Richard M. Gale

A new cosmological argument

We present a valid deductive cosmological argument for the necessary existence of a powerful and intelligent creator of the actual universe. Whereas traditional cosmological arguments had to employ a strong version of the principle of sufficient reason that held that every fact actually has an explanation, our argument can make do with the weak version of Duns Scotus according to which every fact possibly has an explanation. As a result, our argument is less vulnerable to the charge of begging the question than are these traditional cosmological arguments.

William James and the Willfulness of Belief

It was important to Jamess philosophy, especially his doctrine of the will to believe, that we could believe at will. Toward this end he argues in The Principles of Psychology that attending to an idea is identical with believing it, which, in turn, is identical with willing that it be realized. Since willing is identical with believing and willing is an intentional action, it follows by Leibnizs Law that believing also is an intentional action. This paper explores the problems with Jamess thesis that attending=will=belief. An attempt is made to show that it has a salvageable core that is of considerable philosophical interest and importance.

The overall argument of Alston's perceiving God

Alstons overall aim in Perceiving God is to show that we are rationally justified in believing that our apparent direct perceptions of Gods presence (called ‘M-experiences’) are reliable and thus for the most part veridical, the objective, existentially-committed beliefs based on these experiences thereby being prima facie justified, subject to defeat by certain overriders supplied by some background religion. It is argued that our rational justification for believing this is of both an epistemic and pragmatic (or practical) sort, in which an epistemic reason for believing a proposition is truth conducive, rendering the proposition probable, while a pragmatic one concerns the benefits which accrue from belief. We will begin by considering the pragmatic justification, since the case he makes out for epistemic justification is built on its back.

Swinburne on providence

My review of Swinburnes elaborate and ingenious higher-good type theodicy will begin with an examination of his argument for why the theist needs a theodicy in the first place. After a preliminary sketch of his theodicy and its crucial free-will plank, its rational-choice theoretic arguments will be critically scrutinized. Richard Swinburne Providence and the Problem of EviL (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998). Pp. xiii + 263. ?35.50 Hbk. ?14.99 Pbk.

A response to Almeida and Judisch

Our new cosmological argument for the existence of God weakens the usual Principle of Sufficient Reason premise that every contingent true proposition has an explanation to a weaker principle (WPSR) that every such proposition could have an explanation. Almeida and Judisch have criticized the premises of our argument for leading to a contradiction. We show that their argument fails, but along the way we are led to clarify the nature of the conclusion of our argument. Moreover, we discuss an argument against us based on a principle of alternate explanation incompatible with our WPSR, and show that his argument fails.

“What, Then, is Time?”

1. The first serious attempt to analyze the concept of time occurs in Aristotle’s Physics. He raises the question, “In what sense, if any, can time be said to exist?” For Aristotle, only individual substances, which are compounds of form and matter, can be said to exist in an unqualified sense, everything else being attributes of these substances. Time is defined as the “number of movement in respect of ‘before’ and ‘after.’” Motion is an attribute of a substance, and time in turn is an attribute of motion. Time is not motion, but the number or measure of motion. Motion is potentially time and becomes such in actuality only when its temporal succession is noted and measured by some sentient creature. Thus time is not a substantial entity which is capable of existing separately from other things: it has no reality independently of the changes that substances undergo. It has being only as an attribute of an attribute of substance.

Comments on the Will to Believe

Kasher and Nishi interpret James as holding an expressivist theory about epistemic duties, as well as other normative sentences. On this interpretation, James’s claim that we have a will‐to‐believe type option to believe an epistemic duty winds up being inconsistent. For one can believe only that which is either true or false; but, for the expressivist, normative claims are neither. It is argued that Feldman’s essay is not only a wildly anachronistic account of Clifford and James but also is of no philosophical merit in its own right.

A New Argument for the Existence of God: One that Works, Well, Sort of

The following is a new argument for the existence of a being who, if not the super-deluxe God of traditional Western theism, is at least a close cousin in that it too is capable of playing the role in the lives of working theists of a being that is a suitable object of worship, adoration, love, respect, and obedience. Unlike the super-deluxe God, the God whose necessary existence is established by my argument need not essentially have the divine perfections of omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence. Furthermore, he need not even be contingently omnipotent and omniscient, just powerful and intelligent enough to be the supernatural designer-creator of the very complex and wondrous cosmos that in fact confronts us. Hopefully, his benevolence can be taken to be unlimited. My reasons for preferring to work with this more limited God is not just that I am able to prove his existence but not that of the super-deluxe one. It also involves, as will emerge later, the ability of the concept of a finite God to get around certain difficulties that confront the traditional conception of God as an absolutely perfect being.