Richard Youngs

Fusing Security and Development: Just Another Euro-Platitude?

The EU has increasingly committed itself to fusing security and development. Developmental approaches to security are routinely seen as integral to the EU’s distinctive foreign policy identity. This paper finds, however, that much work remains to be done to implement this commitment. Few in the EU would doubt that development and security go hand in hand, but differences abound over what this implies for the allocation of finite resources and the nature of diplomatic engagements. CEPS Working Documents are intended to give an indication of work being conducted within CEPS research programmes and to stimulate reactions from other experts in the field. Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed are attributable only to the author in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which he is associated.

What Has Europe Been Doing

Abstract:European governments are spending more on political aid and democratization in particular. The ways in which this money is being spent have evolved. This has corrected many shortcomings of previous European democracy-promotion policies but also leaves many doubts about the effectiveness of this funding. In particular, it remains uncertain how pertinent the strong European focus on governance and social policies is to broad, systemic-level political change. Some contours of a “European” approach to democracy exist, but significant differences remain between the policies of different member states, and simplistic differentiation from US policies should be resisted.

Is European Democracy Promotion on the Wane

The EU routinely asserts that the promotion of democracy and human rights is central to its international identity. However, while in some places the EU has a relatively strong record as a supporter of democratic values, it is failing to respond effectively to the emergence of a vastly more challenging environment for democracy promotion. This paper reveals serious limits across three strands of democracy policy - the magnitude of incentives offered in return for democratic change, the degree of critical pressure exerted for democratic reform and the scale of European democracy funding. Even where the EU is building on the initiatives it has pursued for the last two decades, the paper demonstrates that these policies fail to measure up to the challenges posed by the new international context.

Democratic institution-building and conflict resolution: emerging EU approaches

Support for democratization has become a central feature of European conflict resolution policies. However, the conceptualization of precisely how different institution building strategies dovetail with conflict resolution imperatives remains relatively weak. Approaches to democratic reform in conflict scenarios have emerged in an ad hoc fashion and are still unduly short-termist. Serious obstacles persist to the practical linking together of the human rights and peace support agendas. Support has been forthcoming for various forms of modified democracy that do not always bode well for the sustainability of peace.

Europe's democracy trilemma

A truly democratic European Union seems to have become the graal of European politics, the projects redemptive promise and unreachable horizon. Much has been written about the gap between promise and performance and about the obstacles to EU democratization. Here, we suggest that one way to apprehend the ‘democratic deficit’ debate as it has evolved in the wake of the euro crisis is to think of it as a ‘democratic trilemma’. We argue that European legitimacy requires responses in different realms: first, an acknowledgement of Europes ‘transnational democratic interdependence’; second, an anchoring of the functionalist European superstructure in ‘national democratic legitimacy’; and third, a grounding of both European and national power in ‘local democratic legitimacy’. While the very notion of trilemma points to the tensions that arise in trying to satisfy these requisites simultaneously, we nevertheless need to look for ways of alleviating the trilemma rather than coming up with democratic magic bullets in a single one of these realms. While our main goal is to reframe and open up the debate around the key concepts of empowerment, mutual recognition and flexibility, we also provide examples of what this may mean.

The Politics of the Single Currency: Learning the Lessons of Maastricht

Integration theorists have increasingly called for a more comprehensive assessment of the evolving relationship between domestic politics and the process of European integration. Responding to this challenge, the article analyses the politicization of debate over EMU in the period following the Maastricht summit. It contrasts the limited engagement of domestic actors prior to 1991 with their increasingly influential reaction against convergence-driven reforms over recent years. While acknowledging that domestic politics have consequently become integral to explaining the nature of economic and monetary integration, the article enumerates a number of ways in which their influence is still limited.

Exploring "Non-Western Democracy"

Calls for non-Western forms of democracy are becoming louder and more ubiquitous. More needs to be done to nurture a wider variation in democratic processes and practices. Forms of democracy that differ from prevailing Western norms should be encouraged rather than simply dismissed as a cloak for illiberalism or authoritarianism. However, it is highly questionable that a wholesale non-Western variety of democracy exists. Indeed, the calls for non-Western democracy suffer from some major problems. Rather than a binary competition between ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’ democracy, joint experimentation is needed between different regions of the world to advance democratic renewal.

The Barcelona process after the UK presidency: The need for prioritization

Developments within the Barcelona process during the UK presidency illustrate a number of limitations to EU strategy in the southern Mediterranean. First, in relying on the expectation that its economic, political and social initiatives will naturally reinforce each other in stabilizing relations with the Mediterranean region, the EU has failed to recognize the need for a coherent prioritization between potentially conflicting objectives in the design of its short‐term policies. Second, a number of EU policy instruments lack the precision necessary for their possible operationalization to have been contemplated within the Barcelona framework. Third, the Barcelona process still lacks the norms of co‐operation that characterize international regimes and facilitate the desired convergence of negotiating positions.

Spain, Latin America and Europe: The complex interaction of regionalism and cultural identification

Spains commercial, diplomatic and developmental ties with Latin America strengthened considerably during the 1990s. While policy towards the region was one of Spains most notable success stories, in some areas it was still subject to significant limitations. Conversely, in other areas it might be argued that the focus on Latin America was disproportionate and optimal neither for Spains own substantive interests nor in terms of Madrids relations with other EU member states. The relationship between Spains European and Latin American policies was increasingly complex, neither completely mutually reinforcing nor entirely zero‐sum, but subject to different dynamics in different areas of policy. Balancing the forces of regionalization within Europe with the culturally driven orientation towards Latin America constituted an acute challenge for Spanish foreign policy: a challenge which was met with considerable, but not unqualified, success.

Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Need for Triangulation

European Union policy towards the Middle East and North Africa suffers from geographic fragmentation and an increasing functional imbalance which reflects a growing trend towards securitisation. While policy towards the Mediterranean is highly institutionalised, the Gulf Cooperation Council states receive much less attention and policies towards Iran, Iraq and the occupied Palestinian territories exist in isolation. A narrow focus on an exclusionist approach to security has taken over to the detriment of political and economic concerns. The shortcomings in European foreign policy towards the broader Middle East in terms of lack of breadth and coherence need to be addressed in order to forge a more cohesive and effective policy.