Robert C. Luskin

Measuring Political Sophistication

ion A second and generally preferable approach capitalizes on the relationship between constraint and abstraction. Constraint, in large degree, is abstraction. Hence by gauging a persons use of abstractions-either how abstract they are or how heavily used-we can gauge his or her This content downloaded from 207.46.13.172 on Tue, 23 Aug 2016 06:12:09 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms MEASURING POLITICAL SOPHISTICATION 877 constraint. Size and range, through correlation with constraint, follow

Explaining political sophistication

Debates over the political sophistication of mass publics smolder on. The more fundamental question, however, is why people become as politically sophisticated or unsophisticated as they do. This paper develops a nonlinear simultaneous equation model to weigh explanations of three general sorts: the politicalinformation to which people are exposed, theirability to assimilate and organize such information, and theirmotivation to do so. The estimates suggest that interest and intelligence, representing motivation and ability, have major effects, but that education and media exposure, the big informational variables, do not. I consider the reasons and sketch some implications for the sophistication of mass publics, for the study of sophistication and other “variables of extent,” and for democratic theory.

Considered Opinions: Deliberative Polling in Britain

This article presents the results of the first Deliberative Poll, in which a national British sample discussed the issue of rising crime and what to do about it. We describe Deliberative Polling and its rationale, the representativeness of the deliberative sample, the extent to which the participants acquired factual information about the issue and about politics generally, and how much and how they changed their views. We also weigh the extent to which such changes of view hinge on small group influences versus information gains.

''Don't Know'' Means ''Don't Know'': DK Responses and the Public's Level of Political Knowledge

Does the public know much more about politics than conventionally thought? A number of studies have recently argued, on various grounds, that the ‘‘don’t know’’ (DK) and incorrect responses to traditionally designed and scored survey knowledge items conceal a good deal of knowledge. This paper examines these claims, focusing on the prominent and influential argument that discouraging DKs would reveal a substantially more knowledgeable public. Using two experimental surveys with national random samples, we show that discouraging DKs does little to affect our picture of how much the public knows about politics. For closed-ended items, the increase in correct responses is large but mainly illusory. For open-ended items, it is genuine but minor. We close by examining the other recent evidence for a substantially more knowledgeable public, showing that it too holds little water.

Deliberative Democracy in an Unlikely Place: Deliberative Polling in China

Talk of democratic reform sometimes focuses on talk. The aspiration of ‘deliberative democracy’ is for the mass public to influence policy making through public discussion. The common presumption is that this is an advanced version of democracy, possible only in established democracies. Even there, there are doubts. Some contend that ordinary citizens cannot deal with complex policy issues, others that their deliberations will be distorted by gender or class inequalities, and yet others that they will be ineluctably polarizing. In less fully democratic societies like China’s, the prospects may seem slimmer.

Where Is the Schema? Going Beyond the “S” Word in Political Psychology

Schema theory has established wide currency today among scholars who study political attitudes, beliefs, values, recollections, or other perceptions and orientations that citizens may exhibit. How much does schema conceptualization actually contribute to understanding political behavior and attitudes? How much potential does schema theory have for future contributions? We address these questions, arguing for a more satisfying political psychology than is offered by research emanating from schema conceptualizations.

Deliberation, Single-Peakedness, and the Possibility of Meaningful Democracy: Evidence from Deliberative Polls

Majority cycling and related social choice paradoxes are often thought to threaten the meaningfulness of democracy. Deliberation can protect against majority cycles—not by inducing unanimity, which is unrealistic, but by bringing preferences closer to single-peakedness. We present the first empirical test of this hypothesis, using data from Deliberative Polls. Comparing preferences before and after deliberation, we find increases in proximity to single-peakedness. The increases are greater for lower- versus higher-salience issues and for individuals who seem to have deliberated more versus less effectively. They are not merely a by-product of increased substantive agreement (which in fact does not generally increase). Our results are important, quite apart from their implications for majority cycling, because single-peakedness can be naturally interpreted in terms of an underlying issue dimension, which can both clarify the debate and allow a majority-winning alternative to be interpreted as a median choice and thus as an attractive “compromise.”

Simple Explanations of Turnout Decline

Several recent studies have claimed to explain the post-1960 decline in U.S. presidential and congressional election turnout in terms of just a few variables. Abramson and Aldrich (1982) attribute the great bulk of the decline to aggregate declines in partisanship and political efficacy. Shaffer (1981) attributes still more of the decline to aggregate decreases in these same two variables plus age and following the campaign in the newspapers. And Kleppner (1982) attributes “virtually all” of the decline to aggregate decreases in the first three of these variables. We show how these studies measure explanation too generously and how the very short-handedness of their models makes them seem more successful than they are. These few variables, we conclude, leave most of the decline unexplained.

Abusus Non Tollit Usum: Standardized Coefficients, Correlations, and R 2 s

In a withering critique of statistical praxis, Gary King (1986) has recently warned modelers off standardized regression coefficients, bivariate correlations, and coefficients of determination (R2s). Without denying that these particular statistics are frequently abused (and without taking issue with any of Kings other admonitions), I want to argue here that they are not therefore useless-and, in the process, to sketch their legitimate uses.

Deliberating Across Deep Divides

Deeply divided societies would seem to be infertile ground for mass deliberation. ‘Enclave deliberation’, among people on the same side, may well occur. But people on opposing sides may not trust one another, they may not listen with an open mind, or they may regard the other sides arguments as insincere cover for sectional interests. Perhaps, though, we underestimate their deliberative capacities? This article examines a deliberative poll (DP) in the Omagh area of Northern Ireland, a society having only recently emerged from protracted violence, reflecting and reinforcing the deep divide between Catholics and Protestants. The topic – the future of the local schools – was one on which many of the issues were heavily impinged by the Catholic–Protestant divide. We examine the extent to which a representative sample, including both Catholics and Protestants, was able to deliberate constructively and how the experience changed their policy attitudes and their opinions of one another.