William T. Tow

What is Asian security architecture

‘Architecture’ has emerged as the new catchphrase in Asian security politics. Despite its growing centrality, insufficient attention has thus far been given to defining the term, often leading to its imprecise usage. This article seeks to redress that shortcoming. It reviews the ways in which various scholars and practitioners have employed the term ‘security architecture’ and highlights the anomalies that their often differing employment has created. The article proposes a set of guidelines to aid conceptualisation and application of the term. In so doing it establishes criteria to ascertain what ‘security architecture’ actually exists in the Asian region, and must ultimately exist to assure regional security.

Sino-American Relations and the Australian Factor: Inflated Expectations or Discriminate Engagement?

Orchestrating relations between its American security ally and increasingly crucial Chinese trading partner constitutes perhaps the major foreign policy challenge now confronting Australia. The Howard government insists that it can pursue such diplomacy without having to choose between the US and China in the event of a future great power regional confrontation. Both Washington and Beijing, however, appear intent on pulling Australia into their own orbits of influence. This article contends that neither of them will be content to allow Australia to apply a ‘discriminate engagement’ policy toward their own regional interests if Sino–American strategic competition intensifies over Taiwan or throughout the Asia–Pacific region. It reviews Chinese and American strategic expectations regarding Australia and their response to that countrys relations with the other, and outlines growing policy imperatives that Australia must confront in order to overcome current anomalies in its ‘dual strategy’ directed toward China and the United States.

Deputy sheriff or independent ally? Evolving Australian–American ties in an ambiguous world order

The policies of Australia’s current government have been so close to the United States as to invite comparisons to an Australian ‘deputy sheriff’ executing the interests and policies of a US global marshal. Advocates of the ANZUS alliance disagree, citing the immense politico-strategic benefits Australia extracts from that relationship and insisting that ANZUS objectives are commensurate with a stable and just world order. Recent developments in international security politics such as the Iraq conflict and the persistence of global terrorism may now challenge that proposition and test the Australian electorate’s future support for the American alliance. A greater determination by Australia to cultivate a more balanced approach to alliance politics will underwrite its national security interests more effectively than a sustained and rigid adherence to alliance loyalty under any circumstances.

Contending Security Approaches in the Asia-Pacific Region

The author would like to thank Chris Leithner, Douglas T. Stuart, and Joanne Wright for their comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this article. Karen Davis and Alison Kessels extended invaluable logistical support.

Northeast Asia and international security: Transforming competition to collaboration

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The Anzus Dispute: Testing U.S. Extended Deterrence in Alliance Politics

Thirty-five years after its founding in San Francisco during September 1951, the ANZUS alliance (composed of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States) has become the latest victim in the steady dissolution of Washingtons postwar collective defense framework. Formed as part of the settlement between Pacific nations that led to a peace treaty with Japan ending World War II, ANZUS signified both Australias and New Zealands acknowledgment of their dependence on Washington to underwrite their own security. From Washingtons perspective, ANZUS was designed to serve as part of its global network of extended deterrence against Soviet military power stretching beyond Eastern Europe and the Peoples Republic of China into the outer maritime reaches of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Requisite military intelligence and logistical arrangements such as the RadfordCollins Agreement (formulated soon after the ANZUS Treaty itself), moreover, gave both the Australians and the New Zealanders at least a symbolic role in the planning and implementing of western maritime strategy in the Southwest Pacific. I

Guest Editor's Forward

‘Time waits for no man’*/and for no country! This is obvious in the contemporary Asia-Pacific. China’s spectacular economic performance and growing military power is presenting its regional neighbours with epic challenges in managing their trade and shaping their geopolitics. Australia and Japan*/two long-established developed states*/are increasingly preoccupied with responding to a ‘China growing strong’. In adjusting to China’s rise, they are visibly struggling to sustain and support their bilateral ties, which have been among the most successful in the region throughout the post-war era. In a recent (November 2009) poll taken for the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 57 percent of those Australians surveyed had low or only moderately positive feelings about Japan, compared to 60 percent feeling Japan was a ‘reliable friend’ and only 10 percent with negative feelings toward Japan in a 2006 poll (Wurth 2010). The Cabinet Office in Japan reported that its October 2009 survey of the Japanese public revealed that only half of the Japanese populace expressed ‘warm feelings’ toward Australia, down from 67.7 percent in a similar October 2007 poll; cool or cold feelings intensified from 20.8 percent in 2007 to 40.3 percent in 2009 (Cook 2010). In July 2010, Japan’s Ambassador to Australia observed that the two countries’ strategic relationship is ‘at the crossroads’ (Kojima 2010). Why two regional maritime powers with traditionally complementary economies and well-matched strategic interests should reach such a stage is puzzling. Some of these shifts could be explained by short-term differences. The acrimonious debate over Japan’s whaling practices is illustrative. That country’s determination to continue its ‘scientific research’ whaling program in Antarctic waters prompted Australia to take it to the International Court of Justice in May 2010 (Hasegawa 2010). Negotiations over a proposed Australia Japan free trade agreement have been stalled by what Australia views as Japan’s inflexibility in easing agricultural protectionism. The Rudd government also clearly irritated its Japanese counterpart by the prime minister’s initial visit to Asia including China but not Japan, and by its perceived indifference to Japanese efforts in the nuclear non-proliferation diplomatic arena (Cook 2010; Shanahan 2010). It is clear, however, that the fundamental economic and strategic interests the two countries share still outweigh their differences. Japan was Australia’s largest export market for four decades (only recently surpassed by China) and still generates Australia’s largest trade surplus. As recently as the late 1980s (just before Japan’s ‘economic bubble’ burst, leading to that country’s economic stagnation), Australian exports to Japan were valued at A

Rules of engagement: America's Asia-Pacific security policy under an Obama administration

13 billion, or more than twice the value of our second-most important market, Britain (Salt 2010). Japan remains the third largest foreign investor in Australia (after the United

The utility of the human security agenda for policy‐makers

The United States’ strategy in the Asia-Pacific stands at a historic juncture. How the new Obama administration conceives and implements its Asia-Pacific policy during its first term of office will have major and enduring ramifications for Americas future. The new administration must have a clear vision of its countrys national security interests in the Asia-Pacific as well as a better appreciation of the evolving dynamics of the region. To this end, it should continue to underwrite its bilateral security commitments, albeit through a less threat-centric lens, and be more cognisant of the regions multilateral overtures by further anchoring US participation in regional multilateral institutions. This shift from a position of bilateral primacy to one of engaged bilateral and multilateral partnership—a ‘convergent security’ approach—is the best strategy for Washington to advance its strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific.

Asia‐Pacific security regimes: Conditions and constraints

The idea of “human security” is gaining attention among policy‐makers and security analysts. Little scholarly attention has been given to the questions of why states accept (or reject) a human security agenda or how such an agenda is incorporated into policy practices. The article suggests that a human security approach is most likely to be applied when both humanitarian and national interests combine. Yet when states or organisations adopt a human security approach, they often misjudge the complex and long‐term commitment required of such an approach. There is also the potential for such an agenda to be manipulated to justify questionable courses of action. These issues frame an analysis of six recent case studies.