Robert B. Ekelund

Smoking and absenteeism

Studies of the causes of absence from work tend to indicate uniformly that smokers miss more work than non-smokers. Some estimates of this increased smoker absenteeism range as high as 32%, or about 81 million additional lost days of work per year in the US alone. Unfortunately these studies, in the main, employ only a simple means difference test as a statistical basis for their deductions, and hence are incapable of determining whether smokers miss more work because they smoke or for other reasons common to smokers as a group. In this study, we posit a native model of absenteeism and employ Tobit analysis to estimate its response to various determinants using data from the 1968 PSID. We than empoly a Blinder-type decomposition technique to attempt to determine the amount of absenteeism attributable directly or indirectly to smoking behaviour of workers. Our results suggest that smokers miss no more work than non-smokers because they smoke. Rather smokers tend to be younger, heavier drinkers, blue collar...

The medieval church and rents from marriage market regulations

This paper addresses the medieval Roman Catholic Churchs attempts to monopolize the marriage market and to wrest control over the institution from secular authority. In particular, the paper highlights specific doctrinal innovations and evolving rules and regulations. Rules surrounding endogamy, the definition of a valid marriages, and the escape clauses established by the Church are the principal features of the argument as is the place of these manipulations in the overall monopoly of the Church.

Marginal Deterrence and Multiple Murders

This paper examines empirically the state-level impact of capital punishment on multiple murder rates for the period 1995–1999. In baseline tests—tests employing mixed panel data and using an estimation technique combining aspects of both fixed- and random-effects models—we show that executions reduce the single murder rate and that the use of electrocution reduces the murder rate beyond that resulting from lethal injection. These results are not unique. The unique finding of our analysis is that multiple murders are not deterred by execution in any form, quite possibly because the marginal cost of murders after the first is approximately zero. Finally, we offer a brief historical analysis of how the principle of marginal deterrence has been used and suggest how it might be applied in the matter of multiple murders.

Methodenstreit: The economics of competing interests

Abstract The Methodenstreit between the Austrian School and the German Historical School was a famous controversy of nineteenth century economics. This paper argues and presents evidence to the effect that this debate was spurred by interest-group concerns. In essence, Austrian economists were trying to enter the German academic cartel managed by Schmoller.

SCHUMPETERIAN ANALYSIS, SUPPLY-SIDE ECONOMICS AND MACROECONOMIC POLICY IN THE 1920S*

Economists who are passionately determined not to admit that policies answering to their social and moral vision, particularly fiscal policies of anticapitalist tendency, can possibly interfere with the working of the economic system, will no doubt hold that there was mere chance coincidence between that sociopolitical pattern and the economic results achieved in this country during the twenties, and between the different setup and the different results in England or Germany … we cannot, however, neglect the possible inference to the contrary. [J.S.Schumpeter, 1939, p. 289]

A note on politics and franchise bidding

ConclusionTo sum up, one problem posed by critics of franchise bidding is that the unfavorable political participation associated with the present system of regulation would only be accentuated under a franchise scheme. However, we have argued to the contrary that under a franchising scheme political interest could be particularized at the local level. Restricting the franchising bodys influence to a specific utility serving a local area decreases monetary cost and increases the incentive of the local regulator to act in the interest of the local constituency. Market forces then would be more active in policing both the franchising body and the firm providing the services.

Railroads, engineers, and the developement of spatial economics in France

This articles traces a little-known French tradition in spatial economics that was advanced by state engineers who were trained at the Ecole des Ponts et Chaussees and worked for the State Corps engineers. Spurred in part by changes in power technology, especially the advent of the railroad, these engineers pioneered the spatial aspects of competition in a macroeconomic framework. The contribution of Jules Dupuit (1804 - 1866) and Emile Cheysson (1836 - 1910) are especially singled out for analysis, and are shown to have anticipated later important developments in spatial economic theory.

Marriage, Divorce and Prostitution: Economicc Sociology in Medieval England and Enlightenment Spain

“Marriage, Divorce and Prostitution: Economicc Sociology in Medieval England and Enlightenment Spain” by Robert B. Ekelund,Jr., Donald R. Street and Audrey B. Davidson. This paper studies the medieval insititutions of marriage, divorce and prostitution through the prism of the economic sociology and rent-seeking behaviour on the part of the medieval Roman Catholic Church. Regulation by Church or state-Particular prohibitions and regulation of recontracting – created costly alternatives and substitutes for low-cost recontracting of marriage vows. In addition to a brief survey of the instititional situation in medieval England, we bring to light the economic sociology of the Spaniard Francisco de Cabarrus relating to the marriage market and marital utitlity. Indirectly we suggest that exogenous restrictions in marriage markeers create unappropriated costs and the impetus for change in social institutions over time over time.