Robert Audi

Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character

This book presents an ethical theory that uniquely integrates naturalistic and rationalistic elements. Robert Audi develops his theory in four areas: moral epistemology, the metaphysics of ethics, moral psychology, and the foundations of ethics. Comprising both new and published work, the book sets forth a moderate intuitionism, clarifies the relation between reason and motivation, constructs a theory of intrinsic value and its place in moral obligation, and presents a sophisticated account of moral justification. The concluding chapter articulates a new normative framework built from both Kantian and intuitionist elements. Connecting ethics in novel ways to both the theory of value and the philosophy of action, the essays explore topics such as ethical intuition, reason and judgement, and virtue. Audi also considers major views in the history of ethics, including those of Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Mill, Moore, and W. D. Ross, and engages contemporary work on autonomy, responsibility, objectivity, reasons, and other issues. Clear and conceptually rich, this book makes vital reading for students and scholars of ethics.

Rationality and religious commitment

PART I: EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS: RATIONALITY, JUSTIFICATION, AND KNOWLEDGE PART II. THE DIMENSIONS OF RATIONAL RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT PART III. THE RATIONALITY OF RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT IN THE POSTMODERN WORLD

Acting for Reasons

I f we do not know for what reasons a person acts, we do not fully understand that person. If we do not know any reason for which an agent does something, we cannot adequately assess whether, in doing it, that agent is acting rationally. And if Kant is right, unless we know the reason(s) for which an action is performed, we do not know its moral worth. But what is it to act for a reason? Clearly, acting for a reason is closely related to acting intentionally, to acting rationally, and to acting on the basis of practical reasoning. An action for a reason apparently must be intentional; an action based on practical reasoning must be performed for a reason; and at least the paradigms of rational action must be intentional. Whether there are some equivalences among these notions will be discussed below. Let us begin by laying out some guiding assumptions.

Democratic authority and the separation of church and state

Preface and Acknowledgments Introduction 1. The Autonomy of Ethics and the Moral Authority of Religion I. The Autonomy of Ethics II. Moral Knowledge: General and Particular III. Religion, Theology, and Ethics IV. Theoethical Equilibrium: The Integration of Religion and Ethics V. Divine Command Ethics and Secular Morality 2. The Liberty of Citizens and the Responsibilities of Government I. The Separation of Church and State and the Limits of Democratic Authority II. The Liberty Principle and the Scope of Religious Freedom III. The Equality Principle and the Case Against Establishment IV. The Neutrality Principle: Accommodationist Secularity V. Religious Neutrality, Valuational Neutrality, and Public Policy 3. The Secular State and the Religious Citizen I. Freedom of Expression in the Advocacy of Laws and Public Policies II. Major Principles Governing the Advocacy of Laws and Public Policies III. The Charge of Exclusivism toward Religious Reasons IV. Natural Reason, Secularity, and Religious Convictions V. Religious Reasons, Political Decision, and Toleration VI. Privatization Versus Activism: The Place of Religious Considerations in Public Political Discourse 4. Democratic Tolerance and Religious Obligation in a Globalized World I. The Nature of Tolerance II. Is Tolerance a Virtue? III. Toleration and Forgiveness IV. The Normative Standards for Democratic Toleration V. Religion in the Workplace as a Test Case for a Theory of Toleration VI, Cosmopolitanism as a Framework for Tolerance VII. Civic Virtue and Democratic Participation VIII. International Implications of the Framework Conclusion Notes Index

Self-deception vs. self-caused deception: A comment on Professor Mele

Meles study of philosophical and psychological theories of self-deception informatively links the conceptual and dynamic aspects of self-deception and explicates it without positing mutually inconsistent beliefs, such as those occurring in two-person deception. It is argued, however, that he does not do full justice to the dissociation characteristic of self-deception and does not sufficiently distinguish self-deception from self-caused deception.

