Robert Ayson

The 'arc of instability' and Australia's strategic policy

The proposition that Australia faces an ‘arc of instability’ to its north has been an important feature of the Australian strategic debate in the early twenty-first century. Prompted by worries in the late 1990s over Indonesias future and East Timors uncertain path to independence, the ‘arc’ metaphor also encapsulated growing Australian concerns about the political cohesiveness of Melanesian polities, including Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands. While tending to overlook the divergent experiences of countries within its expanding boundaries, the ‘arc’ fed from Australias historical requirement for a secure archipelagic screen. As such it has became an important weapon in the debate over whether the locus of Australias strategic priorities should be increasingly global in the ‘war on terror’ period or remain closer to home in the immediate region. The ‘arc of instability’ metaphor was consequently adopted by leading Australian Labor Party politicians to argue that the Howard Coalition government was neglecting South Pacific security challenges. It became less prominent following the Howard governments greater activism in the South Pacific, signalled by Australias leadership of the East Timor intervention in 2003. But its prominence returned in 2006 with the unrest in both Honiara and Dili. In overall terms, the ‘arc of instability’ discussion has helped direct Australian strategic and political attention to the immediate neighbourhood. But it has not provided specific policy guidance on what should be done to address the instabilities it includes.

After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects

It is just possible that a terrorist nuclear attack could catalyze an inter-state nuclear war. The likelihood of a terrorist group gaining access to nuclear weapons is lower than some fear, and terrorists might not use a nuclear weapon as soon as they had acquired one. But if a terrorist group was to explode a nuclear device in a country that was itself armed with nuclear weapons, and especially if that country was in a conflict-prone relationship with another nuclear-armed state, the broader consequences of even a single terrorist nuclear detonation could be much more serious than some assume.

Regional Stability in the Asia-Pacific: Towards a Conceptual Understanding

Abstract This article evaluates regional stability as a concept for Asia-Pacific security analysis. Stability can be viewed as a systems tendency towards equilibrium, including its ability to find a new equilibrium in changing conditions. This approach is reflected in five types of Asia-Pacific stability - the avoidance of major war, the stability of the distribution of power, the stability of institutions and norms, political stability within countries, and economic stability. While all of these factors constitute stability in the Asia-Pacific, it is not clear that any of them constitute the stability of the Asia-Pacific region as a coherent unit of analysis.

Attacking North Korea: Why War Might Be Preferred

An air of complacency surrounds the continuing nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Many analysts assert that the chances of a second Korean War erupting are small, barring a serious act of miscalculation or misadventure on the part of Pyongyang. This paper confirms that there is indeed a range of important reasons why the United States would not wish to initiate hostilities on the peninsula in the short to medium term. However it also finds that the case that US policymakers could, over time, build for a deliberate and very major attack on North Korea is actually more comprehensive and its logic more robust than is commonly acknowledged. While it is easy for analysts to continue to regard the attack option as both unlikely and irrational, therefore, this paper concludes that the prospect of a US-led war against North Korea is one that still ought to be taken seriously.

Management, Abolition and Nullification: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Strategies in the 21st Century

As the 21st century opens, the international community must choose how to address the continuing challenges posed by nuclear proliferation. Roughly speaking, there are three main strategies available for tackling these challenges. The first of these is the “management” strategy, which relies upon arms control as its main instrument, including the international nonproliferation regime built around the 1968 Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The second is the “abolition” strategy, which sees the control of nuclear proliferation as a step down the road towards complete nuclear disarmament, an approach that emphasizes the commitment to that end contained in Article VI of the NPT. The third is the “nullification” strategy that advocates military counter-measures, such as missile defense systems, to cancel out the capabilities and threats that arise from proliferation.

Asia's Diplomacy of Violence: China–US Coercion and Regional Order

Military coercion has already changed the Asia-Pacific region.

Arms control in Asia: yesterday's concept for today's region?

Even if the international mood in favour of steep US and Russian nuclear cuts was to last, it is unlikely to spread to Asia, where nuclear arsenals remain comparatively modest and where regional allies rely on Washington for extended deterrence. This does not render nuclear arms control irrelevant in Asia, where there is a modest but significant tradition based on informal and unilateral restraint rather than formal agreement. But as more of Asias nuclear programs have come out of the closet and as great power relationships intensify, the region needs to look nuclear arms control more squarely in the eye. For arms control to have real purchase in tomorrows Asia, China and the USA will need to look beyond their currently asymmetrical relationship and find an understanding based on increased nuclear transparency which also restrains their potentially escalatory competition in advanced conventional war-fighting abilities.

Missile Strategy in a Post-Nuclear Age

Abstract While the arrival of nuclear weapons coincided roughly with the development of short, medium, intermediate, and eventually intercontinental missiles, the contribution of missile technology to the deterrence equation is often lost. If nuclear weapons were eliminated, even new generation missiles with conventional payloads could struggle to render effective deterrence. But some of the physical and psychological effects commonly ascribed to nuclear weapons could still be in play. And in a world without nuclear weapons, thinking about the use and control of force from the nuclear age would also deserve renewed attention.

Can a Sino-Japanese War Be Controlled?

In a crisis, a limited exchange of fire could escalate into a wider conflict. We have no precedent to suggest how dangerous it might become.

Australia's defense policy: medium power, even bigger ambitions?

Abstract Australian defense policy suggests a case where strategic ambitions exceed the countrys direct security needs. But there are some peculiar reasons for this state of affairs. These include the relationship between the size of the Australian continent and its proximity to maritime Asia; Australias sense of itself as a medium power with a strong interest in the future of the wider regional strategic balance; and the long-standing judgment that Australia needs a capacity for independent military action in its own area because even its closest allies cannot always be expected to help out. The Rudd governments 2009 Defence White Paper, the first such document in nearly a decade, confirms this pattern of thinking. In particular it reflects Australias interest in not falling behind the defense modernization in the wider region of strong and rising powers (including, but by no means limited to, China). It helps return a sense of coherence to Australian policy which went missing in the post-9/11 era. B...