Richard S. Grossman

The Shoe That Didn't Drop: Explaining Banking Stability During the Great Depression

This article attempts to account for the exceptional stability exhibited by the banking systems of Britain, Canada, and ten other countries during the Great Depression. It considers three possible explanations of stability—the structure of the commercial banking system, macroeconomic policy and performance, and lender of last resort behavior—employing data from 25 countries across Europe and North America. The results suggest that macroeconomic policy—especially exchange-rate policy—and banking structure, but not lenders of last resort, were systematically responsible for banking stability.

Double Liability and Bank Risk Taking

This paper examines double liability as it existed in the United States prior to the Great Depression and assesses its impact upon bank risk-taking. Under double liability shareholders of failing banks could lose, in addition to the initial purchase price of shares, an amount equal to the par value of shares owned. This paper assesses whether or not banks chartered in states with double liability laws undertook less risk than banks operating under conventional limited liability. The results suggest that double liability did reduce bank risk-taking, but did not guarantee bank stability in times of widespread financial distress.

A monthly stock exchange index for Ireland, 1864-1930

Information on the performance of equities during the latter part of the globalized long nineteenth century is scarce, particularly for smaller European economies such as Ireland. Using a dataset of over 35,000 price-year observations from the Investor’s Monthly Manual, this paper constructs new monthly Irish stock market price indices for the period 1864-1930, encompassing periods of significant economic and political turmoil in Irish history. In addition to a total market index covering all 118 equity securities issued by 94 companies, sector-specific indices are presented for railways, financial services companies, and miscellaneous industrial and retail companies. Weighted by market capitalization, nominal equity prices were largely static in the 1860s, before increasing by almost 60% in nominal terms between 1870 and 1878. Between 1878 and 1879, equity prices fell by one sixth in the space of a year, after which there was a secular rise in equity prices for two decades, with equity prices in 1899 twice what they had been in 1864. Between the turn of the century and the outbreak of the Great War, though, prices fell by 25%, a pattern that stands in stark contrast to returns on the London exchange, which were greater during 1894-1913 than during the preceding two decades. The period from 1914 until 1929 saw a number of boom-bust cycles, concurrent with war and other political events affecting Ireland, including its independence movement. Railway equities, which had trebled between the mid-1860s and the turn of the century, fell sharply during the 1910s and 1920s. In contrast, financial equity prices – which were just 20% higher in 1920 than in 1864 – rose strongly during the 1920s. Overall, the average annual gain in equity prices over the period was just 0.9%, well below levels associated with an equity premium puzzle.

The Cross Section of Stock Returns before World War I

We examine the cross section of stock returns using an original dataset consisting of annual observations on price, dividends, and shares outstanding for nearly all stocks listed on U.K. exchanges between 1870 and 1913, supplemented with additional information about attrition. The only clear pattern in the historical U.K. data is the high returns of extremely small stocks. Among the largest 99.8% of stocks, the historical U.K. data do not display the pattern found in modern U.S. (CRSP) data of excess returns for small stocks or stocks with poor past performance. Unlike CRSP data, stocks that do not pay dividends do not outperform stocks that pay small dividends during this period. However, as in the modern data, there is a weak relation between dividend yield and performance for stocks that pay dividends.

Debt Deflation and Financial Instability: Two Historical Explorations

Recent research, both historical and contemporary, has broadened existing analyses of the connections between financial markets and macroeconomic conditions to embrace debt deflation and financial instability explanations for business cycle fluctuations. This paper explores two episodes on which much of this research has focused: the post-bellum United States and the global depression of the 1930s. It seeks to distinguish the effects of bank failures and debt deflation and to probe the connections between them.

Bloody foreigners! Overseas equity on the London Stock Exchange, 1869–1929

This article presents data on quantity, capital gains, dividend yields, and total returns of domestic and overseas equities listed on the London Stock Exchange during 1869–1929. Indices are presented for Africa, Asia, Australia (including New Zealand), Europe, Latin America, and North America (as well as for the UK), and for the finance, transportation, raw materials, and utilities sectors in each region. Returns and volatility were typically highest in emerging regions and the raw materials sector. Dividend yields were similar across regions and differences in total returns were due largely to disparities in capital gains. Contingent liability was most extensively employed where leverage was high and the physical assets were either meagre or inaccessible to creditors.