Intrinsic Value and Meaningful Life

Abstract I distinguish various ways in which human life may be thought to be meaningful and present an account of what might be called existential meaningfulness. The account is neutral with respect to both theism and naturalism, but each is addressed in several places and the papers main points are harmonious with certain versions of both. A number of important criteria for existential meaningfulness are examined, and special emphasis is placed on criteria centering on creativity and excellence, on contributing to the well-being of persons, and on human relationships, particularly those pervaded by love. In the light of a conception of intrinsic goodness, the good life is compared with the meaningful life, and the relation between the two notions is explored. I argue that goodness in a life counts towards its meaningfulness and that the goodness of a life is sufficient for an important kind of meaningfulness. I also suggest that the overall notion of rewarding elements in a life-intrinsically good elements that are typically but not necessarily pleasurable-is a significant unifying concept that helps both in understanding existential meaningfulness and in integrating the various kinds of constituents in a life that conduce to its meaningfulness.

FAITH, BELIEF, AND RATIONALITY

Faith and reason are often taken to need reconciliation. They are viewed as not only contrasting, but also competing. The opposition is often seen as a tension between the spiritual and the rational, or between religion and science. I shall argue that, different though they are, faith and reason need not be put on opposing sides in human life. But there is a second mistake that concerns me even more. It is the attempt to reconcile faith and reason by assimilating faith, or at least the kind of faith regarded as consonant with reason, to rational belief. If this assimilation is a mistake, it is an important one. For if faith, or at least religious faith, is not reducible to a kind of belief, then the rationality of religious faith need not be decided on the basis of an account of rational belief. It may be, of course, that the relevant kinds of religious belief are rational and can be shown to be so. But I want to explore the possibility that faith, as a central element in religious commitment, can be rational even if theistic beliefs with the same content should turn out not to be. In doing this, I will distinguish between faith and belief in a way others have generally not done.1

Moderate Intuitionism and the Epistemology of Moral Judgment

This paper outlines and defends a moderate intuitionism. The point of departure is the intuitionism of W. D. Ross (1930) in The Right and the Good, conceived as ethically pluralist and epistemologically rationalist. The paper articulates a conception of self-evidence – including mediate as well as immediate kinds – appropriate to a moderate intuitionism, explores some of the resources and varieties of that position, and considers some problems and prospects for a rationalist version of intuitionism. The final section addresses the issue of how best to conceive the nature and grounds of prima facie duty, the problem of whether intuitionism can adequately deal with conflicts of prima facie duties, and the question of how satisfactorily a moderate intuitionism can account for the epistemic status of moral judgments of overall duty and their connection with rational action.

Foundationalism, epistemic dependence, and defeasibility

This paper is an examination of modest foundationalism in relation to some important criteria of epistemic dependence. The paper distinguishes between causal and epistemic dependence and indicates how each might be related to reasons. Four kinds of reasons are also distinguished: reasons to believe, reasons one has for believing, reasons for which one believes, and reasons why one believes. In the light of all these distinctions, epistemic dependence is contrasted with defeasibility, and it is argued that modest foundationalism is not committed to criteria of epistemic dependence on which foundational beliefs are indefeasible. Modest foundationalism is contrasted with coherentism and is shown to be hospitable to a causal criterion of epistemic dependence, compatible with reliabilism, and neutral with respect to skepticism.

The ethics of belief: doxastic self-control and intellectual virtue

Most of the literature on doxastic voluntarism has concentrated on the question of the voluntariness of belief and the issue of how our actual or possible control of our beliefs bears on our justification for holding them and on how, in the light of this control, our intellectual character should be assessed. This paper largely concerns a related question on which less philosophical work has been done: the voluntariness of the grounding of belief and the bearing of various views about this matter on justification, knowledge, and intellectual virtue. In part, my concern is the nature and extent of our voluntary control over our responses to reasons for believing—or over what we take to be such reasons. This paper provides a partial account of such control and, on the basis of the account, will clarify the criteria for appraising intellectual virtue.