s theory is contrasted with the class interdependence model in Lorenz von Stein, in particular. Elias’s work is understood as a synthesis of later developments in track II in which he strongly reaffirmed the historical separation of sociology from philosophy. Elias’s work is presented as a central theory of society and as a promising alternative to the prevailing practice of theoretical eclecticism in sociology.

Zygmunt Baumans Sozialkritik: Themenstellungen und Kontinuitäten

Dieser Beitrag zielt auf eine Analyse und Einschatzung von Baumans Schriften wahrend der neunziger Jahre vor dem Hintergrund der Annahme einer thematischen Kontinuitat des Werks seit seinen fruhen Schriften. Einige Leser sind auf Bauman nur deshalb aufmerksam geworden, weil sie seine eher neuen Bucher wie etwa „Modernity and the Holocaust“ (1988), „Intimations of Postmodernity“ (1992), „Postmodern Ethics“ (1993) und „Life in Fragments“ (1995) wahrgenommen haben. Sie mogen jedoch in diesem Zusammenhang nicht vollstandig erkannt haben, 1) welchen Stellenwert diese Arbeiten in der Entwicklung von Baumans Oeuvre als Gesamtheit innehaben und 2) konnte ihnen die Art und Weise des Denkens und der zu Grunde gelegten Annahmen, die Bauman vortragt, entgangen sein.

Karl Marx: New Perspectives

This chapter explains the significant challenges involved in a reappraisal of the scientific status of Marx as a pioneer in the longer-term development of a relatively detached, independent discipline of sociology. His work is decoupled from forms of Marxism, which tend ideologically either to freeze his ideas in time or to simplify them for political purposes, often enveloping him in a mythical aura. The genesis of his work in the 1840s is reconstructed, and Marx’s important insights into the structured nature of economic power are acknowledged. Drawbacks include the metaphysical thinking surviving in his theories, political overstatements and lack of a sociological psychology. Subsequently, a pared-down version of traditional Marxism informed the perceived imperative of a politically committed ‘critical’ sociology, which has further impeded the achievement of a more balanced picture of Marx’s standing.

The pitfalls of bombast A response to Stephen Dunne’s ‘Figurational sociology and the rhetoric of post-philosophy’

Stephen Dunne’s (2014) article is an indignant and rather verbose philosopher’s attack on Norbert Elias, ‘figurational sociologists’, anonymous ‘followers’ and ‘supporters’ generally, and on me in particular. We play fast and loose with the age-old tradition of philosophy in the name of an over-estimated and much-vaunted figurational sociology. These dupes are said to have swallowed hook, line and sinker Elias’s fallacious and arrogant claim definitively to have ‘overcome’ philosophy as well as his belief that that is a good thing for sociology. Dunne says that ‘rhetorical motifs buttress the belief that figurational sociology has done away with philosophy, without its actually having done so’ (2014: 78; original emphasis). I think Dunne’s understanding of Elias is very deficient. He has also misrepresented my work and to make his case has descended into unprincipled vilification of his opponents as well as exegetical obfuscation and trickery. My term ‘post-philosophical’, which I have used to describe Elias’s approach, seems to have provoked much of Dunne’s ire. He stubbornly persists with a formalistic interpretation of this idea throughout the article. I innocently assumed that informed social scientists would recognize that Elias was, over a long period, developing a sociological theory of the growth of human knowledge, a processual theory that was simultaneously theoretical and empirical. Elias saw Auguste Comte as the first sociologist of the growth of scientific knowledge. In effect Comte had begun to see how, from a medieval world in which ‘philosophy’ embraced pretty well all branches of knowledge, over the centuries the

The Sociology of Wilhelm Baldamus: Paradox and Inference:

The Professional Guinea Pig belongs to a social science growth area investigating the pharmaceutical industry in contemporary health care. This literature is united by a prevailing consensus that views the drug industry as the villain du jour in health policy. After focusing on unbridled professional power and the for-profit insurance industry, the critical social gaze is turned to Big Pharma. Consequently, most social scientists see it as their job to expose the scientific manipulation, the chase of profit margins, the dehumanization, the ethical transgressions, and the inequities that flow from drug industry involvement. In engaging prose, Roberto Abadie delivers the expected social science message. Abadie conducted an eighteen-month ethnography of a group of healthy people who made a living as research subjects in Phase One clinical trials in Philadelphia. Most trial participants are African-American and Latino, but Abadie spent time with a group of young, non-Hispanic white anarchists who enrolled in clinical trials. He compares these trial participants with people enrolling in HIV trials. The book examines the motivations, reflections, and practices of professionalized clinical trial participation. What does Abadie make from this data? He highlights the ‘‘commodification’’ (p. 15) of the trial subjects’ bodies in a ‘‘slow torture economy’’ (p. 46). He pays attention to the ‘‘revolt’’ (p. 54) of the professional research subjects when they felt underpaid and threatened to walk out. Instead they received an

The symbol theory

800 bonus. He notes the ‘‘resistance of the weak’’ (p. 60), when ‘‘guinea pigs’’ (p. 21) smuggle in forbidden foods or engage in other acts of ‘‘sabotage’’ (p. 61). Abadie also examines the risk-management strategies of the trial subjects: they weigh money against potential long-term effects but tend to believe that drugs wash out of their bodies in a couple of days. He then compares the professional trial participants to those involved in HIV trials and argues that the latter are motivated by deeper existential concerns but, of course, they also have a disease and participate in different kinds of trials. In a final empirical chapter, Abadie examines the professional trial subject’s limited understanding of informed consent procedures, and argues that the drug industry deliberately uses the consent form to obfuscate the commodified relationship with research subjects. Abadie’s book has two glaring weaknesses. First, he brings much rhetorical bluster to his study but the interview quotes and observations do not bear out the core themes of ‘‘alienation’’ (p. 6) and ‘‘exploitation’’ (p. 154). The fascinating empirical puzzle of his study is that anarchists are willing to swallow their principles and vegan diet to take money from this most controversial industry. In the conclusion, Abadie pays attention to the paradox between anarchist politics and pragmatics, but throughout most of the book he tries to rationalize the anarchists’ justifications for the blood money that sustains their lifestyle of leisure. Some of his friends even minimize the trial risk because they assume that strong government oversight protects them from harm! Abadie writes: ‘‘[these] views of governmental regulation are not totally at odds with their radical [anarchist] beliefs’’ (p. 143). Really? Rather than reconcile the dissonance between what anarchists do and belief in theoretical constructs of exploitation, the explanation seems more mundane. People end up in trial after trial by choice or circumstances because it is easy money. Compared to flipping burgers, cleaning toilets, or being homeless, testing pills is extremely attractive. The job stinks, but the money is good. Abadie also wrote the wrong book. While he lived in the anarchist community, he never participated along with his research subjects in the trials. Abadie’s information comes largely from casual conversations