Richard Öhrvall

Anti-immigrant parties, local presence and electoral success

Abstract Does the local organisational presence of anti-immigrant parties affect their chances for electoral success? In order to answer this question, the article explores the potential of a supply-oriented explanation to anti-immigrant party success by examining the electoral advancements the Sweden Democrats (SD) made in the 2006 and 2010 elections. Our results indicate that traditional demand-side explanations to anti-immigrant party success can be successfully complemented by an ‘internal supply-side argument’ to make the electoral fates of these parties more intelligible. Whether the SD had a local organisational presence had a substantial effect on its results in the national election and on the probability of gaining representation in local councils. Thus, the party’s fate in the national as well as local elections was largely determined by whether or not it had a local organisational presence in Swedish municipalities.

Voter Turnout and Political Equality: Testing the ‘Law of Dispersion’ in a Swedish Natural Experiment

According to the ‘law of dispersion’, the level of inequality in political participation is higher when voter turnout is low. We empirically test this hypothesis by evaluating levels of voter turnout in the 2010 Swedish election to the Västra Götaland county council and in the 2011 re-election for the same county council. The re-election voter turnout was reduced by almost half, from 80.6 per cent to 44.1 per cent. Our results support the law of dispersion: the level of inequality in participation substantially increased between young and old, rich and poor, low and high educated and politically interested and uninterested.

Not so Fair after All? Perceptions of Procedural Fairness and Satisfaction with Democracy in the Nordic Welfare States

The Nordic countries are known for their well-functioning public administrations. In indices measuring control of corruption and the quality of the rule of law, they frequently occupy top positions. However, as we demonstrate in this article, a countrys top position in comparative indices does not automatically imply that citizens view the state of affairs in the same way as depicted by experts. The observation is in no way trivial: Drawing on theories of procedural fairness, we go on to show—statistically, using individual level data—that widespread public perceptions about the unfairness of civil servants may have a negative effect on the legitimacy of the political system even in so-called high-trust and “least corrupt” settings such as the Nordic ones.

Issues on Transparency, Accountability and Control in Hybrid organisations: The Case of Enterprises Owned by Local Government

This study increases our knowledge regarding the challenges of governing hybrid organisations in general and enterprises owned by local government in particular. Therefore, the findings of this study are considered to be of support to politicians as well as civil servants involved in and responsible for the governance of hybrid organisations. We argue that it is important to carefully supervise this development in local government. As corporations owned and operated by local governments have increased in numbers, they are responsible for large values and services that are crucial for the modern society (water, waste management, energy, IT). Consequently, they are becoming ever more important players in their respective local economies. At the same time, concerns have been raised regarding how to govern hybrid organisations in order to secure accountability and to protect public sector values.

More politicians, more corruption: evidence from Swedish municipalities

In the literature on political economy and public choice, it is typically assumed that government size correlates positively with public corruption. The empirical literature, however, is inconclusive, owing to both measurement problems and endogeneity. This paper creates a corruption index based on original data from a survey covering top politicians and civil servants in all Swedish municipalities. The effect of more politicians on corruption problems is analyzed using discontinuities in the required minimum size of local councils. Despite the fact that Sweden consistently has been ranked among the least corrupt countries in the world, the survey suggest that non-trivial corruption problems are present in Sweden. Municipalities with more local council seats have more reported corruption problems, and the regression discontinuity design suggests that the effect is causal.

Why do councillors quit prematurely? On the democratic consequences of councillors leaving their seats before the end of their terms

In Sweden, one out of six councillors leave council before their term ends, which is often claimed to signal a crisis for democracy. We critically scrutinize this by surveying the motives behind dropping out. The claim may be right if political motives dominate, but if private motives dominate, dropouts do not signal a crisis for democracy. Questionnaires were sent to all premature dropouts from 2002-2006 and 2006-2009 in 13 municipalities. We find that private reasons dominate, and a majority of the respondents report that they enjoyed their time in council. Therefore premature dropouts cannot be claimed to signal a crisis for local democracy. Keywords: • de-recruitment • premature dropouts • local politics • political parties • local government